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Emergent Emotion: THESIS SUMMARY 
 
I argue that emotion is an ontologically emergent and sui generis. I argue that emotion 
meets both of two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for 
ontological emergence. These are, (i) that emotion necessarily has constituent parts to 
which it cannot be reduced, and (ii) that emotion has a causal effect on its constituent 
parts (i.e. emotion demonstrates downward causation).  
 
I argue that emotion is partly cognitive, partly constituted by feelings and partly 
perceptual. 1) I argue that both the type and the intensity of an emotion supervene on 
cognitive factors. But emotion cannot be reduced to cognition because emotions are 
paradigmatically valenced and cognitions are not. 2) I argue that the phenomenal 
properties of emotion are determined by bodily feelings, thus emotion necessarily 
requires feelings. But emotion cannot be reduced to feelings because emotion has 
rational properties not held by bodily feelings. 3) I argue that the intentional objects of 
emotion are perceptual objects, and hence emotion necessarily requires perception. But 
emotion cannot be reduced to perception because emotion has second orders (as 
evidenced by metaemotion) and perception does not. Thus emotion meets the first 
necessary condition for ontological emergence; emotion has constituent parts to which it 
cannot be reduced. 
 
I go on to argue that emotion has a causal effect on its 4) cognitive, 5) feeling, and 6) 
perceptual parts, both as a faculty and at the level of the individual emotion.  
 
Emotion meets the two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for 
ontological emergence: (i) emotion has composite parts to which it cannot be reduced, 
and (ii) emotion has a causal effect on its composite parts. Thus emotion is 
ontologically emergent. Being ontologically emergent, emotion is sui generis.  
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Introduction:	  
 
In an article in The Guardian1, Oliver Burkeman claimed that researchers and experts on 
emotion have, for many years, been hiding a secret. “They don’t discuss it in 
interviews,” he writes. “But get chatting to a psychologist on his or her third whiskey, at 
a lonely bar on the outskirts of town near closing time, and you might finally hear the 
truth.” The truth, according to Burkeman, “is that no one really has a damned clue what 
an emotion is”.  
 
One of the problems in finding the answer to the persistent mystery of emotion is that 
science, with all of its specialisms, seems ill equipped to provide a coherent answer. 
Neurology and biochemistry can tell us what happens in the brain and the body when 
we experience emotion; psychology can tell us what happens in the mind; sociology can 
tell us what happens in society as a consequence. But ultimately each specialism holds 
only part of the answer. The bigger picture gets lost in its pixilation, so to speak. This is 
because, in essence, the question “what is an emotion” is a philosophical question, 
requiring a philosophical answer. The aim of this thesis is to provide such an answer. 2 I 
will argue that emotions are ontologically emergent and sui generis. On my view, 
humans are best understood as possessing, in addition to our cognitive and perceptual 
faculties, a complex faculty of emotion which blends together thoughts, feelings, and 
perceptions. My view contrasts with three main types of rival view: those according to 
which emotions can be reduced to cognitions; those according to which emotions can be 
reduced to feelings; and those according to which emotions can be reduced to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Oliver	  Burkeman	  14.08.2015	  “What	  is	  an	  emotion?”	  in	  the	  Guardian	  online:	  http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/aug/14/oliver-­‐burkeman-­‐what-­‐exactly-­‐is-­‐an-­‐2	  My	   concern	   throughout	   this	   thesis	   lies	   solely	   with	   occurrent	   emotion;	   I	   make	   no	   commitment	  with	  regard	  to	  moods	  or	  dispositional	  emotion.	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perceptions. I argue against each in the course of articulating and defending my own, 
novel view. 
 
In the remainder of this introduction, I provide a brief explanation of ontological 
emergence, which is central to my view. I explain that there are two individually 
necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions which emotion must meet if it is to be 
considered ontologically emergent: (1) emotion must have constituent parts to which it 
cannot be reduced; and (2) emotion must have a causal effect on those constituent parts. 
I go on to provide a summary of my thesis, which is formed of two parts, each one 
dealing with one of the two necessary conditions. In Part I, I argue that emotion is 
constituted by cognitions, feelings and perceptions, but that it cannot be reduced to any 
one of these. In Part II, I argue that emotion has a causal effect on its constituent parts. 
 
  
Ontological	  Emergence:	  a	  short	  introduction 
 
Emergence theory is concerned with ways in which complex systems3 might be 
explained. By definition, complex systems have mereological4 parts on which they 
supervene 5  – otherwise they would be simple rather than complex. However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘complex	  system’	  as	  a	  catch-­‐all	  to	  denote	  complex	  biological	  phenomena	  as	  well	  as	  non-­‐biological	  complex	  compounds,	  structures	  or	  arrangements.	  	  4	  Mereological	  parts	  might	  roughly	  be	  described	  as	  intrinsic	  composite	  parts	  of	  a	  whole.	  For	  example	  the	  tines	  and	  the	  handle	  are	  mereological	  parts	  of	  the	  fork.	  For	  more	  on	  mereology	  see	  Varzi	  (2015).	  	  5	  Supervenience	   is	   a	   dependence	   relation	   which	   describes	   how	   the	   higher-­‐level	   properties	   of	   a	  system	  necessarily	  depend	  on	  its	  lower-­‐level	  properties.	  If	  we	  call	  the	  higher-­‐level	  properties	  of	  a	  system	  ‘H’	  properties	  and	  we	  call	  the	  lower-­‐level	  properties	  of	  that	  system	  ‘L’	  properties	  then	  the	  supervenience	   relationship	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   follows:	   H-­‐properties	   supervene	   on	   L-­‐properties	   if	  and	  only	   if	  anything	  that	  has	  some	  H-­‐property	  necessarily	  has	  some	  L-­‐property,	  such	  that	  having	  that	   L-­‐property	   guarantees	   having	   that	   H-­‐property.	   For	   example,	   a	   person’s	   discernible	  characteristics	  such	  as	  the	  colour	  of	  their	  eyes	  (an	  H-­‐property)	  supervenes	  on	  that	  person’s	  genetic	  makeup	  (an	  L-­‐property).	  In	  our	  world	  it	   is	  a	  matter	  of	  nomological	  necessity	  that	  a	  person	  with	  a	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philosophical controversy exists as to whether a complex system can be described as 
being merely the aggregation of its parts (and therefore explainable solely in terms of 
those parts) or whether the emergent system can be said to be different in kind from the 
parts on which it supervenes; i.e. whether the emergent system can be characterised as a 
metaphysically new phenomenon. Metaphysical claims of this kind can be difficult to 
substantiate, and so ontological emergence remains controversial.  
 
An example may help to clarify. Sodium (Na) molecules and chlorine (Cl) molecules 
combine, in a 1:1 ratio, to form sodium chloride (NaCl), or table salt. Table salt has 
qualitatively different properties from those of its constituent parts. For instance, 
sodium is a soft silvery metal, which oxidises (loses electrons) under standard 
conditions of temperature and pressure unless it is immersed in oil. Under the same 
standard conditions, chlorine is a gas. These two chemical elements combine to form 
table salt, which is a crystalline mineral. The question that emergence theory addresses 
is whether table salt should be characterised merely as a combination of sodium and 
chloride (i.e. merely an aggregation of its parts); or whether it should be characterised 
as different in kind from its parts, and therefore as something metaphysically new.    
 
Some theorists6 hold the position that complex systems are merely the aggregation of 
their parts and thus can be characterised ontologically by appeal to those parts. Others7 
hold that the property differences between a complex system and its parts is evidence of 
a difference in kind between the emergent system and the parts on which it supervenes. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  particular	   eye	   colour	  necessarily	  has	   a	  particular	   chromosomal	  makeup,	   such	   that	   a	  person	  with	  that	  chromosomal	  makeup	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  have	  that	  eye	  colour.	  For	  more	  on	  ‘Supervenience’	  see	  McLaughlin	  and	  Bennett	  (2014).	  6	  See	  Bedau	  (1997),	  Kim	  (2006).	  7	  See	  Davies	  (2006),	  O’Connor	  (1994,	  2000),	  O’Connor	  &	  Jacobs	  (2003),	  O’Connor	  &	  Wong	  (2015),	  Van	  Gulick	  (2001).	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On this latter view, for instance, the property differences between salt (a crystalline 
mineral), and its sodium (a soft metal) and chlorine (a gas) constituents, constitutes 
evidence that salt is an emergent compound. On this view, if there is a difference in 
kind between salt and its constituents then our ontological commitments ought to reflect 
that difference.  
 
The reductionist position, however, argues that property difference is not sufficient for 
ontological emergence. For instance, Jaegwon Kim (2006) argues that if property 
difference were sufficient then too many properties would count as emergent; “this 
object on my desk has the property of being a ballpoint pen, although none of its parts 
are ballpoint pens; the brick I am holding is hefty, although none of its molecular parts 
are hefty, and so on” (Kim 2006, p.192). Indeed, both Kim and Mark Bedau (1997) treat 
the notion that an emergent system can ever be ‘more than the sum of its parts’ as 
deeply problematic. Bedau suggests that such a claim “is uncomfortably like magic” 
(1997, p.377). He questions how complex systems that arise from the aggregation of 
parts could be characterised as anything more than mere aggregations. On his view if 
one had access to all of the information about the systems composite parts, as well as 
the laws underlying their interaction, one could theoretically predict the emergent 
properties of a complex system. In practice, such predictions are limited by our 
knowledge, and so it is only through simulation that emergent properties become 
known. Given this, such emergent properties may be said to be epistemically emergent 
but that does not entitle one to claim that they are ontologically emergent.  
 
Epistemic emergence (also known as ‘weak emergence’) is, therefore, a weaker thesis 
than ontological emergence (also known as ‘strong emergence’). It recognises that a 
	   13	  
complex system can have qualitatively different properties from the properties of its 
mereological parts. It also recognises that, as a result of those differences, one cannot 
predict the emergent system’s properties in advance; one cannot predict its properties 
based purely on the properties of its constituents. But it denies that this indicates a 
difference in kind, and thus maintains that no further ontological commitment is 
required beyond characterising the complex system as an aggregation of its parts. 
 
In order for an emergent system to claim a difference in kind, it must demonstrate a 
causal effect that could not be ascribed to its constituents. For instance, salt has a 
corrosive effect on metal. On the epistemic emergence view, this effect might be 
explained as being due to the effect of the constituents of salt (corrosion might be due to 
the effects of sodium or chlorine), in which case one need not commit to the view that 
salt is ontologically emergent. On this view, the only way one could plausibly claim that 
an emergent system is ontologically emergent, is if that system can be shown to have a 
causal effect on its mereological parts. If the emergent system has a causal effect on its 
constituents, then the effect cannot be said to be due to those constituents. This is 
because each constituent would not have a causal effect on itself; and the effect of 
individual parts on each other is already demonstrated as yielding the emergent 
phenomenon. For instance, sodium has no causal effect on sodium (ditto for chlorine), 
and the causal effect of interaction between sodium and chlorine is the formation of salt.  
 
If an emergent system has a causal effect on its constituents, it must be due to the 
emergent system being somehow ‘more than’ merely the aggregation of its parts. This 
notion of a system having a casual effect on its mereological parts is known as 
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‘downward causation’, and for the reasons described, it is the sine qua non of 
ontological emergence.  
 
Putting all of this together I am now in a position to describe the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a claim of ontological emergence. A system can be said to be 
ontologically emergent if and only if it demonstrates the following individually 
necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions: 
1. The emergent system is composed of parts to which it cannot be reduced. 
2. The emergent system demonstrates downward causation. 
 
In this thesis I will argue that emotion meets the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
ontological emergence. 
 
	  
Part	  I	  Summary:	  	  
 
In Chapter 1 I argue that emotion is partly cognitive, but that it cannot be reduced to 
cognition. The chapter is composed of three parts. First (§1.1), I argue that the type and 
intensity of emotion are partly determined by cognition. Hence, emotion is partly 
cognitive. I defend my position against four potential challenges; a challenge from the 
passivity of emotion; a perceptualist challenge; a challenge from recalcitrant emotion; 
and a challenge from contingency. Second (§1.2), I present a cognitivist argument for 
the reduction of emotion to cognition. Third (§1.3), I argue that cognition cannot fully 
explain emotion because emotion has at least one property not held by cognition; 
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emotions are paradigmatically valenced and cognitions are not. Thus emotion is partly 
cognitive, but it cannot be reduced to its cognitive parts.   
 
In Chapter 2 I argue that emotion is partly constituted by feelings, but that it cannot be 
reduced to feelings. First (§2.1), I argue that the phenomenal properties of emotion are 
partly determined by feelings; what it’s like to have an emotion is partly determined by 
how that emotion feels. I argue that this is an intuitive claim (reflected in the intensional 
interchangeability between ‘having’ an emotion and ‘feeling’ an emotion), and I present 
biochemical evidence which backs up this intuition. Hence, emotion is partly 
constituted by feelings. I defend my position against a challenge that feelings are no 
more than the causal effects of emotion. Second (§2.2), I present the so-called ‘feeling 
theories’ which hold that feelings are both necessary and sufficient for emotion, and 
thus emotion can be reduced to feelings. Third (§2.3), I argue that emotion has rational 
properties not held by feelings, so emotion cannot be fully explained by feelings. Thus, 
emotion is partly constituted by feelings, but it cannot be reduced to its feeling parts. 
 
In Chapter 3 I argue that emotion is partly perceptual, but that it cannot be reduced to 
perception. I argue (§3.1) that the intentionality of emotion is partly determined by 
perception; the intentional objects of emotion are perceptual objects. Hence, emotion is 
partly perceptual. I defend my position against two challenges; a challenge from 
overdetermination of the intentionality of emotion; and a challenge from absent objects. 
I then present (§3.2) a perceptualist argument for the reduction of emotion to 
perception. Finally, I argue (§3.3) that emotion cannot be reduced to perception because 
emotion has second-orders and perceptions do not; perception cannot account for the 
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second-order phenomenon of metaemotion. Thus, emotion is partly perceptual, but it 
cannot be reduced to its perceptual parts.   
 
Conclusion to Part I: On the basis of my arguments in the first three chapters I claim 
that emotion has cognitive, feeling, and perceptual parts to which it cannot be reduced. 
Thus emotion meets the first necessary condition for ontological emergence. I also 
explain the reasons why I characterise emotion as a ‘faculty’, rather than merely as a 
response to objects and events.  
 
 
Part	  II	  Summary:	  	  
 
In Chapter 4 I argue that emotion has a causal effect on cognition both at the macro-
level of the emotional faculty, and at the level of the individual emotion. At the macro-
level of the emotional faculty, I argue (§4.1) that emotion has a causal effect on decision 
making, (§4.2) that emotion is a causal factor in cognitive bias, and (§4.3) that emotion 
is a causal factor in self-deception. At the level of the individual emotion I argue that an 
emotion can be a rationalising reason for action. As rationalising reasons can be causes, 
emotion can cause action. 
 
In Chapter 5 I argue that emotion has a causal effect on how one feels both at the 
macro-level of the emotional faculty and at the level of the individual emotion. At the 
macro-level, I argue (§5.1) that emotion is a causal factor in the character of one’s life 
in terms of its happiness or unhappiness. At the level of the individual emotion, I argue 
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(§5.2) that a so-called prohibited emotion can be a causal factor in painful self-
chastisement. 
 
In Chapter 6 I argue that emotion has a causal effect on perception both at the macro-
level of the emotional faculty and at the level of individual emotion. At the macro-level 
I argue (§6.1) emotion has a causal effect on perceptual selectivity. At the level of the 
individual emotion I argue (§6.2) that an emotion can have a causal effect on higher-
order perception.    
 
Thesis Conclusion: I conclude that emotion meets the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for ontological emergence. Emotion is complex faculty in which thoughts, 
feelings and perceptions blend together; emotion has cognitive, feeling, and perceptual 
parts to which it cannot be reduced. Emotion also has a downward causal effect on its 
cognitive, feeling, and perceptual parts. As downward causation is the sine qua non of 
ontological emergence, emotion is ontologically emergent. Being ontologically 
emergent, emotion is different in kind from the faculties on which it supervenes. 
Emotion is an ontologically emergent sui generis faculty.  
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Part	  I	  	  	  
Emotion	  has	  cognitive,	  feeling,	  and	  perceptual	  mereological	  parts	  to	  which	  it	  cannot	  
be	  reduced.	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Chapter	  1:	  Emotion’s	  Cognitive	  Parts	  	  
 
In this chapter I will argue that emotion is partly cognitive, but that emotion cannot be 
reduced to cognition. I argue (§1.1) that both the type of an emotion, and its intensity, 
are determined by cognition. As such, therefore, emotion is partly cognitive. I discuss 
(§1.2) a cognitivist argument which maintains that emotion can be fully explained by, 
and therefore reduced to, cognition. I argue (§1.3) that emotion has at least one property 
that cognition does not have; paradigmatically emotions are valenced while cognitions 
are not. Thus emotion cannot be reduced to cognition. Emotion is partly cognitive, but it 
cannot be reduced to its cognitive parts. 
 
 
§1.1:	  Emotion	  is	  Partly	  Cognitive	  
 
In this section I will argue (§1.1.1) that emotion is partly cognitive; specifically, the 
type and intensity of an emotion are determined, in part, by cognition. I defend my view 
against four potential challenges, according to which (§1.1.2) emotions are higher-order 
perceptions, (§1.1.3) emotions are passive happenings, (§1.1.4) that my view cannot 
account for recalcitrant emotions, and (§1.1.5) that the relation between emotion and 
cognition is contingent rather than necessary. 
 
§1.1.1:	  Emotion	  is	  Partly	  Cognitive	  
 
Consider the following situation. Three individuals stand in exactly the same spot at the 
edge of a precipice. In this imagined scenario all external circumstances, (weather, 
wind-speed etc.) are held constant and the individuals have roughly similar visual and 
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auditory acuity. Thus the conditions are such that the three individuals have more or less 
the same perceptual stimuli available to them.  
 
In this imagined scenario all three individuals feel emotion. The first subject (S1) feels 
fear, the second subject (S2) feels exhilarated, and the third subject (S3) feels terrified. 
Thus, in this scenario we can say that S1 and S2 have different types of emotion, and 
that S1 and S3 have the same emotion-type (fear) but their emotions differ in their 
intensity. In my view any plausible theory of emotion ought to be able to provide an 
explanation both for the individual emotions experienced, as well as any differences 
between them in terms of type or intensity. 
 
Taking first the difference in emotion-type between S1 and S2. If the same intentional 
object (the precipice) instils fear in S1, and exhilaration in S2, then the differences in 
their emotional states is plausibly due to differences between the individuals. After all, 
the external factors are held constant for both, and they have roughly similar perceptual 
abilities, so if S1 and S2 experience different emotions then we cannot easily appeal to 
external factors to explain that difference. On my view the difference in emotion-type is 
best explained by appeal to subjective psychological differences between S1 and S2. If I 
am correct then emotion is partly determined by cognition. 
 
I should stress at this point that when I claim emotion is partly cognitive, I do not limit 
the cognitive part of emotion to beliefs and judgments. When cognitive differences exist 
between two individuals it is possible that there is also a disparity in their beliefs and 
judgments. But it is also possible that there is some disparity in their experiential 
histories, their memories, their ways of thinking and of reasoning, their priorities, and 
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their goals etc. Memories, thoughts, goals etc. fall under the broad umbrella of 
cognition. According to my view, therefore, a claim that emotion is partly determined 
by subjective psychological factors amounts to the claim that emotion is partly 
determined by cognition.  
 
Returning to the example: If one wishes to explain why S2 feels exhilarated while S1 
feels afraid, or vice versa, one will intuitively look for explanatory reasons; which is to 
say that one will look to psychological differences to explain the difference in their 
emotion-types. And if, for example, one were to find that S1 doesn’t like heights and 
that S2 is an avid base-jumper, one would reasonably cite these differences in one’s 
explanation for the difference in their emotion-type. It is plausible, therefore, that the 
difference in emotion-type between S1 and S2 supervenes on the kinds of psychological 
differences between S1 and S2 that I’ve described; S1 feels fear because she doesn’t 
like heights, while S2 feels exhilarated because she’s an avid base-jumper. If I’m 
correct then it is plausible that the type of emotion a person feels in a given set of 
circumstances is partly determined by subjective psychological factors. I have said that 
this claim amounts to the claim that emotion is partly determined by cognition. Thus 
emotion is partly cognitive. 
 
Now consider the difference in emotional intensity between the fear of S1 and the terror 
of S3. We can feel certain emotion-types with varying degrees of intensity. Fear is one 
such. At the lower end of the intensity scale fear may be experienced as something like 
trepidation, while a fear experienced as terror lies at the higher-intensity end of the 
spectrum. Accordingly, S1 and S3 have the same emotion-type but the intensity of 
emotion differs between the two. When we try to explain why S3’s fear is so much 
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more intense than that of S1, we intuitively look to subjective psychological factors. We 
might, for instance, wonder if S3 is generally more cautious, and less adventurous, than 
S1. We might wonder if S3 has some traumatic experience involving heights in her past, 
which S1 doesn’t have, and which might account for why S3 is terrified while S1 is 
merely afraid. Regardless of the details, it is not implausible to consider a psychological 
difference to be a reasonable explanation for the difference in emotion-intensity 
between the two. It is plausible that the difference in emotion-intensity between S1 and 
S3 is determined by subjective psychological differences between S1 and S3. If this is  
correct then it is plausible that emotion is partly determined by subjective psychological 
factors. I have said that this claim amounts to the claim that emotion is partly 
determined by cognition. Thus emotion is partly cognitive. 
 
 
§1.1.2:	  Challenge	  from	  Perceptualism	  about	  Emotion	  
 
A challenge to my claim that emotion is partly cognitive might be offered from a 
perceptualist view of emotion8. A perceptualist account of emotion might hold that the 
difference in emotion-type between S1 and S2 can be explained by differences in their 
higher-order perceptions. On this view S1 (higher-order) perceives the precipice as 
dangerous and her feeling of fear supervenes on her perception. S2, on the other hand, 
(higher-order) perceives the precipice as challenging and her feeling of exhilaration 
supervenes on that perception. As S1 and S2 have differing higher-order perceptions, 
they have differing emotions.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For	  examples	  of	  this	  view	  see:	  de	  Sousa	  (1987),	  Roberts	  (1988),	  Prinz	  (2004,	  2006),	  Döring	  (2008).	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Similarly, the difference in emotion-intensity between S1 and S3 might be explained by 
a perceptualist about emotion as a difference in higher-order perceptions. For instance, 
the perceptualist might claim that S3 (higher-order) perceives the precipice as lethal 
rather than merely as dangerous. On this perceptualist view the difference in higher 
order perception between S1 (who perceives the precipice as dangerous) and S3 (who 
perceives the precipice as lethal) might be said to explain the difference in their 
emotion-intensity.  
 
On a perceptualist view, therefore, the difference in emotion-type between S1 and S2, 
as well as the difference in emotion-intensity between S1 and S3, can be explained by 
appeal to differences in the higher-order perceptions of the individuals. If this position 
is correct then a perceptualist might claim that one can explain emotion without appeal 
to cognition. 
 
I do not wish to discount the role of perception in emotion, indeed I will argue in 
Chapter 3 that emotion is partly perceptual. It certainly seems plausible that one person 
can perceive a precipice as dangerous while another perceives it as a challenge, and a 
third perceives it as lethal. So I do not, in fact, disagree with this kind of explanation in 
as far as it goes.  
 
My objection is that the explanation is incomplete. In my view we also want to know 
what it is that accounts for the differences in higher-order perceptions upon which the 
difference in emotion supervenes. Which is to say that we want to know why S1 
perceives the precipice as dangerous, for instance, when S2 perceives it as challenging, 
and vice versa; we want the explanatory reasons that underlie the differences in higher-
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order perception between S1 and S2. Similarly, we want to know why S3 perceives the 
precipice as treacherous when S1 perceives it merely as dangerous, and vice versa. 
 
On my view the difference in higher-order perceptions between S1, S2, and S3, 
supervenes on a difference in subjective psychological factors between S1, S2, and S3; 
such as, for instance, S1’s not liking heights, S2’s being an avid base-jumper, and S3’s 
previous traumatic experience involving heights. If my view is correct then each 
individual’s emotion type or intensity can supervene on their higher-order perceptions, 
but those higher-order perceptions in turn supervene on cognitive factors. As 
supervenience is transitive, this means that emotion’s type and intensity supervene on 
cognitive factors. If that’s true, then emotion supervenes, at least in part, on cognition. 
In other words, emotion is partly cognitive. 
 
 
§1.1.3	  Challenge	  from	  The	  Passivity	  of	  Emotion	  
 
A further challenge may be raised at this point. My account seems to assume that 
emotion is not passive, it assumes that emotion isn't something that merely happens. 
There is a difference between the things which we can be said to do, and the things that 
can be said to happen to us. Making supper is something I do; being soaked by a sudden 
downpour is something that happens me. The former is agentive, the latter is not. My 
view that emotion partly supervenes on cognition may be challenged by the view that 
emotion is passive; that emotions are happenings rather than doings. Peters and Mace 
(1962) make this argument. They argue that we are the passive receivers of the 
emotions that we feel; they are “mists in our mental windscreens rather than 
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straightforward judgments” (1962, p.119). The authors point to emotions like fear, 
jealousy, and anger as emotions with which we can be ‘overcome’ prereflectively. On 
their view when one is prereflectively overcome by emotion, it is the functioning of 
one’s autonomic nervous system which determines the emotion, and not the workings 
of cognition as I claim. If emotion is passive, if it is a happening rather than a doing, 
then my view that emotion is partly cognitive is undermined.  
 
I find the challenge from the passivity of emotion to be problematic for two reasons. 
The first is the assumption, on which the challenge is based, that pre-reflectivity implies 
passivity. The second is that the normativity of emotion is inconsistent with the notion 
that emotion is passive. 
 
Taking the pre-reflectivity issue first: Emotional responses can be prereflective, they 
can occur without our thinking about them. It might be thought that the rapidity of an 
emotional response constitutes evidence that emotion is something that happens to us – 
the functioning of our autonomic nervous system – rather than something agentive. But 
there are many things that I can be said to do which I do not think about before doing 
them. For instance, when I reach for my mug of coffee my hand grasps the handle 
without my having to think about it before doing it. When I touch-type I do so without 
thinking about the placement of the letters on the keyboard or about which fingers I 
need to move in which order etc. Neither grasping the handle of my mug, nor typing 
this sentence, can be said to be something that happens to me; they are both things that I 
do. And yet both are done pre-reflectively. I do not see, therefore, why the pre-reflective 
nature of emotion should constitute evidence that emotion is a happening rather than a 
doing. Emotions are responses to objects, events and imaginings etc. Responses can be 
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pre-reflective and nevertheless involve cognition. For instance, catching something as it 
falls off a table or a ledge. This response involves complex calculations of speed and 
distance. And yet the response (catching the falling item) is also pre-reflective; in fact 
consciously thinking about it would probably reduce the chances of my making the 
catch. Pre-reflectivity does not imply passivity. The notion of a response as pre-
reflective is consistent with the notion of a response as agentive. Thus, the fact that 
one’s emotional response can be pre-reflective does not imply that emotion is passive, 
and the challenge from the passivity of emotion is undermined. 
 
But perhaps more problematic for the passivity challenge is the fact that emotions are 
subject to normative constraint; they can be assessed as appropriate or inappropriate. 
And the notion that emotion is subject to normative constraint contradicts the notion 
that emotion is passive. Normative constraint applies to the things that we do, and not to 
the things that happen to us. Consider something that really is passive, like the knee-jerk 
reflex. When the patellar tendon is struck, the knee jerks. This is a straightforward, non-
agentive, physical reflex. The idea that a knee-jerk reflex might be normatively 
constrained is incoherent. The knee-jerk reflex is entirely passive; it is not open to 
agentive control, nor is it open to normative constraint. The notion of normative 
constraint is inconsistent with the notion of passivity. Thus, if emotions were passive, in 
the way that the knee-jerk reflex is, their normativity would be incoherent. We can, and 
do take responsibility for our emotions. Therefore the notion that emotion is passive is 
false, and the challenge from the passivity of emotion fails. 
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§1.1.4:	  Challenge	  from	  Recalcitrant	  Emotion	  
 
A further challenge to my account of emotion as partly cognitive might be raised from 
the existence of recalcitrant emotions. Recalcitrant emotions are emotions that are 
thought to be at odds with (or contrary to) one’s beliefs or judgments. For instance, one 
might feel terrified when sitting on an airplane despite one’s belief that flying is a 
relatively safe way to travel; or one might continue to be plagued with jealousy despite 
one’s judgment that one’s partner is faithful.  
 
Recalcitrant emotion is problematic for my account if it is thought of as analogous to 
perceptual illusion. For instance, one will see a straight stick as bent in water, despite 
one’s belief that the stick is straight. It is thought that perceptual illusions demonstrate 
that perception can be encapsulated from cognitions such as belief and judgment9. On 
this view the disparity between my belief that the stick is straight and my perception of 
the stick as bent can be explained by the idea that what I see can be encapsulated from, 
and so can run contrary to, what I believe to be the case.  
 
In instances of recalcitrant emotion it seems that what one feels similarly runs contrary 
to what one believes to be the case. So it might be argued that experiences of 
recalcitrant emotion are analogous to experiences of perceptual illusion. If that’s the 
case then recalcitrant emotion might similarly be explained by appeal to cognitive 
encapsulation. But if emotion can be encapsulated from beliefs and judgments in this 
way then my claim that emotion is partly cognitive comes under serious threat.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See	  Fodor	  (1983).	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I believe the challenge to be mistaken for two reasons. First, there are important 
differences between recalcitrant emotion and perceptual illusion that belie the analogy 
between the two. Second, the challenge presents an overly restrictive view of the type of 
cognition involved in emotion, it mistakenly restricts cognition solely to beliefs and 
judgments.   
 
Taking the disanalogy between recalcitrant emotion and perceptual illusion first. There 
are at least two important differences between recalcitrant emotion and perceptual 
illusion. The first is a difference in rationality, and the second is a difference in 
persistence. Perceptual illusions are arational. A person who persists in seeing a straight 
stick as bent in water, despite believing that the stick is in fact straight, is not typically 
thought, as a result, to be either rational or irrational. This is because susceptibility to 
perceptual illusion is not a question of rationality but a question of perceptual 
architecture.  
 
Recalcitrant emotion, on the other hand, is typically thought of as irrational. Indeed, 
phobias are also colloquially referred to as ‘irrational’ fears, and a fairly standard 
accusation levelled at someone who, for instance, continues to feel jealous when there’s 
no evidence of infidelity is that they’re ‘being irrational’. Recalcitrant emotion can be 
deemed irrational because its persistence is not a question of perceptual architecture. 
Recalcitrant emotions “involve rational conflict or tension” (Brady 2009, p.413; 
original emphasis), hence the vulnerability of such emotion to rational criticism and 
charges of irrationality.  
 
	   29	  
Recalcitrant emotion’s openness to rational criticism points to a second important 
difference between it and perceptual illusion, the difference of persistence. Recalcitrant 
emotions are open to change in a way that perceptual illusions typically are not. No 
matter how many hours a person might devote to understanding perceptual illusions, 
they nevertheless persist; one will typically continue to see a straight stick as bent in 
water no matter how much one thinks, and talks, about it. On the other hand, the same 
hours devoted to understanding the psychological and emotional issues underpinning 
one’s recalcitrant emotions can lead to a change in those emotions. While, admittedly, it 
is very difficult to change recalcitrant emotion, it is nevertheless possible to do so in a 
way that is not typically the case for perceptual illusion.  
 
Differences in rationality and persistence between recalcitrant emotion and perceptual 
illusion mean that the two are not analogous, as the challenge to my position would 
require. Failure of the analogy, however, is not sufficient to defeat the challenge. If, as I 
maintain, emotion is partly cognitive then I must account for the seemingly conflicting 
beliefs held, for instance, by a person who persists in feeling jealous, despite her belief 
that her partner is faithful. It seems that my account requires that this person holds both 
the belief that her partner is unfaithful (as a constituent part of her jealousy) and the 
belief that her partner is faithful. A challenger to my position might suggest that this 
seeming conflict is resolved if belief is not a constituent part of jealousy. If belief is not 
a constituent part of emotion then a person could, at one and the same time, both feel 
jealous and believe that her partner is faithful. Recalcitrant emotion, therefore, seems to 
provide evidence that emotion does not have cognitive parts, even if it is not analogous 
to perceptual illusion. 
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But the explanation provided (that cognition is not a constituent part of emotion) in the 
challenge above cannot be correct because it fails to explain the attribution of 
irrationality to recalcitrant emotion. Rational conflict involves a divergence between 
one’s own opposing thoughts, reasons, beliefs, or judgments; in short a clash between 
one’s opposing cognitions. If, as the challenge suggests, jealousy has no cognitive parts 
then there would be no rational conflict in an instance in which one’s emotion diverges 
from one’s beliefs. The problem with the challenge from recalcitrant emotion, in my 
view, is that the view espoused stems from too narrow a specification of the types of 
cognition upon which emotion can be said to supervene. In the challenge the jealous 
partner is credited with two straightforward, directly conflicting, beliefs; the belief that 
her partner is unfaithful and the belief that her partner is faithful. But the cognitive 
underpinnings of recalcitrant jealousy can be far more complicated than this simplistic 
picture allows.  
 
An alternative, and perhaps more plausible, account can be found if one were to 
consider something like Script Theory. Script Theory, originating from the work of 
Silvan Tomkins10, suggests that past recurrent or habitual emotional experiences play an 
important role in our occurrent emotional responses. The theory maintains that a person 
can respond to occurrent events as if  they were the events of the past. So, for instance, 
it may be that the jealous partner has previously been cheated on, perhaps more than 
once. These kinds of painful experiences can leave indelible psychological marks. For 
example, one aspect of this can be the development of an unconscious ‘script’ according 
to which ‘partners cheat’. This script can be triggered by events sufficiently similar to 
the events that resulted in the script first being ‘learned’. So, for the person with a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Script	  Theory	  was	  originally	  presented	  by	  Tomkins	  at	  the	  1954	  International	  Congress	  of	  Psychology	  in	  Montreal.	  See	  also	  Tomkins	  (1995)	  pp.312-­‐388.	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‘partners cheat’ script, the smallest gesture or omission on the part of a current partner 
can result in an ‘as if’ response – i.e. she responds as if the current situation is a replay 
of the past in which her pervious partner had been unfaithful. The fact that her 
recalcitrant jealousy involves a rational conflict or tension is explained on this view. 
The jealous partner can be fully aware that her jealousy is irrational, she may in fact 
agree with any accusation of irrationality levelled towards her, but nevertheless her 
jealousy will persist (at least until she deals with the underlying emotional trauma of 
earlier infidelities). The rational conflict that results can be explained if her jealousy is 
determined, not by a belief that her current partner is unfaithful (a belief she holds to be 
false), but by a script which is itself determined by events from the past.  
 
In my view, rather than challenging my thesis, recalcitrant emotion strengthens the 
argument for cognitive parts of emotion. Script Theory seems to me to be a plausible 
thesis. And if the theory is correct then it is a script which is in conflict with belief 
when recalcitrant emotion arises. Such scripts are essentially cognitive. On this view, 
recalcitrant emotions are partly cognitive, and the challenge fails.  
 
 
§1.1.5:	  Challenge	  from	  Contingency	  
 
A final challenge to my position might suggest that the relationship between cognition 
and emotion may be contingent rather than necessary. I have said that the type and 
intensity of emotion are partly determined by subjective psychological factors. A 
challenger might hold that my position is too strong, entailing as it does a necessary 
relation between emotion and cognition. On a challenger’s view subjective 
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psychological factors may simply cause emotion, which would mean that the relation 
between cognition and emotion is contingent rather than necessary.  
 
Jesse Prinz (2004) makes this sort of challenge when he characterises cognitions as 
playing a purely causal role in emotion. Prinz maintains that the relationship between 
cognition and emotion is such that cognitions are “prior conditions, not constituent 
parts” of emotion (2004, p.98, original emphasis)11. He elaborates using the example of 
jealousy. He claims that when romantic jealousy occurs, there is first a judgment to the 
effect that one’s lover has been unfaithful, and this judgment causes the emotion of 
jealousy. On his view, the judgment is causally antecedent to the emotion and not a 
constituent part of it. He defends his view on the basis that different judgments can 
result in the same emotion. “Jealousy can be triggered by the judgment that one’s lover 
has been unfaithful, but it can also be triggered by other judgments, such as the 
judgment that one’s lover has been staying unusually late at work…There is, therefore, 
no pressure to say that any particular judgment comprises a constituent part of any 
higher cognitive emotion” (Prinz 2004, p.101). According to Prinz, emotion has no 
cognitive parts and the relationship between cognition and emotion is merely 
contingent. If he is correct then my claim that emotion is partly cognitive is challenged. 
 
With respect, Prinz’s claim that no specific judgment is required for emotion does not 
entitle him to conclude that no judgment whatsoever is required for emotion. Holding 
that judgment is required is consistent with the notion that no specific judgment is 
required. But more importantly, even if one could conclude that the relation between 
judgment and emotion is contingent, one could not further conclude from this that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  I	  will	  discuss	  Prinz’s	  thesis	  in	  greater	  depth	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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relation between cognition and emotion is contingent. To do so is to assume that all 
cognition can be reduced to judgment, which seems implausible.   
 
I believe that there are good reasons to hold that the type of emotion a person 
experiences, and the intensity with which they experience that emotion, are both 
determined, at least in part, by cognition. A person who dislikes heights is more likely 
to feel fear at the edge of a precipice, than is an avid base-jumper. Similarly, a person 
who is insecure or lacking self-esteem is more likely to feel jealousy, or to feel jealousy 
more intensely, than someone who is both secure and confident. More importantly, a 
change in a person’s psychology can result in a change in their emotional responses. 
The plasticity of emotion is such that our emotional responses can be improved, even in 
adulthood12. A so-called thin-skinned individual, one who is easily offended, can come 
to realise that ‘not everything others do or say is always about me’, and consequently 
their threshold for offence can be increased. Having a higher threshold for offence, the 
person will become angry less easily or less frequently. Similarly, a person lacking in 
self-esteem can come to realise their own value, and consequently their propensity to 
experience security-related emotions like jealousy can abate.  
 
It seems that when we change as individuals (i.e. when we change our psychology) our 
emotional responses also change. This constitutes good evidence that emotion 
supervenes on subjective psychological factors. Supervenience is such that one cannot 
change the lower-order property without some change in the higher-order property. If a 
change in psychology translates into a change in emotional response then the 
relationship between the two is plausibly one of supervenience. Supervenience is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See	  Kotsou,	  Nelis,	  Grégoire,	  &	  Mikolajczak	  (2011)	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necessary, rather than a contingent, relationship. On this basis it is plausible that the 
relation between emotion and cognition is necessary rather than contingent. Hence it is 
plausible that emotion is partly cognitive.  
 
On my view emotion is partly cognitive. In the next section I will consider a 
reductionist theory which claims that emotion is wholly cognitive. According to this 
view emotion just is a form of cognition. 
 
 
§1.2:	  An	  Argument	  for	  the	  Reduction	  of	  Emotion	  to	  Cognition	  
 
In this section I present a cognitive view of emotion. Cognitivists about emotion13 hold 
that emotion can be fully explained by cognition. They also largely agree (with the 
exception of Nussbaum 2001) that perception and feelings have a causal relationship 
with emotion; respectively as antecedent and consequent. They argue that perceptions 
can cause emotions but perception is not a constitutive part of emotion, and that 
emotions cause feelings but feelings are not a constitutive part of emotion. I present 
(§1.2.1) Martha Nussbaum’s (2001) argument for the reduction of emotion to cognition 
from her publication Upheavals of Thought: the intelligence of emotions. Nussbaum 
describes her position as similar to the Stoical view that “emotions are appraisals or 
value judgments, which ascribe to things and persons outside the person’s own control 
great importance for that person’s own flourishing” (Nussbaum 2001, p.4). On her view 
emotions are cognitive evaluations with no necessary somatic correlates; emotions are 
essentially, and exclusively, cognitive. I consider (§1.2.2) three challenges to Nussbaum 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	   examples	   of	   Cognitivism	   about	   emotion	   see	   Gordon	   1987;	   Marks	   1982;	   Nash	   1989;	   Neu	  1987;	  Nussbaum	  2001;	  Solomon	  2004	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as well as her responses to these challenges. The first challenge suggests that 
Nussbaum’s explanation of emotion is also consistent with judgments as causal rather 
than constituent parts of emotion. The second challenge comes from the fact that 
emotion can dissipate over time even when judgments don’t change, the paradigm 
example being that of grief. The third challenge is that Nussbaum’s view denies any 
role for feelings in emotion.  
 
 
§1.2.1:	  Nussbaum’s	  Cognitive	  Thesis	  
 
Martha Nussbaum (2001) argues that the directedness or intentionality of emotion is 
cognitive. The aboutness of emotion she says, “comes from my active ways of seeing 
and interpreting: it is not like being given a snapshot of the object, but requires looking 
at the object, so to speak, through one’s own window” (Nussbaum 2001, p.27). She 
maintains that the identity of an emotion – what distinguishes fear from hope, love from 
grief etc. – “is not so much the identity of the object, which might not change, but the 
way in which the object is seen” (ibid, p.27). The object of one person’s loathing might 
be the object of another’s love, the object of one person’s fear might be the object of 
another’s excitement.  
 
Nussbaum argues that seeing the object of one’s emotion as contemptible or lovable etc. 
might be cashed out in terms of believing that object to be contemptible or lovable etc. 
She writes; “it is not always easy, or even desirable, to distinguish an instance of seeing 
X as Y,…from having a belief that X is Y” (ibid, p.27, original emphasis). In order to 
have fear, she argues, one must believe that something bad is impending; in order to feel 
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anger, one must believe some non-accidental injustice has been perpetrated against me 
or someone important to me. “If I should discover that not A but B had done the 
damage, or that it was not done willingly, or that it was not serious, we could expect my 
anger to modify itself accordingly, or go away” (ibid, p.28). On Nussbaum’s view, 
severing belief from emotion severs the emotion. On this basis, she argues, belief is 
necessary for emotion. 
 
Nussbaum considers whether the necessity for belief in emotion means that relevant 
beliefs are a constituent part of emotion. “A claim of necessity,” she writes, “is 
compatible with, but does not entail, a claim of constituent parthood, since the beliefs 
might be necessary as external causes of something that in its own nature does not 
contain belief” (2001, p.34). But she rules out the notion that beliefs might merely be 
causes of emotion. They must be constitutive, she argues, because they are an essential 
part of an emotion’s identity. She maintains that if beliefs are an essential part of what 
differentiates one emotion from another, then beliefs are a constitutive part of emotion.  	  Neither	   a	   characteristic	   feeling	   nor	   a	   characteristic	   mode	   of	   behaviour	  would	   appear	   sufficient	   to	  define	   emotions	   such	   as	   envy,	   hope,	   grief,	   pity,	  and	  jealousy,	  or	  to	  differentiate	  one	  of	  these	  from	  the	  others.	  In	  some	  cases	  (for	  example,	   anger	  and	   fear)	   there	  are	  at	   least	  prima	   facie	   candidates	   for	  such	  a	  defining	  feeling,	  although	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  full-­‐fledged	  emotion	  requires	  more	  than	  this	   feeling	  (and	  shall	   later	  argue	  that	  this	   feeling	   isn’t	  always	  present).	   In	  others,	   such	  as	  hope	  and	  envy,	  we	   can’t	   even	  begin	   to	  specify	   such	   a	   defining	   feeling.	   We	   seem	   to	   be	   left,	   then,	   at	   least	   with	  constituent	  parthood,	  with,	  that	  is,	  the	  thesis	  that	  the	  cognitive	  elements	  are	  part	  of	  what	  an	  emotion	  is	   Nussbaum	  2001,	  p.34.	  
 
 
According to Nussbaum belief is a necessary constituent of emotion, and not just a 
necessary external cause of it, because it is a constituent part of an emotion’s identity. 
But this constituent parthood is insufficient to her larger thesis. If, as Nussbaum claims, 
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emotion can be fully explained by cognition then cognition must be more than just 
necessary for emotion, cognition must also be sufficient. To conclude her argument, 
therefore, Nussbaum turns to another form of cognition, judgment.  
 
Nussbaum defines judgment as an assent to an appearance. She explains this as having 
two phases: “First, it occurs to me or strikes me that such and such is the case. It looks 
to me that way, I see things that way – but so far I haven’t really accepted it” (2001, 
p.37). At this stage “I can accept or embrace the way things look, take it into me as the 
way things are; in this case the appearance has become my judgment and the act of 
acceptance is what judging is” (ibid, p.37). This latter act, she asserts, “seems to be a 
job that requires the discriminating power of cognition” (ibid, p.38, original emphasis). 
And emotion, she argues, is just such an act of assent to the appearance of how things 
are. She gives the example of grief. For instance, it can strike me that someone close to 
me has died without my really accepting it, as in the case of denial. Grief, Nussbaum 
claims, is the acceptance of it really being the case that someone close to me has died. 
Grief is the judgment that it really is the case.  
 
Importantly, entailed in this judgment, says Nussbaum, is a necessary property of the 
object as being important to me. Severing the object’s value or importance ‘for me’, 
Nussbaum argues, also severs the emotion. Writing of her own mother’s death, she 
says: “Suppose that I did not love my mother or consider her a person of great 
importance; suppose I considered her about as important as a branch on a tree next to 
my house. Then (unless I had invested the tree-branch itself with an unusual degree of 
value) I would not fear her death, or hope so passionately for her recovery” (Nussbaum 
2001, p.29). She writes: “Internal to the grief itself must be the perception of the 
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beloved object and of her importance” (ibid, p.44). This entirety (the assent to the 
appearance of how things are and the importance of the object), is not only necessary to 
emotion, she claims, it is also sufficient.  
 
 
§1.2.2:	  Challenges	  to	  Nussbaum’s	  View	  
 
Nussbaum anticipates three important objections to her position. The first of these is 
that her position is consistent with judgments as causal rather than constituent parts of 
emotion. Her judgments that her mother has died and that her mother was someone that 
was important to her might be construed as causing her grief. If that’s the case then the 
most Nussbaum can claim is that such judgments are necessary for emotion but not that 
they are sufficient for it.  
 
Nussbaum responds to the objection by denying that judgment could be construed as 
merely causal. Her judgment that her mother has died, she argues, is not an event that 
temporally precedes her grief. “When I grieve, I do not first of all coolly embrace the 
proposition, ‘my wonderful mother is dead’, and then set about grieving” (2001, p.45). 
She makes this claim on the basis that her judgment doesn’t cease once the grief sets in. 
The full recognition of her mother’s death, she claims, is the upheaval of grief. It is a 
state of affairs one accepts or assents to continuously.  
 
A second complication for Nussbaum’s position stems from the fact that emotions like 
grief typically diminish over time. If the emotion of grief just is the judgment that her 
mother (someone who is precious to her) is dead, then how can she account for the 
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diminution of her grief? “The suggestion,” she writes, “is that the original proposition is 
retained, and that the waning must therefore be accounted for in some other way” 
(2001, p.79). If the judgment that her mother is dead persists, but her grief wanes over 
time, then her grief must be more than just her judgment that her mother is dead. If 
that’s true then judgment is not sufficient to explain emotion.  
 
Nussbaum recognises that her thesis must account for the diminution of her grief purely 
by appeal to cognition. She considers the difference between the intensity of her grief at 
the time of her mother’s death and its intensity eight years later. “The real question then 
is,” she writes, “is the difference between my calmed state of August 2000 and my 
grief-stricken state of April 1992 a cognitive difference, or a noncognitive difference?” 
(2001, p.80). She argues that the difference can be explained by cognition. Her 
judgment that her mother has died does not change, she says, but that judgment is 
gradually displaced in the forefront of her mind: 	  [W]hen	   the	   knowledge	   of	   her	   death	   has	   been	   with	   me	   for	   a	   long	   time,	   I	  reorganize	  my	  other	  beliefs	  about	  the	  present	  and	  future	  to	  accord	  with	  it.	  I	  no	  longer	  have	  the	  belief	  that	  I	  will	  see	  my	  mother	  at	  Thanksgiving	  dinner;	  I	  no	  longer	  think	  of	  the	  end	  of	  a	  busy	  day	  as	  a	  time	  when	  I	  can	  call	  her	  up	  and	  enjoy	  a	   long	   talk;	   I	   no	   longer	   think	  of	   a	   trip	   abroad	  as	   an	  occasion	   to	  buy	  presents	   for	  her;	   I	   no	   longer	   expect	   to	  make	  happy	  plans	   to	   celebrate	  her	  birthday.	  Indeed,	  the	  experience	  of	  mourning	  is	  in	  great	  part	  an	  experience	  of	   repeatedly	   encountering	   cognitive	   frustration	   and	   reweaving	   one’s	  cognitive	  fabric	  in	  consequence.	  	   Nussbaum	  2001,	  p.80	  
 
 
Her grief changes, argues Nussbaum, as its relationship to her other beliefs and 
judgments changes. But, she admits, this is not yet an emotional change on her 
definition. “I have defined emotions by their content, not by their relationship to other 
parts of our mental content” (Nussbaum 2001, p.81). In that respect the most influential 
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change, she argues, is the centrality of her mother’s salience to her own wellbeing; 
“propositions having to do with the central role of my mother in my own conception of 
flourishing will shift into the past tense” (ibid, p.82). It is this change in judgment, she 
argues, that is a large part of the diminution of grief: 	  Some	   things	   stay	   constant:	   my	   judgments	   about	   her	   intrinsic	   worth,	   and	  about	   the	   badness	   of	   what	   happened	   to	   her,	   my	   judgment	   that	   she	   has	  figured	   centrally	   in	  my	  history.	  We	  may	   even	   say	   that	   I	   do	   not	   altogether	  remove	  her	  from	  my	  present	  life,	  since	  after	  all	  I	  have	  hardly	  ceased	  to	  write	  and	  think	  about	  her.	  So	  in	  one	  respect,	  my	  experience	  is	  still	  an	  experience	  of	  loss.	  But	  I	  put	  her	  into	  a	  different	  place	  in	  my	  life,	  one	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  her	  being	  dead,	  and	  so	  not	  an	  ongoing	  active	  partner	  in	  conversation,	  love	  and	  support.	  	   Nussbaum	  2001,	  p.82	  
 
 
Thus for Nussbaum the diminution of her grief in the eight years following her mother’s 
death can be accounted for purely in cognitive terms. Her grief is no longer at the 
forefront of her mind, and to the extent that her grief is displaced by other beliefs and 
judgments, so her grief diminishes. If that’s true, Nussbaum claims, then the diminution 
of her emotion over time can be fully explained by cognition and the challenge fails.   
 
But Nussbaum’s response seems to me to be unsatisfactory inasmuch as it raises the 
third and strongest challenge to her position; Nussbaum’s account seems to ignore the 
involvement of feelings in emotion. It seems to me that the aspect of grief that 
diminishes over time is how keenly grief is felt. When Nussbaum relates her experience 
at the time of her mother’s death, she describes periods of agonised weeping, days of 
crushing fatigue. When she talks about her feelings eight years after her mother’s death, 
she describes a ‘calmed state’. On her own admission, there is not just a difference in 
terms of the judgments she makes, there is a difference in how she feels. Her response 
to the challenge from the diminution of grief over time does not explain the change in 
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her hedonic state. Because Nussbaum’s account of emotion ignores how emotion feels, 
the plausibility of her position is undermined. Unless cognition can explain the change 
in hedonic state, then Nussbaum’s thesis results in an underdetermination of emotion. 
 
Nussbaum denies that feelings are a necessary part of emotion. As sentient beings, she 
says, our conscious experiences necessarily seem to have some feeling or phenomenal 
aspects. “But we don’t have any clear reason to say that these things are part of grief 
itself” (2001, p.57). Her reason for this, she explains, is that “if we confine ourselves to 
a particular episode of emotion we have difficulty finding arguments bearing on the 
question of whether a given feeling or bodily process is or is not a necessary part of its 
internal conditions of identity” (ibid, p.57). On her view human experiences are 
embodied, and as such, all conscious experiences will entail phenomenal properties, 
thus emotion too will have some phenomenology. But Nussbaum holds that 
phenomenology is not a necessary part of the identity conditions for grief (and a fortiori 
for emotion) and thus it is not a necessary constituent of that grief. She elaborates this 
view as follows: 	  There	   usually	   will	   be	   bodily	   sensations	   and	   changes	   of	   many	   sorts	  involved	   in	   grieving;	   but	   if	   we	   discovered	  my	   blood	   pressure	  was	   quite	  low	  during	  this	  whole	  episode,	  or	  that	  my	  pulse	  rate	  never	  got	  above	  sixty,	  we	  would	  not,	  I	  think,	  have	  the	  slightest	  reason	  to	  conclude	  that	  I	  was	  not	  really	   grieving.	   (Quadriplegics	   lack	   altogether	   the	   usual	   connection	  between	   central	   blood	   pressure	   and	   heart	   rate	   regulatory	   mechanisms	  and	   peripheral	   effector	   mechanisms,	   and	   yet	   we	   have	   no	   difficulty	  thinking	  that	  such	  people	  really	  have	  emotions.)	  If	  my	  hands	  and	  feet	  were	  cold	  or	  warm,	  sweaty	  or	  dry,	  again	  this	  would	  be	  of	  no	  necessary	  criterial	  value,	  given	  the	  great	  variability	  of	  the	  relevant	  physiological	  connections.	  Nussbaum	  2001,	  p.57	  
 
 
For Nussbaum emotion has no specific somatic correlates other than those we might 
expect to experience as necessary to our being sentient embodied entities. She argues 
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that there are no bodily states or processes that are “constantly correlated with our 
experiences of emotion, in such a way that we will want to put that particular bodily 
state in to the definition of a given emotion-type” (2001, p.58). Instead, she argues, the 
judgment that constitutes an emotion “has many of the kinetic properties that the 
‘feeling’ is presumably intended to explain” (ibid, p.60). Bodily states, she claims, 
“may accompany an emotion of a specific type and they may not - but they are not 
absolutely necessary for it” (ibid, p.60). Nussbaum argues for this position by pointing 
out that there is a degree of plasticity in the way different people feel different 
emotions; for instance, some feel anger as a roiling in the gut, and others feel it as a 
tension in the shoulders. She claims that we don’t all feel the same emotions in the same 
way. This means, she claims, that there are no specific feelings that are constantly 
correlated with emotion; and hence emotion has no necessary somatic correlates.  
 
Pace Nussbaum, her claim that different people feel emotion differently does not entitle 
her to conclude that feelings are unnecessary to emotion. Furthermore, research 
suggests that Nussbaum’s claim about emotional plasticity is false. A study by 
Nummenmaa et al. (2013) shows that there is a statistically significant correlation 
between various emotion-types and where those emotions are felt in the body. The 
researchers ran five experiments amongst a total of 701 subjects. Participants were 
given various emotional stimuli (specifically movies and guided mental imagery using 
words and stories) and asked to indicate the bodily regions where they felt increased or 
decreased activation. The researchers found that: “Different emotions were consistently 
associated with statistically separable bodily sensation maps [BSMs] across 
experiments” (Nummenmaa et al. 2013, p.646). 
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In their paper, Nummenmaa et al. anticipated an objection from the fact that body-
related expressions are common for describing emotions across all cultures. Many of 
these expressions are metaphorical (such as having butterflies in one’s stomach etc.) and 
it might be argued from this that the research findings do no more than “reflect a purely 
conceptual association between semantic knowledge of language-based stereotypes 
associating emotions with bodily sensations” (2013, p.649). To allay this concern the 
research was carried out in two regions (Norway and Taiwan) thought to be sufficiently 
culturally disparate to remove any bias from conceptual association. The researchers 
conclude that the ‘strong concordance’ between the results from the two regions 
suggests that “BSMs likely reflect universal sensation patterns triggered by activation of 
the emotion systems, rather than culturally specific conceptual predictions and 
associations between emotional semantics and bodily sensation patterns” (Nummenmaa 
et al. 2013, p.649).  
 
But a counterargument may be made here. The empirical research suggests only that 
bodily feelings play a role in emotion, this does not necessarily mean that those feelings 
are constituent parts of emotion. For instance, Joel Marks (1982) argues that emotion 
causes bodily feelings but denies that those ensuing feelings are part of the emotion that 
cause them. Thus a cognitive response to Nummenmaa et al.’s research might hold that 
the somatic aspects of emotion are causal effects and not constituent parts of emotion. 
Marks’ view is that emotion can be reduced to belief-desire sets. He writes: 	  My	  main	  argument	  for	  my	  position	  is	  this:	  we	  say,	  'His	  fright	  caused	  him	  to	  shiver',	  'He	  blanched	  from	  fear',	  'His	  fear	  made	  him	  tense	  up';	  we	  also	  say,	  'He	  acted	  out	  of	  fear',	  'He	  ran	  away	  because	  he	  was	  afraid',	  etc.	  The	  strong	  suggestion	  here	   is	   that	   the	   locus	  of	   the	  emotion	   is	  (causally)	  prior	   to	   the	  various	  manifestations	  of	   the	  emotion	   (and	  among	   these	  are	  acts).	  Thus,	  the	   manifestations	   are	   not	   the	   emotion	   (plus	   action),	   but	   (along	   with	  action)	  effects	  of	  the	  emotion.	  But	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  (i.e.,	  ex	  hypothesi)	  that	  these	  manifestations	  can	  be	  construed	  as	  effects	  of	  (some	  set	  of)	  the	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emoter's	  beliefs	  and/or	  desires.	  Therefore,	  the	  emotion	  is	  just	  some	  set	  of	  the	  emoter's	  beliefs	  and/or	  desires.	   Marks	  1982,	  pp.229-­‐30	  
 
 
Marks suggests that if the locus or root of an emotion is in the cognitions prior to bodily 
feelings then bodily feelings just are the causal effects of emotion. Emotion itself, he 
maintains, can be fully explained by cognition while still accounting for the role of 
feelings.  
 
On Marks’ view, if I’m afraid of a rabid dog then the root of my fear, that which 
inspired it in the first place, is my belief that the dog is dangerous and my desire to save 
myself. According to Marks, this belief-desire (BD) set is causally prior to any 
physiological feeling that my fear results in. He argues that this BD set is necessary for 
my emotion. If I don’t believe the dog constitutes a danger, if he’s securely locked away 
for example, I would have no BD set regarding the dog and hence would have no fear. 
This necessary connection, he argues, cannot be explained unless emotion is essentially 
cognitive.  
 
Marks claims that the feelings associated with emotions arise only as effects. He 
concludes from this that emotion can be reduced to cognition alone. In the next section I 
will argue that this cognitivist position is flawed. Emotion has at least one property that 
cognition does not have; emotions are paradigmatically valenced and cognitions are not, 
thus cognition alone cannot account for at least one property of emotion. If that’s the 
case then emotion cannot be reduced to cognition.   
 
 
	   45	  
§1.3:	  A	  Property	  of	  Emotion	  Not	  Held	  by	  Cognition	  
 
I argued (§1.1) that emotion is partly cognitive. I then presented (§1.2) the reductionist 
position that emotion can be fully explained by cognition. In this section I argue that 
emotion cannot be reduced to cognition because emotion has at least one property not 
held by cognition. I argue (§1.3.1) that emotions are paradigmatically valenced and 
cognitions are not. If valence cannot be accounted for by cognition then emotion cannot 
be reduced to cognition alone. I anticipate a challenge (§1.3.2) to my argument on the 
basis that the valence of an emotion may not be intrinsic to it but rather may merely be a 
causal effect. I respond that valence is a property of emotion, and as such is intrinsic to 
it. I consider the potential counterargument (§1.3.3) that unconscious emotions are not 
valenced and therefore valence is not necessary for emotion. I respond that unconscious 
states are special cases and not counterexamples; all unconscious states lack 
phenomenology by definition. In such cases the absence of evidence does not constitute 
evidence of absence; the absence of valence in instances of unconscious emotions does 
not constitute evidence for the absence of valence in the case of conscious emotions. I 
conclude (§1.3.4) that conscious emotions are paradigmatically valenced. As cognition 
is not valenced, cognition cannot explain the valence of emotion. Hence, emotion 
cannot be reduced to cognition by virtue of having a property not held by cognition.  
 
 
§1.3.1:	  Cognition	  cannot	  account	  for	  Emotional	  Valence.	  
 
Feeling states can have a certain negative or positive hedonic resonance. Feeling hungry 
(as well as feeling too full), feeling thirsty, feeling pain – these feeling states have in 
common that they are unpleasant; roughly, they ‘feel bad’. On the other hand, feeling 
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comfortable, feeling satiated, feeling cosy – these feeling states have in common that 
they are pleasant; roughly, they ‘feel good’. Emotions too have negative or positive 
hedonic resonance. Grief, jealousy, shame, and guilt are emotions that have in common 
the fact that they have a negative hedonic charge. While joy, love, happiness and awe 
are emotions that have in common the fact that they have a positive hedonic charge.  
 
The term ‘valence’ is used to refer to the hedonic charge or resonance of an emotion. A 
valenced state is one that is experienced phenomenologically as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’; 
roughly speaking, as ‘feeling good’ or ‘feeling bad’14. Emotions are paradigmatically 
valenced states. Indeed, valence is said to be among “the most fundamental properties 
of affective experience” (Kuppens et. al 2013, p.917). It seems that emotions typically 
have a positive (agreeable) or negative (aversive) character or ‘feel’ about them; 
consciously felt emotion has a valence that can be characterised predominantly as either 
positive or negative15.  
 
If emotions are paradigmatically valenced states then cognition cannot fully explain 
emotion because cognition does not have the property of being valenced. When I 
believe that grass is green, that snow is white and that the sun will rise tomorrow, none 
of these beliefs feels particularly attractive or aversive, none feels positively or 
negatively charged. In fact, the notion that cognitions might have phenomenal 
properties at all is philosophically controversial. David Pitt (2004) writes: “It is a 
traditional assumption in analytic philosophy of mind that intentional states, such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  The	  notions	  of	  ‘positive’	  and	  ‘negative’	  or	  ‘good’	  and	  ‘bad’	  are	  used	  in	  different	  ways	  in	  emotion	  literature	   –	   e.g.	   the	   terms	   can	   be	   used	   in	   the	   normative	   or	   axiological	   sense.	   I	   use	   the	   terms	  ‘positive’	  and	  ‘negative’	  exclusively	  in	  the	  phenomenological	  sense	  here.	  	  15	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  deny	  that	  one	  can	  experience	  mixed	  emotions	  -­‐	  affective	  episodes	  in	  which	  some	  positively	  valenced	  and	  some	  negatively	  valenced	  emotions	  are	  elicited	  -­‐	  in	  these	  cases	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  overall	  valence	  of	  the	  experience	  may	  also	  feel	  mixed.	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believing, doubting or wondering that p, have no intrinsic phenomenal properties” (Pitt 
2004, p.1).  
 
The notion that conscious thoughts might have phenomenal properties remains hotly 
debated. Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague write: 	  One	  of	  the	  striking	  features	  of	  the	  cognitive	  phenomenology	  debate	  is	  that	  it	  exists	  at	  all.	  Why	  do	  some	  theorists	  (the	   ‘conservatives’)	  hold	  that	  there	   is	  no	   distinctive	   phenomenal	   character	   to	   thought,	   whilst	   others	   (the	  ‘liberals’)	   hold	   that	   there	   is?	   After	   all,	   it	   is	  widely	   held	   that	   one	   is—or	   at	  least	   can	   be—aware	   of	   the	   phenomenal	   character	   of	   a	   given	  mental	   state	  just	   in	   virtue	  of	  being	   in	   that	  mental	   state.	   In	   light	  of	   this,	   explaining	  why	  there	   is	   such	   deep	   disagreement	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   conscious	   thought	  poses	   something	   of	   a	   challenge.	   (Compare	   the	   cognitive	   phenomenology	  debate	   to	   debates	   about	   the	   sensory	   phenomenological	   character	   of	  perception,	  which	  are	  not	  typically	  about	  whether	  sensory	  phenomenology	  exists	  but	  about	  how	  best	  to	  explain	  it.)	   Bayne	  and	  Montague	  2011	  p.4	  
 
The notion of cognitive phenomenology continues to be subject to debate and the very 
fact of this controversy demonstrates that cognitions are not valenced states. If thoughts 
were valenced, cognition would have clear phenomenal properties and the debate would 
be different. The fact that we question whether thoughts have any phenomenal 
properties at all shows, at the very least, that they are not valenced states. Thoughts are 
not valenced and even the most controversially liberal view, as espoused by Pitt16, 
would not suggest otherwise. Valence is something that is felt in the body, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Pitt’s	  (2004)	  view	  is	  that	  there	  is	  something	  that	   it’s	   like	  to	  think	  a	  conscious	  thought	  and	  that	  “what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  think	  the	  conscious	  thought	  that	  p	  is	  distinct	  from	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  think	  any	  other	  conscious	   thought,	   and	   that	   the	   phenomenology	   of	   a	   conscious	   thought	   is	   constitutive	   of	   its	  content”	   (Pitt	   2004,	   p.1).	   	   He	   argues	   for	   his	   position	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   a	   mental	   state,	   if	   it	   is	  conscious,	  has	  phenomenal	  properties.	  Conscious	  thoughts	  are	  conscious	  mental	  states,	  therefore,	  conscious	   thoughts	   have	   phenomenal	   properties.	   He	   defends	   his	   argument	   against	   any	   claims	   of	  triviality	  (if	   ‘conscious’	  means	  or	  entails	   ‘phenomenal’	   then	  the	  argument	  that	  conscious	  thoughts	  have	  phenomenology	  is	  trivial)	  by	  saying	  that	  he	  finds	  this	  to	  be	  no	  objection	  at	  all.	  Even	  if	  his	  claim	  is	  true	  by	  definition	  or	  trivially	  true,	  he	  says,	  it	  is	  still	  true.	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necessarily somatic. If emotions are valenced states, and if valence is necessarily 
somatic then emotions necessarily have somatic parts.  
 
 
§1.3.2:	  Challenge	  from	  Contingency	  
 
A challenge may be raised here. I claim that emotions are valenced and that valence is 
necessarily felt therefore emotions necessarily have somatic parts. However, the 
objection might be made that a claim that valence is necessarily felt does not allow one 
to conclude that valence is a property of emotion. The relation between emotion and 
valence may be contingent rather than necessary. In §1.2 I reported Nussbaum’s claim 
that there are no bodily states or processes that are ‘constantly correlated’ with our 
experiences of emotion. I countered that Nussbaum cannot conclude from this that 
emotion has no somatic parts whatsoever. I provided evidence from research that 
suggests emotion is felt in the body. However, neither my counterargument, nor the 
research, provides evidence either way as to whether the somatic correlates of emotion 
are necessary constituent parts of emotion. The evidence is equally consistent with the 
claim that the somatic aspects of emotion are merely the causal effects of the cognitions 
that constitute emotion, as Joel Marks (1982) argues. Even if emotion involves bodily 
feelings, those feelings may not necessarily be a constitutive part of emotion. On this 
view, valence might be the effect of an emotion rather than part of it. If that’s true then 
emotion might be fully explained by cognition and my argument that emotion cannot be 
reduced to cognition fails.   
 
The challenge is mistaken. The valence of an emotion is not separable from the emotion 
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itself. Consider the valence of an emotion like grief, there is no added extra component 
on top of grief, by virtue of which grief feels bad. One would not say, for instance, that 
‘grief + negative valence = what makes grief feel bad’. Grief feels bad in itself; ‘bad’ is 
just how grief feels. This is akin to the point made by Kenny when he says that pleasure 
is not a ‘separate sensation’ that can be added to make a pleasurable activity pleasurable 
(Kenny 1963, chapter 6).  
 
Additionally, the differing valences of different emotions cannot be said to be 
analogous to inverted spectrum cases. In inverted spectrum cases two individuals might, 
for instance, share the same colour vocabulary and discriminations but the colour one 
person sees may nevertheless be different from the colour the other person sees17. But 
when two individuals share the same emotional vocabulary and discriminations their 
emotional experiences cannot be inverted. This is because sharing the same vocabulary 
and discriminations with regard to emotion necessarily involves sharing the same 
vocabulary and discriminations with regard to emotional valence. For instance, it cannot 
be the case that one person feels joy and calls it grief, while the other feels grief and 
calls it joy. The valence of grief is negative, the valence of joy is positive. This 
phenomenological difference is reflected in the vocabulary used to describe these 
emotions, as well as in the way we discriminate one from the other. As emotion is 
paradigmatically valenced, then emotion has at least one property that is not held by 
cognition. Thus emotion cannot be reduced to cognition. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  For	  more	  on	  inverted	  spectrum	  cases	  see	  Byrne	  (2015).	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§1.3.3:	  Challenge	  from	  Unconscious	  Emotion	  
 
The counterargument might be raised from the possibility of unconscious emotion. 
Martha Nussbaum (2001) makes this argument when she holds that the possibility that 
we can have emotions that we don’t feel (unconscious emotions), is evidence that 
feelings are not a constitutive part of emotion. Unconscious emotion is not valenced. It 
seems plausible that I might be afraid of one person or in love with another without my 
being aware of my emotional state. And if I am unaware that I have an emotion, I am 
also unaware of the valence of that emotion. Nevertheless I can still be said to have that 
emotion. According to the challenge, unconscious emotion is not valenced, therefore 
valence is not a necessary part of emotion. Thus, my claim that emotion cannot be 
reduced to cognition is undermined.  
 
The notion of unconscious emotion is controversial but I will not deny its possibility 
here. However, I do not need to deny the possibility of unconscious emotion to respond 
to the challenge. This is because all unconscious states lack phenomenology by 
definition. This is true irrespective of whether the state in question is perceptual, 
cognitive, conative or affective. I can arrive home at the end of a long drive with little or 
no memory of the journey; I can hold beliefs I didn’t realise I had until they are called 
into question; I can remain unaware of my hunger until I stop working and realise that I 
haven’t eaten anything since breakfast.  
 
Unconscious states lack phenomenology by definition. On my view this means that 
unconscious states are special cases and not counterexamples. Consider unconscious 
perceptual states, such as arriving home after a long journey, and realising that one was 
entirely unconscious of driving for much of it. The question becomes whether events 
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like this call into question whether perceptual states necessarily have phenomenal 
properties. After all, I can assume that my perceptual faculties were operating during the 
time in which I was driving ‘unconsciously’ so to speak. The fact that I arrived home 
safely is evidence of this. And yet, the very fact that I was driving ‘unconsciously’ 
means that I was unaware of my perceptions as having phenomenal properties at the 
time.  
 
In considering this scenario, it’s useful to call on Ned Block’s (1995) distinction 
between phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness) and access consciousness (A-
consciousness). What makes a state P-conscious is that there is ‘something that it’s like’ 
to be in that conscious state (as suggested by Nagel 1974). Block writes that “we have 
P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste, and have pains. P-conscious 
properties include the experiential properties of sensations, feelings, and perceptions, 
but I would also include thoughts, desires and emotions” (Block 1995, p.230); when I 
drive ‘unconsciously’ my experience can be said to lack P-consciousness.  
 
Block suggests that A-consciousness lacks experiential properties and is involved in the 
performance of cognitive, perceptual and behaviour-control tasks; when I drive 
‘unconsciously’ I might be said to be in an A-conscious state18. However, that a 
conceptual distinction might be made between these two types of consciousness does 
not imply that P-conscious properties are not a necessary part of conscious perception. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Block’s	  uses	  ‘blind-­‐sight’	  as	  the	  primary	  exemplar	  for	  his	  distinction	  between	  P-­‐conscious	  and	  A-­‐conscious	  states.	  Damage	  to	  particular	  parts	  of	  the	  visual	  cortex	  can	  result	   in	  blindness	  in	  certain	  areas	   of	   the	   visual	   field.	   A	   blind-­‐sighted	   person	   cannot	   see	   anything	   presented	   to	   them	   in	   their	  ‘blind	  spot’	  but,	  when	  questioned,	  they	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  ‘guess’	  the	  location	  of	  the	  item	  correctly.	  Block	   takes	   this	   as	   an	   example	   of	   the	   operation	   of	   A-­‐consciousness	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   P-­‐consciousness.	  Another	  of	  Block’s	  examples	  of	  A-­‐consciousness	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  P-­‐consciousness	  is	  somewhat	  closer	  to	  my	  driving	  example;	  “suppose	  you	  are	  engaged	  in	  intense	  conversation	  when	  suddenly	  at	  noon	  you	  realize	  that	  right	  outside	  your	  window	  there	  is	  –	  and	  has	  been	  for	  some	  time	  –	  a	  deafening	  pneumatic	  drill	  digging	  up	  the	  street.	  You	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  noise	  all	  along,	  but	  only	  at	  noon	  are	  you	  consciously	  aware	  of	  it”	  (Block	  1995,	  p.234,	  original	  emphasis).	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To suggest otherwise leaves us open to the conceptual possibility of the philosophical 
zombie19. Conscious perception necessarily has P-conscious properties; if it lacked P-
conscious properties then, by definition, it wouldn’t be conscious perception.  
 
Unconscious states have no phenomenal properties and it is therefore a mistake to 
appeal to them as arbiters of the phenomenal properties of conscious states. Thus, 
unconscious emotions cannot be appealed to in order to determine the phenomenal 
properties of emotion. Valence is a phenomenal property of emotion. Unconscious 
emotion cannot be used to deny that valence is a phenomenal property of emotion. 
Therefore the counterchallenge fails.  
 
Emotions are paradigmatically valenced. Cognitions are not valenced. The valence of 
emotion cannot be explained by cognition. Hence emotion cannot be reduced to 
cognition.  
 
 
Chapter	  Conclusion:	  
 
I have argued that the type and intensity of one’s emotional response to the objects and 
events of the world are both determined by cognition. Therefore, emotion is partly 
cognitive. However, cognition cannot account for some of the phenomenal properties of 
emotion and in particular it cannot account for an emotion’s valence. Hence emotion 
cannot be reduced to cognition alone. Therefore, emotion is partly cognitive, but it 
cannot be reduced to its cognitive parts.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  A	  philosophical	  zombie	  is	  an	  entity	  which	  is	  like	  ourselves	  in	  all	  other	  respects,	  but	  which	  lacks	  phenomenal	  consciousness.	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In the next Chapter I will argue that emotion is partly constituted by feelings but that it 
cannot be reduced to its feeling parts.   
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Chapter	  2:	  Emotion’s	  Feeling	  Parts	  
 
In this chapter I will argue that emotion is partly constituted by feelings, but that 
emotion cannot be reduced to its feeling parts. I argue (§2.1) that the phenomenal 
properties of emotion supervene on bodily feelings, and thus emotion is necessarily 
partly constituted by bodily feelings. I consider (§2.2) feeling theories which 
hypothesise that emotion can be fully explained by, and thus reduced to, feelings. I 
argue (§2.3) that emotion has rational properties not held by bodily feelings, and thus 
emotion cannot be fully explained by feelings. Hence emotion is partly constituted by 
feelings, but it cannot be reduced to its feeling parts.  
 
§2.1	  The	  Feeling	  Part	  of	  Emotion	  
 
There is something that it’s like to be happy and there’s something that it’s like to be 
sad. There’s something that it’s like to be jealous and there’s something that it’s like to 
be in love. There’s something that it’s like to grieve and there’s something that it’s like 
to be afraid. This ‘what-it’s-likeness’ refers to the phenomenal qualities of an emotion. 
The phenomenal properties of emotion can be ineffable; one cannot always easily 
describe the ‘what-it’s-likeness’ of an emotion in semantic terms20. However, even if 
one cannot easily describe what it’s like to be happy, one can nevertheless say that what 
it’s like feels different in some way from what it’s like to feel sad (mutatis mutandis for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Brian	  Loar	  contends	  that	  “no	  direct	  semantic	  correlation	  holds	  between	  phenomenal	  qualities	  and	  English	  expressions”	  (1990,	  p.81)	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the other emotions mentioned). The difference between the two is a difference in 
phenomenal content. I argue (§2.1.1) that somatic feelings are a necessary part of an 
emotion’s phenomenal properties, and back up my claim by explaining the biochemical 
underpinnings of emotion. When two emotions differ in somatic feeling, they will also 
differ in their phenomenal properties. On this basis, how an emotion feels somatically is 
part of what it’s like to have that emotion; somatic feelings are part of the phenomenal 
properties of an emotion. Therefore emotion necessarily requires bodily feelings. I 
consider the challenge (§2.1.2) that feelings are merely the causal effects of emotion 
and not constituent parts of it. I respond (§2.1.3) that the challenge is incoherent. The 
phenomenal properties of a conscious emotion are intrinsic to that emotion. Feelings are 
an intrinsic part of the phenomenal properties of emotion, therefore, feelings are an 
intrinsic part of emotion. Emotion is partly constituted by feelings. 
 
 
§2.1.1:	  Emotion	  Necessarily	  Requires	  Feelings	  
 
It seems intuitively to be the case that emotion necessarily requires feelings. For 
instance, notions of ‘feeling an emotion’ and ‘having an emotion’ appear to be 
intensionally interchangeable – the two seem to mean the same thing. ‘Feeling happy’ 
and ‘being happy’ are analogous terms. Similarly ‘feeling annoyed’ and ‘being 
annoyed’, or ‘feeling jealous’ and ‘being jealous’. The intensional interchangeability 
between such terms makes emotion somewhat different from non-emotional states. 
Take the example of a cognitive state like belief. The notion of ‘believing that the sky is 
blue’ isn’t typically intensionally interchangeable with the notion of ‘feeling that the 
sky is blue’. Someone claiming a belief and someone claiming a feeling with the same 
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intentional content are not taken to be making analogous claims. Similarly for 
perceptual states; ‘seeing my laptop’ and ‘feeling my laptop’ refer to two distinct 
perceptual senses, visual and kinaesthetic, and therefore the two notions are not 
intensionally interchangeable. The intensional interchangeability between ‘being in an 
emotional state’ and ‘feeling an emotion’ seems to indicate an intuitive link between 
emotion and feeling. 
 
The feelings that seem integral to emotion include bodily or somatic feelings. 
Paradigmatically the somatic symptoms of emotion include inter alia elevated or 
decreased heart rate, increased or decreased respiration, tensing or relaxing of muscles, 
and intestinal peristalsis. Many of these somatic aspects are reflected in the 
metaphorical language we use to describe what it’s like to be in a particular emotional 
state – for instance gut wrenching despair, cringing embarrassment, or paralysing fear. 
Indeed, it may seem almost trivial to claim that what it’s like to be in a particular 
emotional state is determined inter alia by how one feels somatically. This seeming 
triviality illustrates that the phenomenal properties of emotion are intimately linked with 
somatic feelings. The reason for this intimate link may be found when one considers the 
biochemical processes that underpin emotion. Neuroscientist Candice Pert (1997) 
explains the process in her book Molecules of Emotion: 
 
During episodes of emotion a biochemical chain of events unfolds. Small-chain amino 
acids, known as peptides, are released into the body. These peptides travel through the 
blood and the limbic system and affect muscles and internal organs at a cellular level.  
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The surface of every cell throughout the body and in the brain has an outer oily 
membrane. Cellular structures known as ‘receptors’ are found in this membrane. These 
receptors are analogous to “lily pads floating on the surface of a pond, and, like lilies, 
receptors have roots enmeshed in the fluid membrane…and reaching deep into the 
interior of the cell” (Pert 1997, p.22). Receptors are composed of single molecules that 
respond to energy and chemical cues by vibrating. This allows chemicals to bond with 
the cell, a process that results in structural changes in the cell itself; receptors “bend and 
change from one shape to another, often moving back and forth between two or three 
favoured shapes, or conformations” (Pert 1997, p.22). A single cell can have millions of 
these receptors on its surface.  
 
At a cellular level, receptors bind with specific chemicals, known as ligands21, which 
exist in the extracellular fluid. A ligand is analogous to a chemical ‘key’ which binds 
with the receptor much as a key enters a keyhole. This process of binding creates a 
disturbance in the receptor molecule, causing it to rearrange its shape so that the 
chemical information of the ligand can enter the cell. The chemical information, having 
moved from the surface to the interior of the cell, begins a chain reaction of biochemical 
events that alter the state of the cell itself so that it might, for example begin to 
manufacture proteins, initiate cell division or discharge electricity. “In short, the life of 
the cell, what it is up to at any moment, is determined by which receptors are on its 
surface and whether those receptors are occupied by ligands or not” (Pert 1997, p.24). 
As an example, the binding of acetylcholine22 to receptors on the cells of heart muscle, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  From	  the	  Latin	  ligare,	  meaning	  that	  which	  binds.	  22	  Acetylcholine	   is	   an	   organic	   molecule	   that	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   heightened	  responsiveness	  and	  attention	  to	  sensory	  stimuli.	  See:	  Spehlmann	  et.	  al.	  (1971),	  Stone	  (1972),	  Foote	  et	  al.	  (1975).	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digestive tract muscle, and skeletal muscle, can variously result in a slowing of the 
heartbeat, the stimulation of digestion and feelings of relaxation. 
 
Because of receptor specificity the process of binding is selective. Receptor specificity 
means that a receptor will bind only with those ligands that have exactly the right shape 
to fit with it. “The opiate receptor, for instance, can ‘receive’ only those ligands that are 
members of the opiate group, like endorphins, morphine or heroin” (Pert 1997, p.24). 
Ligands are divided into three chemical types. The first type is that of the classical 
neurotransmitters like serotonin, histamine, dopamine and acetylcholine. The second is 
the category of steroids such as cortisol, oestrogen, progesterone and testosterone. But 
by far the largest category of ligands (accounting for about 95% of them) are the 
‘peptides’, which play a wide role in the regulation of all biological processes, and 
amongst which the emotional peptides are to be found: 	  Until	   the	  brain	  peptides	  were	  brought	   into	   focus	  by	   the	  discoveries	  of	   the	  1970s,	  most	  of	  our	  attention	  had	  been	  directed	   toward	  neurotransmitters	  and	  the	  jump	  they	  made	  from	  one	  neuron	  to	  another,	  across	  the	  little	  moat	  known	   as	   the	   synaptic	   cleft.	   The	   neurotransmitters	   seemed	   to	   carry	   very	  basic	  messages,	   either	   ‘on’	   or	   ‘off’,	   referring	   to	  whether	   the	   receiving	   cell	  discharges	   electricity	   or	   not.	   The	   peptides,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   while	   they	  sometimes	  act	   like	  neurotransmitters,	   swimming	  across	   the	   synaptic	   cleft,	  are	  much	  more	   likely	   to	  move	   through	  extracellular	   space,	   swept	  along	   in	  the	   blood	   and	   cerebrospinal	   fluid,	   travelling	   long	   distances	   and	   causing	  complex	   and	   fundamental	   changes	   in	   the	   cells	   whose	   receptors	   they	   lock	  into.	   Pert	  1997,	  p.26-­‐7 
 
 
 
Peptides are organic molecules that have extensive impact on the body at a cellular 
level. Composed of short-chain amino acids, bound together with carbon and nitrogen, 
peptides can be thought of as chemical messengers or ‘information substances’: “Amino 
acids are the letters. Peptides, including polypeptides and proteins, are the words made 
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from those letters. And they all come together to make up a language that composes and 
directs every cell, organ and system in your body” (Pert 1997, p.65).  
 
The biochemical changes, initiated by peptide binding at receptor sites, result in the 
alteration of cellular structure. Pert writes: “When a receptor is flooded with a ligand, it 
changes the cell membrane in such a way that the probability of an electrical impulse 
travelling across the membrane where the receptor resides is facilitated or inhibited” 
(1997, p.143). This occurs not only in the cells of the brain but at receptor sites between 
nerves and bundles of nerve-cell called ganglia, distributed in and near the spinal chord. 
These extend along pathways to the internal organs and to the skin. What this means is 
that the biochemical process involved in emotion – the binding of emotion peptides like 
adrenaline, noradrenaline, serotonin, cortisol, acetylcholine, etc. to receptors and 
subsequent cellular alteration – happens throughout the body.  
 
Having an emotion changes the body at a cellular level in ways that can be felt at a 
conscious level, so to ignore these changes would constitute an underdetermination of 
emotion. Take for instance a rough biochemical picture of what happens in the ‘fight or 
flight’ response associated with fear. When you feel fear, cortisol is released into the 
bloodstream. Cortisol binds with receptors in the cells of your brain and body (heart, 
lungs, skeletal muscles etc.). Once bound, cortisol releases its chemical information into 
the cells and results in structural cellular changes; your neurons fire, your heart beats 
faster and your blood pressure rises, your breath is more shallow, your muscles tense. 
All of these changes happen at a cellular level but they are changes that register, i.e. you 
can feel them happening. This means that the phenomenal properties of emotion - what 
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it’s like to have an emotion - is determined in part by the bodily feelings that 
accompany the biochemical changes occurring at a cellular level throughout the body.  
 
The evidence from the biochemistry of emotion provides empirical support for our 
intuitive notion that emotion necessarily requires feelings. On my view, therefore, 
emotion necessarily requires feelings.  
 
 
§2.1.2:	  A	  Challenge	  from	  Contingency	  	  
 
A cognitivist challenge to my position might argue that feelings are not constituent parts 
of emotion, rather they are merely its causal effects. Joel Marks (1982) argues for this 
claim. He maintains that emotions can be reduced to belief-desire sets. On his view an 
episode of fear, for instance, can be reduced to the belief that one is in danger and the 
desire to flee. According to Marks, emotion can cause bodily feelings but the bodily 
feelings that arise are contingent, and therefore not an intrinsic part of the emotion 
itself.  
 
 
§2.1.3:	  Response	  to	  the	  Challenge	  
 
I believe the cognitivist position is unconvincing. I argued in the previous chapter that 
emotions are paradigmatically valenced states. I argued that valence is necessarily 
somatic, it is necessarily felt in the body. And I defended this claim against an objection 
from unconscious emotion. I argued that unconscious emotions are special cases and not 
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counterexamples because unconscious states lack phenomenal properties by definition, 
so one may not appeal to these states as arbiters of phenomenal properties.  
 
In order for the challenge to be convincing, it would have to demonstrate that the 
phenomenal properties of a conscious emotion are causal effects of that emotion and 
not intrinsic parts of it. This seems to me to be an incoherent position. If one were to 
remove the phenomenal properties of emotion, one would remove the emotion. For 
instance, if one were to remove the feeling of a racing heart and churning stomach from 
the emotion of excitement, if one were to feel nothing at all, one would no longer 
characterise oneself as excited. The phenomenal properties of a conscious emotion are 
intrinsic to that emotion. Feelings are an intrinsic part of those phenomenal properties. 
Therefore feelings are an intrinsic part of emotion. Emotion is partly constituted by 
feelings. 
 
I now present feeling theories of emotion which hold that emotion can be reduced to 
feelings alone. I then go on to argue (§2.3) that emotion cannot be reduced to feelings 
because emotion has rational properties which feelings do not have. 
  
 
§2.2:	  Argument	  for	  the	  Reduction	  of	  Emotion	  to	  Feelings	  
 
I argued in the previous section that emotion is partly constituted by feelings. But some 
theorists have gone further and suggested that emotions just are those feelings. In this 
section I present (§2.2.1) the feeling theories of emotion. I also present (§2.2.2) a 
challenge against those theories. I further discuss (§2.2.3) a methodological weakness in 
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the challenge before presenting my argument (§2.3) for why emotion cannot be reduced 
to feelings. 
 
 
§2.2.1:	  Feeling	  Theories	  of	  Emotion	  
 
Feeling theories of emotion, most notably those of William James (1884) and Carl 
Lange (1885), characterise emotions as physiological changes. On this view, when an 
object or event provokes emotion, one has a physiological response, and one’s 
physiological response is both necessary and sufficient for emotion; the somatic 
response just is the emotion.  
 
William James writes; “My thesis…is that the bodily changes follow directly the 
PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they 
occur IS the emotion” (1884 p.189-90; original emphasis). He goes on to say that 
“every one of the bodily changes, whatsoever it be, is felt, acutely or obscurely, the 
moment it occurs” (ibid, p.192; original emphasis).  
 
James argues for his thesis by considering what, if anything, is left of emotion once the 
feeling of bodily changes is subtracted from it. “If we fancy some strong emotion and 
then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic 
bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no ‘mind-stuff’ out of which the 
emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is 
all that remains” (ibid, p.193). A purely disembodied emotion, one not felt in the body, 
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is inconceivable according to James. Carl Lange, separately, comes to the same 
conclusion: 	  We	   have	   in	   every	   emotion	   as	   sure	   and	   tangible	   factors:	   (1)	   a	   cause	   –	   a	  sensory	   impression	   which	   usually	   is	   modified	   by	   memory	   or	   a	   previous	  associated	   image;	   and	   (2)	   an	   effect	   –	   namely,	   the	   above	  mentioned	   vaso-­‐motor	  changes	  and	  consequent	  changes	  in	  bodily	  and	  mental	  functions.	  And	  now	  we	   have	   the	   question:	  What	   lies	   between	   these	   two	   factors;	   or	   does	  anything	  lie	  between	  them?	  If	  I	  start	  to	  tremble	  when	  I	  am	  threatened	  by	  a	  loaded	  pistol,	  does	  a	  purely	  mental	  process	  arise,	  fear,	  which	  is	  what	  causes	  my	   trembling,	   palpitation	   of	   the	   heart,	   and	   confusion;	   or	   are	   these	   bodily	  phenomena	   aroused	   immediately	   by	   the	   frightening	   cause,	   so	   that	   the	  emotion	  consists	  exclusively	  of	  these	  functional	  disturbances	  of	  the	  body?	  Lange	  1885,	  p.64	  
 
His answer is that the latter is the case – emotion consists in bodily changes. Like 
James, Lange holds that emotion cannot plausibly be said to exist without its feeling 
attributes. “Take away the bodily symptoms from a frightened individual; let his pulse 
beat calmly, his look be firm, his colour normal, his movements quick and sure, his 
speech strong, his thoughts clear; and what remains of his fear?” (Lange 1885, p.66). 
His question is, he believes, rhetorical; on his view nothing is left. According to both 
James and Lange feelings are necessary for emotion.  
 
James implies that feelings are also sufficient for emotion when he claims that there is 
no ‘mind-stuff’ remaining out of which an emotion can be constituted once the feeling 
of an emotion is removed. Lange goes one step further and attempts to substantiate this 
implication. He argues that emotion can be induced or changed purely by physical 
means. He argues that alcohol can change sorrow into joy, and fear into courage, and 
that emetics can have a depressive effect. If emotion can be elicited in a purely physical 
way “utterly independent of disturbances of the mind” (Lange 1885, p.66), he argues, 
then emotion must be a feeling phenomenon - thought, or cognition cannot be a 
necessary part of it.  
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For James and Lange emotion is best understood as a non-cognitive embodied 
phenomenon for which feelings are both necessary and sufficient. On this view, feelings 
are necessary for emotion because taking away the feeling of an emotion leaves nothing 
remaining that could plausibly be called an emotion. And they are sufficient because 
emotion can be induced by chemical means and therefore without the necessity for 
cognition or perception. If feelings are both necessary and sufficient for emotion, then 
emotions can be reduced to feelings.  
 
 
§2.2.2:	  Challenge	  to	  the	  Feeling	  Theories	  	  
 
An argument against the Feeling Theories was originally put forward by Walter Cannon 
(1927) based on evidence from Gregorio Marañon (1924). Later, Schachter & Singer 
(1962) conducted research that attempted further to substantiate Cannon’s challenge. 
The challenge maintains that feelings alone are not sufficient to explain how we 
differentiate between disparate emotions that feel similar. If that’s true then feelings are 
necessary but not sufficient for emotion.  
 
The feeling theories of James and Lange became orthodoxy until they were challenged 
by Walter Cannon in 1927. He argues that the feeling theories aren’t sufficient to 
explain how we distinguish between emotions and non-emotional states with similar 
physical symptoms. On Cannon’s view, fear and rage, as well as fever and exposure to 
the cold, result in the same “acceleration of the heart, contraction of arterioles, dilatation 
of bronchioles, increase of blood sugar, inhibition of activity of the digestive glands, 
	   65	  
inhibition of gastro-intestinal peristalsis, sweating, discharge of adrenin, widening of 
the pupils and erection of  hairs” (1927, p.110). But, he argues, fear, rage, fever and 
exposure to the cold are all states that we can typically distinguish between under 
normal circumstances; we don’t, under normal circumstances, mistake being cold for 
being enraged. If the physical symptoms are the same in each case, argues Cannon, then 
their differentiation cannot be due to physical symptoms. Thus, on his view, the feeling 
theories are insufficient to account for how we differentiate amongst different emotions 
that feel physiologically similar.  
 
Carl Lange had made purely anecdotal claims about artificial emotion induction in his 
argument. Cannon countered those claims by citing Marañon (1924) who had carried 
out research into the effects of injections of adrenalin:  	  When	   injected	  directly	   into	   the	  blood	   stream	  or	  under	   the	   skin	   it	   induces	  dilatation	   of	   the	   bronchioles,	   constriction	   of	   blood	   vessels,	   liberation	   of	  sugar	   from	   the	   liver,	   stoppage	   of	   gastrointestinal	   functions,	   and	   other	  changes	  such	  as	  are	  characteristic	  of	   intense	  emotions.	   If	   the	  emotions	  are	  the	  consequence	  of	  the	  visceral	  changes	  we	  should	  reasonably	  expect	  them,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  postulates	  of	  the	  James-­‐Lange	  theory,	  to	  follow	  these	  changes	   in	   all	   cases.	   Incidental	   observations	   on	   students	   who	   received	  injections	   of	   adrenalin	   sufficiently	   large	   to	   produce	   general	   bodily	   effects	  have	  brought	  out	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  specific	  emotion	  was	  experienced	  by	  them	  -­‐	  a	  few	  who	  had	  been	  in	  athletic	  competitions	  testified	  to	  feeling	  "on	  edge,"	  "keyed	  up,"	  just	  as	  before	  a	  race.	   Cannon	  1927,	  p.113	  
 
 
Cannon claimed that if artificial stimulation of the physiological changes typically 
associated with strong emotions didn’t produce those emotions, then emotions must be 
more than just physiological changes. On this view, feelings are not sufficient for 
emotion. 
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Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer (1962) believed that the evidence used by Cannon 
in his argument could be open to challenge. The subjects in Marañon’s study had been 
aware that they had been injected with adrenalin. Schachter & Singer believed that this 
could have biased the results. They maintained that a subject who feels ‘on edge’ or 
‘keyed up’ would be less likely to identify themselves as feeling an emotion (fear or 
excitement for example) if they are aware that those feelings are the result of an 
injection of adrenalin. On their view, subjects would be less likely to report an 
emotional state if they already had a physical explanation for the way they felt; they 
would just attribute any physiological symptoms to the injection and not look any 
further for an emotional explanation.  
 
To overcome this shortcoming Schachter & Singer (1962) devised a study that avoided 
the methodological problems of Marañon’s research. In their study subjects were told 
that they were being injected with a vitamin rather than with the epinephrine (adrenalin) 
that was actually used. Of the 185 subjects who took part in the study, some were told 
they would experience physical side effects and some were not. Amongst those who 
were made aware of the possibility of side effects, some were correctly informed that 
they would experience elevated heart rates and increased respiration, while some were 
misinformed that they would experience numbness and itching.  
 
Schachter & Singer’s study was designed to show whether subjects in the same 
artificially induced states of physiological arousal could be manipulated into 
demonstrating and reporting different emotional states. They hypothesised that “given a 
state of physiological arousal for which an individual has no explanation, he will label 
this state in terms of the cognitions available to him” and “by manipulating the 
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cognitions of an individual in such a state we can manipulate his feelings in diverse 
directions” (Schachter & Singer 1962, p.395). To that end, the subjects were split into 
two groups. Individual subjects from the first group were left alone in a room with 
someone demonstrating euphoric behaviour; individuals from the second group were 
left with someone demonstrating increasing levels of outrage.  
 
The researchers hypothesised that subjects who either had no knowledge of, or incorrect 
information about, possible side effects of the ‘vitamin’ injection, could be manipulated 
into believing they felt the emotion being expressed by the person with whom they were 
left alone. Thus, those left with the ‘jester’ would demonstrate and report joy or 
happiness, while subjects left alone with the enraged individual would demonstrate and 
report anger. The results supported their hypothesis: “those subjects who had no 
explanation for the bodily state thus produced, gave behavioural and self-report 
indications that they had been readily manipulable into the disparate feeling states of 
euphoria and anger” (Schacter & Singer 1962, p.395).  
 
Schacter & Singer concluded that something other than the feelings caused by the 
adrenalin, with which the subjects had been injected, must be at play. All of the subjects 
should have experienced the same physiological symptoms (i.e. they should all have 
had similar feelings), yet some subjects claimed to experience joy while others claimed 
to experience anger. The disparity in their reported emotional experience could not be 
explained by the adrenalin injection. Schacter & Singer concluded that emotion 
identification necessarily requires something other than somatic feelings. The research, 
therefore, seemed to demonstrate that feelings are not sufficient for emotion. But the 
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research nevertheless had some methodological problems which undermine this 
conclusion.  
 
 
§2.2.3:	  Issues	  of	  Methodology	  	  
 
A challenge might be raised against Schacter & Singer’s methodology. Although their 
expectation was that the subjects all had similar feelings, resulting purely from the 
adrenaline injection, this may not have been the case. It is equally plausible that 
emotional contagion23 was the reason for the subjects’ reports of their emotions.  
 
Roughly speaking, you tend to feel happy when you’re in the presence of someone who 
is obviously happy, and you tend to feel anxious and angry when you are with someone 
who is enraged. If that’s the case then the researchers’ assumption that the test subjects 
only experienced feelings consistent with the injected adrenaline is flawed. The subjects 
who reported joy may genuinely have had a different physiological experience from 
those who reported anger. Their emotional states may have resulted, not just from the 
injected chemical, but from exposure to the emotional behaviour of the stooges. Those 
who reported feeling happy may indeed have felt happy; those who reported feeling 
angry may indeed have felt angry. If that’s true then the researchers’ conclusion that 
physiological symptoms are insufficient to differentiate between experiences of 
disparate emotions is undermined.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Emotional	   contagion	   is	   a	   form	   of	   empathy	   in	  which	   the	   emotions	   of	   two	   or	  more	   people	   can	  converge	  when	  they	  interact	  with	  one	  another.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  emotional	  contagion	  see	  Hatfield,	  Cacioppo	  &	  Rapson	  (1994).	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Schacter & Singer had two control groups. One was composed of those who were 
correctly informed of the symptoms to expect from the injection they were given; the 
other control consisted of a group injected with placebo (saline instead of epinephrine). 
The researchers hypothesised that those who were correctly informed were less likely to 
identify their physiological state as an emotional state; as with Marañon’s subjects, any 
physiological symptoms would be attributed to the injection. Their results bore this 
hypothesis out: “In those conditions in which subjects were injected with epinephrine 
and told precisely what they would feel and why, they proved relatively immune to any 
effects of the manipulated cognitions.” (1962, p.396). However, the difference between 
the control group injected with placebo and those who were misinformed about the side-
effects of the injection showed only borderline statistical significance. Those who were 
injected with placebo were as likely to report experiences of joy or anger as other 
subjects in the study. The research could not rule out the possibility that subjects were 
influenced by emotional contagion.  
 
In an attempt to compensate for the methodological shortcomings of the Schachter & 
Singer research, further research was carried out by Schachter & Wheeler (1962). In this 
study a further control group was introduced. This control group was injected with the 
autonomic blocking agent, Chlorpromazine24. The new research also mitigated against 
the potential for intersubjective influence by using a comedy movie (as opposed to 
‘stooges’) to manipulate the emotions of the subjects.  
 
The researchers hypothesised that “whatever emotional state is experimentally 
manipulated, it should be most intensely experienced by subjects who have received 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Chlorpromazine	   works	   by	   binding	   with	   cellular	   receptor	   sites	   for	   adrenalin,	   thus	   blocking	  adrenalin	  from	  binding	  to	  those	  sites.	  It	  is	  the	  active	  ingredient	  in	  the	  anti-­‐psychotic	  drug	  marketed	  under	  the	  brand	  name	  Thorazine.	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epinephrine, next by placebo subjects, and least of all by subjects who have received 
injections of an autonomic blocking agent” (Schachter & Wheeler 1962, p.121). Their 
results bore out their hypothesis. “Epinephrine subjects gave indications of greater 
amusement than did placebo subjects who, in turn, were more amused than 
chlorpromazine subjects” (ibid, p.124). Although the research only measured one 
emotion (amusement), it nevertheless backs up Schachter & Singer’s research. It shows 
that the somatic symptoms associated with adrenalin (the biochemical correlate of fear) 
can be misattributed as amusement. This misattribution is evidence that emotion 
identification requires more than somatic feelings.   
 
Schachter & Wheeler (1962) showed that the biochemical correlates of fear (adrenaline) 
can be misattributed as amusement. Research from Dutton & Aron (1974) and White, 
Fishbein & Rutstein (1981) also provides evidence that fear can be misattributed as 
sexual attraction; fear and sexual attraction can be mistaken for one another. The 
feelings associated with fear, excitement, amusement and sexual attraction do not seem 
to be sufficiently different from one another for us to differentiate between these 
disparate emotions. These emotions feel so similar that we can be manipulated into 
mistaking them for one another.  
 
Feeling theories of emotion are problematic because some disparate emotions feel 
similar. As both fear and excitement can be described as including feelings of tension, 
elevated heart rate, and shortness of breath, then there must be some other explanation 
for how we can tell fear and excitement apart. Feelings are not sufficient to explain how 
we differentiate between emotions that feel similar. Thus emotion cannot be reduced to 
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feelings. But I believe there is another reason why emotion cannot be reduced to 
feelings. Namely, emotion has rational properties that feelings do not have. 
 
 
 
§2.3:	  A	  Property	  of	  Emotion	  not	  held	  by	  Feelings	  
 
Ontological emergence entails that the emergent system cannot be reduced to its 
constituents by virtue of its having properties not held by those constituents. In this 
section I argue (§2.3.1) that emotion has rational properties. Emotions can be 
instrumentally rational, inasmuch as emotions can be purposive. Paradigmatic feelings 
like thirst and pain, on the other hand, do not demonstrate instrumental rationality. I 
consider the challenge (§2.3.2) that emotion used purposively is not genuine emotion. I 
respond (§2.3.3) that the challenge is difficult to defeat, but even if it is correct, there is 
further reason to hold that emotion has rational properties. Emotion is open to reason. 
Feelings like thirst and pain, on the other hand, are not. Emotion has rational properties 
not held by feelings. Thus, emotion cannot be reduced to feelings. 
 
 
§2.3.1:	  Emotion’s	  Instrumental	  Rationality	  
 
Emotion has rational properties not held by feelings like thirst and pain. For instance, 
emotion demonstrates instrumental rationality25. We sometimes use emotion to get our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See	  Patricia	  Greenspan	  (1988);	  she	  argues	  that	  emotion	  has	   ‘strategic	  rationality’.	  On	  her	  view,	  the	  rationality	  of	  emotion	  shouldn’t	  be	  assessed	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  rational	  the	  emotion	  might	  be	  as	  an	  immediate	  response,	  nor	  indeed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  agent’s	  control	  over	  her	  emotion	  but	  rather	  in	  
	   72	  
own way. It is not uncommon, for instance, for children to cry, or throw a temper 
tantrums, in order to get what they want. As adults we are also not above resorting to 
emotional blackmail, or using emotion to manipulate others for our own ends. A nice 
example of this is given by Robert Solomon (2003): 	  Joanie	  wants	  to	  go	  to	  a	  party;	  her	  husband	  does	  not.	  She	  begins	  to	  act	  bored	  and	  frustrated;	  he	  watches	  television.	  She	  resigns	  herself	  to	  reading,	  sighing	  occasionally.	  He	   askes	   if	   she	   has	   picked	   up	   some	   shirts	   from	   the	   laundry;	  she	   says	   “no”.	   He	   flies	   into	   a	   rage.	  He	   needs	   shirts	   (he	   has	   hundreds).	  He	  needs	  one	  of	  those	  (they	  are	  all	  the	  same).	  She	  is	  negligent	  (she	  was	  busy).	  She	  takes	  advantage	  of	  him	  (she	  stays	  with	  him).	  Naturally,	  she	  rebels,	  but	  she	   is	   upset,	   with	   mixed	   guilt	   and	   anger.	   She	   thinks	   him	   unreasonable,	  impossible,	   and	   slightly	   neurotic.	   Their	   encounter	   is	   short-­‐lived.	   She	   goes	  off	   to	   read;	   he	   settles	   back	   before	   the	   television.	   The	   party	   is	   out	   of	   the	  question.	   Solomon	  2003,	  p.12	  
   
Both parties in this exchange use emotion to try to get what they want. Joanie 
deliberately shows her boredom and frustration with occasional sighing, presumably in 
an attempt to change her husband’s mind. The husband (we never learn his name) uses 
his anger so that Joanie will give up on the idea of the party. This sort of occurrence is 
not unusual and may even be a familiar part of some relationships. 
 
Similarly, it is not unusual that a person can use sadness to achieve what they want. Part 
of the complexity of this kind of instrumental use of emotion is that our own emotions 
can evoke emotion in another. Sadness can evoke feelings of guilt in another. This guilt 
can then convince the other to give us what we want. We learn this at a very young age 
when we realise that our tears can convince a parent to capitulate. The notion of ‘guilt 
tripping’ is something with which we are probably all familiar; either because we’ve 
done it ourselves, or because we’ve had it done to us, or both. It’s possible to ‘guilt trip’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  terms	  of	  how	  her	  emotion	  functions	  as	  a	  way	  of	  avoiding	  injury	  (in	  the	  widest	  sense	  of	  that	  term)	  and	  controlling	  the	  behaviour	  of	  others.	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another by verbal appeal to their emotions (as in argumentum ad misericordiam), but it 
seems that the easiest way to appeal to another's emotions is through the use of our own. 
It is possible to make someone feel guilty by showing them that you’re sad, and 
allowing them to infer that your sadness is their fault. When someone thinks that your 
sadness is their fault, they are more likely to capitulate and give you what you want. 
Thus sadness can be used instrumentally for one’s own ends. As Solomon writes:  	  Emotions	   are	   not	   the	   brutish,	   unlearned,	   uncultured,	   illogical	   and	   stupid	  drives	   that	   they	   are	   so	   often	   argued	   to	   be.	   To	   the	   contrary,	   they	   are	  extremely	   subtle,	   cunning,	   sophisticated,	   cultured,	   learned,	   logical	   and	  intelligent.	   There	   is	   more	   intelligence	   in	   resentment	   than	   in	   the	   routine	  calculations	   of	   syllogising;	   and	   there	   is	   far	  more	   strategy	   in	   envious	   Iago	  than	  in	  thoughtful	  Hamlet.	  The	  cunning	  of	  Reason,	  when	  you	  see	  what	  Hegel	  means	  by	  it,	  is	  almost	  always	  the	  cunning	  of	  emotion.	   Solomon	  1977,	  p.46	  
 
 
Emotion can be used in subtle, cunning, and sophisticated ways. Emotion can be used to 
manipulate the feelings of others in order to achieve our own ends. As such, therefore, 
emotion demonstrates instrumental rationality.  
 
Bodily feelings are not instrumentally rational. Take thirst and pain for instance. We do 
not (neither consciously, nor unconsciously) become thirsty in order to achieve our own 
ends in the way that we can become angry to avoid going to a party. We become thirsty 
as a result of dehydration. We do not feel pain in order to manipulate others, we feel 
pain when we are injured or unwell.  
 
Emotion demonstrates instrumental rationality, and bodily feelings do not. Emotion has 
rational properties not held by bodily feelings. Bodily feelings, therefore, cannot 
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account for the rationality of emotion. Thus, emotion cannot be reduced to bodily 
feelings. 
 
 
§2.3.2:	  A	  Challenge	  from	  ‘Non-­‐Genuine’	  Emotion	  
 
A potential challenge may be raised against my argument for the rationality of emotion. 
It might be argued that emotion, when it is used instrumentally, is not genuine emotion. 
Theorists who considers genuine emotion to be passive and pre-reflective may hold this 
position26. Peter Goldie (2000) holds something like this position about expressions of 
emotion. He describes facial expressions (as well as related phenomena like laughter 
and tears) as “involuntary bodily movements” (Goldie 2000 p.137; original emphasis). 
He argues that emotional expressions, used instrumentally, do not constitute genuine 
expressions of emotion. In the same vein, it might be argued that someone who uses 
anger to avoid a party is not genuinely angry, rather they pretend to be angry in order to 
get what they want. Similarly, someone who uses sadness to make another feel guilty 
merely pretends to be sad.  
 
Emotion used instrumentally may not be genuine emotion. If emotion used 
instrumentally is not genuine emotion, then such instances do not provide evidence that 
emotion has rational properties. According to this challenge, therefore, emotion cannot 
be said to have rational properties.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  For	  instance	  see	  Peters	  &	  Mace	  (1962)	  on	  emotions	  as	  passive	  states,	  and	  Davis	  (2003)	  on	  expressions	  of	  emotion	  as	  involuntary.	  
	   75	  
 
§2.3.3:	  Response	  to	  the	  Challenge	  
 
The challenge is correct inasmuch as instrumental use of emotion is not sufficient 
evidence for the claim that emotion has rational properties. Indeed, if this were the only 
reason to believe that emotions demonstrate rationality, my argument would be 
seriously undermined. However, emotions can also be said to be rational in another 
way. Emotions are responsive to reason.  
 
For example, in The New York Journal of June 2nd 1897, Mark Twain famously wrote: 
“The report of my death was an exaggeration”. No doubt some of his friends had seen 
the earlier newspaper reports of his death that had prompted him to make the statement. 
If they did see the earlier mistaken reports, then it is likely that they felt grief at what 
they thought was the death of a friend. But the same friends would have ceased to 
grieve once they realised that Twain was still alive. This because grief is open to reason. 
Once one realises that the person one grieves for is still alive there ceases to be a reason 
to grieve, and so one stops grieving.  
 
Similarly, I might feel guilty about turning up fifteen minutes late for dinner, but if I 
were to discover that my watch was running fifteen minutes fast, and I wasn’t in fact 
late after all, I would no longer have reason to feel guilty. My guilt would dissipate, 
probably to be replaced by relief. If emotions weren’t responsive to reason in this way 
then I might continue to feel guilty. The fact that I cease feeling guilty demonstrates that 
emotion is responsive to reason. This responsiveness to reason is a rational property of 
emotion. 
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Bodily feelings, on the other hand, are not responsive to reason. If I am thirsty, 
reasoning that I just had a large glass of water only an hour ago, and ought not to be 
thirsty again, will not alleviate my thirst. If my toe hurts because I stubbed it on the 
coffee-table, reasoning that I ought to have been looking where I was going, or 
discovering that it was in fact the desk and not the coffee-table I’d walked into, will not 
change the pain in my stubbed toe. Bodily feelings like thirst and pain are not open to 
reason.   
 
Emotions have rational properties; they are responsive to reason. Paradigmatic feelings 
are not responsive to reason; they do not have rational properties. As such, therefore, 
emotion has at least one property not held by feelings. As feelings cannot account for 
the rational properties of emotion, emotion cannot be reduced to feelings.  
 
 
 
Chapter	  Conclusion:	  
 
In this chapter I have argued that feelings are an intrinsic part of emotion. This seems 
intuitively to be the case (talk of feelings is often interchangeable with talk of 
emotions), and evidence from the biochemistry of emotion supports this intuition. I 
argued that the phenomenal properties of emotion are partly determined by feelings. 
The phenomenal properties of emotion are intrinsic to emotion. Thus feelings are an 
intrinsic part of emotion. But emotion cannot be reduced to feelings because emotion 
has rational properties not held by feelings. Thus, feelings are necessary but not 
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sufficient for emotion. Feelings are an intrinsic part of emotion, but emotion cannot be 
reduced to feelings.  
 
In the next chapter I argue that emotion is also partly perceptual, but that it cannot be 
reduced to its perceptual parts. 	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Chapter	  3:	  Emotion’s	  Perceptual	  Parts	  
 
In this chapter I will argue that emotion is partly perceptual, but emotion cannot be 
reduced to its perceptual parts. I argue (§3.1) that the intentionality of emotion partly 
supervenes on perception. On my view the intentional objects of emotion are perceptual 
objects and thus emotion necessarily requires perception. I discuss (§3.2) a perceptualist 
argument that emotion can be fully explained by, and therefore reduced to, perception. I 
argue (§3.2) that emotion has at least one property that perception does not have; 
emotion has second-orders, as evidenced by metaemotion, while perception does not. 
Thus emotion cannot be reduced to perception. Emotion is partly perceptual, but it 
cannot be reduced to its perceptual parts.   
 
 
§3.1:	  Emotion	  is	  Partly	  Perceptual	  
 
In this section I will argue that an emotion’s intentionality - what an emotion is about - 
is determined in part by the objects of perception. I argue (§3.1.1) that the intentional 
objects of emotion are perceptual objects. As such, therefore, emotion necessarily 
requires perception. I anticipate two challenges to my position. First (§3.1.2) that the 
intentionality of an emotion is determined by cognition; if that’s the case then my claim 
that the intentionality of emotion also supervenes on perception may be said to 
constitute an overdetermination of emotion. Second (§3.1.3) I consider a potential 
challenge from absent objects.  
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§3.1.1:	  The	  Intentional	  Objects	  of	  Emotion	  are	  Perceptual	  Objects	  
 
Occurrent emotions are typically intentional states, which is to say that they are 
typically about something. When I feel embarrassed, there’s typically something that 
I’m embarrassed about - some ill-advised behaviour on my part. When I grieve, my 
grief is typically about something - the loss of someone important to me. When I feel 
guilty, there’s typically something I feel guilty about - e.g. turning up late for dinner. In 
each of these instances the emotion in question has an intentional object – that which 
the emotion is about. My embarrassment is about my behaviour, my grief is about my 
loss, my guilt is about my tardiness. Emotion represents its intentional objects as being 
a certain way. So for instance, my embarrassment represents my behaviour as socially 
awkward; my grief represents my loss as painful and irredeemable; my guilt represents 
my tardiness as disrespectful or hurtful. Nevertheless the objects and events that 
emotion represents are objects and events in the world. 
 
When I’m angry at some real or imagined slight, my anger can be said to be about that 
real or imagined slight. On this basis it can be said that the real or imagined slight is the 
intentional object of my anger. I emphasise that the slight can be imagined because it is 
possible to be mistaken about the intentional objects of emotion. For instance, suppose a 
friend fails to acknowledge me when we pass each other on the street. I can feel quite 
hurt and angry that she has snubbed me. In this instance ‘her failure to greet me’ is the 
intentional object of my emotion. However, I may be mistaken. It may be that my friend 
was preoccupied with concerns of her own and unaware of her surroundings when we 
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passed one another; it may be that she didn’t see me at the time. In this case no real 
snub exists and my emotional response is mistaken.  
 
Emotion represents the world as being a certain way; as being thus and so. For example, 
my anger and hurt represent ‘my friend’s failure to greet me’ as ‘a snub’. Part of what 
my emotion is about, therefore, is my perception of my friend’s failure to greet me. 
Without my perceiving that failure, there would be no emotion. Thus the intentionality 
of emotion is determined inter alia by the objects that emotion represents. And the 
objects that emotion represents are objects of perception. Thus the intentionality of 
emotion is determined inter alia by the objects of perception. Emotion is partly 
perceptual.  
 
Consider another example. John and Tim have decided to marry. As the day draws 
closer, John notices that Tim is spending less and less time on the wedding 
arrangements and more time with his football friends. The night before the wedding, 
when they were due to introduce their parents to each other, Tim turns up late saying he 
got caught up with work but looking like he’d just got out of the shower. Throughout 
the meal, Tim seems to be paying little attention to the enthusiastic conversation about 
the honeymoon and answers several texts, smiling secretly to himself each time. When 
they reach home afterwards, Tim tells John that he has to pop out again for a little 
while. By the time he returns several hours later, John has worked himself into a 
consummate state of jealousy. John accuses Tim of having cold feet about the wedding, 
he cites Tim’s increasing absence as an obvious lack of commitment, he accuses him of 
lying about why he was late for dinner and concludes that he’d just spent the previous 
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hours with a lover. In John’s opinion they might as well call the wedding off now and 
avoid the inevitable divorce down the line.  
 
As it turns out, John couldn’t have been be more mistaken. Tim had been more absent 
recently because he’d been secretly contacting all of John’s old university friends to ask 
them to come to the wedding as a surprise for John. Given that Tim wasn’t sure who 
these friends were this included a lot of time spent tracking people down, time which 
he’d told John he was spending with his football friends so as not to spoil the surprise. 
On the day of the dinner he’d also devoted hours to searching through dusty old 
archives at the university for endearingly funny photos of John, after which he’d needed 
to shower at the gym in order to be presentable for dinner with the parents. During 
dinner he’d received the final messages from Tim’s old friends promising they’d be 
there for the wedding the next day. After he’d dropped John off, Tim had gone on to his 
office to compile the photos he’d gathered from the university into a video montage 
with John’s favourite song in the background. Unfortunately, this had taken more time 
than he’d envisaged but he couldn’t wait to see John’s delight the following day at the 
wonderful surprise. Equally unfortunately, it never occurred to him that John might 
misinterpret his actions, it never occurred to him that John might feel jealous. But Tim 
was now faced with spoiling the surprise or risking a cancelled wedding.  
 
The point of this fictional story is to show that we can easily be mistaken where 
emotions are concerned. And when we are mistaken it is typically because we have 
misinterpreted or misrepresented that which the emotion is about. John misrepresented 
Tim’s behaviour as infidelity. As such, therefore, John’s jealousy was partly about 
Tim’s behaviour; his absences, his excuses, his furtive texts. And Tim’s behaviour was 
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something that was perceived by John. It seems that the objects we misrepresent, when 
our emotions are mistaken, are perceptual objects. Thus, objects of perception are part 
of the intentionality of emotion.  
 
 
§3.1.2:	  Challenge	  from	  Overdetermination	  
 
A potential challenge may be raised that the intentionality of emotion is cognitive. For 
instance, jealousy is about infidelity or a fear of loss. Thus, John’s jealousy is about his 
evaluation of Tim as being unfaithful. The evaluation made by John represents Tim’s 
behaviour as being a certain way, i.e. as being unfaithful. This evaluation appears to be 
sufficient to explain the representational content of John’s emotion. If that’s the case 
then the intentionality of emotion is cognitive and my characterisation of intentionality 
as partly perceptual might be said to constitute an overdetermination of emotion.  
 
The challenge is flawed because it conflates the intentional objects of emotion with the 
way in which those objects are evaluated. Consider the case in which John’s emotion is 
something other than jealousy. It’s possible that John could have evaluated Tim’s 
behaviour as deeply loving (which in fact it was), in which case his emotion would have 
been something other than jealousy (gratitude perhaps). The version of John’s story in 
which he is jealous and the version in which he is grateful share the same intentional 
object – Tim’s behaviour. The fact that one of these potential emotions is a 
misrepresentation of that object, and the other isn’t, does not detract from the fact that 
the intentional object is the same in both cases. In both cases the intentional object is an 
object of perception.  
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Tim’s behaviour is a real-world state of affairs as perceived by John. To conflate Tim’s 
behaviour with John’s evaluation of that behaviour would be to fall foul of an act-object 
ambiguity. It is a mistake to conflate the object of the emotion with the evaluation of 
that object. Irrespective of how John evaluates Tim’s behaviour, what he evaluates is 
Tim’s behaviour and Tim’s behaviour is a perceptual object. To consider how an object 
of emotion is evaluated, and fail to consider the nature of that which is being evaluated, 
constitutes a serious underdetermination of emotion. And as conflating the act of 
evaluation with the object that is evaluated is a mistake, the challenge fails.  
	  
	  
§3.1.3:	  A	  Challenge	  from	  Absent	  Objects	  	  
 
A second challenge may be raised here. Sometimes we do not directly perceive the 
objects of our emotions. For instance, it is possible to feel angry about an injustice one 
merely reads about in the newspaper. In this instance the object of emotion is not 
directly perceived; the injustice was not witnessed in person. If one can have an emotion 
about an object that is not directly perceived, then my claim that the intentionality of 
emotion supervenes on perception seems to be undermined.   
 
	   84	  
I find the objection unconvincing because it implies that objects of perception might 
only be characterised as objects of perception when they are directly perceived. The 
challenge maintains that one would have to question whether the objects of emotion are 
perceptual objects if one can have an emotion about an absent object. The implication 
here is that the object of an emotion can be said not to be a perceptual object if that 
object is absent, i.e. if it is not directly perceived. But for this view to be correct it 
would have to be the case that any object is an object of perception if and only if that 
object is directly perceived. This position seems to veer perilously close to idealism and 
must therefore be incorrect. Objects of perception can be characterised as objects of 
perception whether or not they are directly perceived. Thus an absent object is 
nevertheless an object of perception and the challenge fails.  
On my view, the intentional objects of emotion are objects and events in the world. If 
my view is correct then the objects of emotion are perceptual objects, irrespective of 
whether those objects are directly perceived by the emoter. And if the intentional 
objects of emotion are perceptual objects then the intentionality of emotion supervenes, 
at least in part, on perception. Emotion is partly perceptual. 
 
 
§3.1.4:	  Section	  Conclusion	  
 
I have argued that perceptual objects are a necessary part of the intentionality of 
emotion. If one removes the perceptual object of an emotion, one removes the emotion. 
Therefore, emotion is partly perceptual. Perceptualism about emotion argues for the 
stronger claim that emotion can be fully explained by perception; on this view emotion 
can be reduced to perception. In the next section I will present the perceptual thesis, and 
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in particular the thesis as it is argued for by Jesse Prinz (2004). I then go on (§3.3) to 
challenge the reduction of emotion to perception on the basis that emotion has at least 
one property not held by perception. 
	  
	  
§3.2:	  An	  Argument	  for	  the	  Reduction	  of	  Emotion	  to	  Perception	  	  
 
Perceptualism about emotion maintains that emotion just is a form of perception. Jesse 
Prinz (2004, 2006) holds this view. He argues that, in much the same way as we 
perceive colour through vision, we perceive danger through fear and we perceive loss 
through sadness. Emotion, according to Prinz, just is a form of perception. I explain 
(§3.2.1) Prinz’s argument that emotion can be reduced to perception. I present a 
challenge (§3.2.2) to Prinz on the basis that his position does not adequately account for 
the way in which we differentiate between different emotions. I then consider his 
response that emotions can be differentiated on the basis of their cognitive causes, 
without cognition being a necessary part of emotion. 
 
 
§3.2.1:	  Prinz’s	  Perceptual	  Argument	  
 
Prinz holds that emotions are the perception of ‘core relational themes’, which he 
describes as relations that pertain to personal wellbeing. Core relational themes, he 
claims, are representations of “organism-environment relations with respect to 
wellbeing” (2004, p.52). He argues that these representations are “inextricably bound up 
with states that are involved in the detection of bodily changes” (ibid, p.52). According 
to Prinz, in much the same way as the eye is the means by which we perceive visual 
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images, bodily changes are the means by which we perceive core relational themes. 
These core relational themes, on Prinz’s view, are perceived directly by the body and 
emotion just is the perception of core relational themes.  
 
In order to unpack Prinz’s perceptual thesis, some clarification is necessary, beginning 
with what we should understand by ‘core relational themes’. Prinz borrows the term 
from Richard Lazarus (1991) who points out that the person and the environment are 
not wholly separable when it comes to emotion, there is a relationship between the two. 
Not everyone is afraid of heights, not everyone feels slighted if a friend turns down their 
dinner invitation, and not everyone enjoys being the centre of attention. “If we feel 
threatened, insulted, or benefited…there must be a conjunction of an environment with 
certain attributes and a person with certain attributes, which together produce relational 
meaning” (Lazarus 1991, p.90).  
 
On Lazarus’ view, threat, insult and gratification are relational concepts; if you remove 
either the person or the circumstances from the equation the concepts lose their 
meaning. Lazarus holds that underlying every emotion is a basic, or central, or core, 
relational theme which describes the relation between the person and her environment 
or circumstances. Underlying all instances of anger, for instance, is a central theme of ‘a 
demeaning offense against me and mine’; underlying all instances of anxiety is a basic 
theme of ‘facing uncertain, existential threat’; underlying all instances of guilt is a core 
theme of ‘having transgressed a moral imperative’. Core relational themes, therefore, 
might be seen as the tropes that underlie different instances of the same emotion. Taking 
Lazarus’ view as the starting point for his argument, Prinz writes: 	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One	   can	   generally	   find	   a	   common	   theme	   behind	   the	   range	   of	   things	   that	  elicit	   any	   given	   emotion.	   Consider	   a	   number	   of	   things	   that	   might	   cause	  sadness:	   a	   child’s	   death,	   a	   report	   on	   political	   crises	   in	   the	  Middle	   East,	   a	  divorce,	   being	   fired,	   a	   rejection	   letter,	   a	   low	   grade,	   misplacing	   one’s	  favourite	   sunglasses,	   a	   bad	   weather	   forecast,	   and	   so	   on.	   These	   elicitors	  range	  from	  the	  tragic	  to	  the	  trivial,	  and	  they	  involve	  utterly	  different	  kinds	  of	   events.	   Still,	   they	   are	   alike	   in	   one	   respect:	   they	   all	   involve	   the	   loss	   of	  something	   valued.	   We	   can	   lose	   loved	   ones,	   hopes	   for	   world	   peace,	  relationships,	  careers,	  prized	  possessions,	  self-­‐esteem,	  access	  to	  resources,	  and	  many	  other	   things.	  The	   things	   themselves	  differ,	  but	  each	  can	  be	   lost,	  each	  one	  is	  valued	  and	  in	  each	  case	  the	  loss	  leads	  to	  sadness.	  It	  makes	  sense	  to	   say	   that	   sadness	   is	   elicited	   by	   loss,	   where	   loss	   is	   defined	   as	   the	  elimination	  of	  something	  valued.	  This	  analysis	  explains	  why	  different	  things	  sadden	  different	  people.	  	   Prinz	  2004,	  p.61-­‐62  
 
 
When viewed in this way, Prinz believes that the concept of core relational themes 
allows for a distinction to be made between the formal object and the particular object 
of an emotion – a distinction first made by Kenny (1963). “The death of a child can be a 
particular object of one’s sadness, but it causes sadness in virtue of being a loss. Being a 
loss is the formal object of sadness” (Prinz 2004, p.62).  
 
Prinz then argues that core relational themes are the formal objects of emotion – they 
are the relational properties in virtue of which a specific emotion is felt. On Prinz’s 
view, emotion represents its formal objects. Thus, according to Prinz: “An episode of 
sadness may concern any number of distinct particular objects, but the sadness in each 
episode represents loss” (ibid, p.62). On this view core relational themes are the formal 
objects of emotion, and emotion represents core relational themes.  
 
Prinz argues that if the representations of emotion can be explained without appeal to 
cognition then emotion can be reduced to perception. He argues that “emotions can 
represent core relational themes without describing them” (2004, p.65) and that “core 
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relational themes are tracked by registering changes in the body” (ibid, p.68). He argues 
that this means that emotion can be reduced fully to perception without appeal to any 
cognitive components like judgement or belief.  
 
To explain this more fully he draws an analogy with higher level conceptual contents of 
visual perception. Theories of higher order perception hold that what we have learned, 
not least in terms of concepts, contributes to the representational content of perception. 
The representational content of perception can depend on experience. In much the same 
way, on Prinz’s view, bodily changes can register as core relational themes. When I see 
a snake, I don’t need to form the judgment that this snake is dangerous to me; “merely 
seeing the snake get’s one’s heart racing” (2004, p.74). Fear represents the core 
relational theme of ‘dangerous to me’, and “fears track dangers via heart palpitations” 
(ibid, p.68). Prinz argues that this means perception is sufficient to explain emotion. 
 
Prinz goes on to argue that core relational themes can be directly perceived. He says, 
“Just as the visual system subdivides into hierarchical pathways for detecting colour, 
form, motion and position, the somatosensory system subdivides into pathways for 
detecting textures, shapes, temperature, injuries and core relational themes” (Prinz 
2004, p.225). He admits that core relational themes may seem very different from 
colours, textures and tastes. We consider the latter to be observable properties whereas 
the former seems not to be observable in the same way. A core relational theme such as 
‘a demeaning offense against me and mine’, or ‘facing uncertain, existential threat’, or 
‘having transgressed a moral imperative’ can’t be tasted or smelled or touched; these do 
not seem to be the sort of thing we think of as ‘in the world’ that might be ‘given’ to us 
directly through perception. But Prinz thinks this is a mistake. The fact that such themes 
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are relational properties, depending on the subject as well the environment, does not 
mean that they cannot be directly perceived. “Many other relational properties can be 
perceived,” he writes. “Consider the property of being about 10 feet away” (ibid, 
p.226). He concludes that there is no obvious reason to deny that core relational themes 
are observational properties.  
 
 
§3.2.2:	  Challenge	  from	  Emotion	  Differentiation	  
 
In the previous chapter I said that feeling theories of emotion were challenged on the 
basis that bodily feelings aren’t sufficient to differentiate between emotions that feel 
similar. Disparate emotions like fear, excitement and sexual attraction, can all have 
similar somatic symptoms. Despite their feeling similar, however, we can usually tell 
them apart from one another under normal circumstances. On Prinz’s view, emotion is 
the perception of core relational themes and these themes are represented by bodily 
feelings. As such, therefore, on his view, the body is the sensory organ of emotional 
perception. But if that’s the case then Prinz must account for how we differentiate 
between emotions that feel similar in the body, like fear and excitement. If he cannot do 
this then his account of emotion as a form of perception can be undermined for much 
the same reason as the feeling theories were.  
 
Prinz anticipates this challenge and responds to it. He argues that emotions can have 
cognitive causes and can be differentiated on the basis of those causes. But on his view, 
the role of cognition is merely contingent. He explains using the example of two 
emotions which he holds to be somatically similar, anger and jealousy. Prinz argues that 
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emotion is individuated by its cognitive causes through, what he calls ‘calibration files’. 
His explanation is inspired by Fred Dretske’s (1986) account of mental representation. 
Prinz appeals to Dretske’s example of a cough being used as a signal. In this instance 
something that usually indicates one thing (a tickle in the throat) can be used to indicate 
another (a signal). “Likewise,” Prince writes, “an embodied appraisal that usually 
represents a demeaning offense (anger) may represent an infidelity (jealousy) when 
used under the direction of the right judgment. We can recalibrate our embodied 
appraisals to occur under conditions that are somewhat different than those for which 
they were initially evolved.” (Prinz 2004, p.99).  
 
Prinz suggests that emotion differentiation is explained by different emotions being 
reliably caused by judgments. He calls the mental mechanism involved in this process 
‘calibration files’: 	  Calibration	  files	  are	  data	  structures	  in	  long-­‐term	  memory.	  Every	  calibration	  file	  contains	  a	  set	  of	  representations	  that	  can	  each	  causally	  trigger	  the	  same	  (or	   similar)	   patterned	   bodily	   responses.	   The	   perceptions	   of	   the	   bodily	  responses	   caused	   by	   representations	   in	   a	   calibration	   file	   are	   emotions.	  Their	   content	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   representations	   in	   a	   calibration.	  Emotions	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  content	  of	  any	  individual	  representation	  in	  a	  calibration	   file	   but	   rather	   the	   more	   abstract	   property	   that	   those	  representations	   collectively	   track.	   The	   calibration	   file	   for	   jealousy	   is	   a	  collection	  of	  representations	  that	  can	  track	  infidelity.	  It	  includes	  the	  explicit	  judgment	  that	  one’s	  lover	  has	  been	  unfaithful.	  When	  representations	  in	  this	  file	   are	   activated,	   they	   trigger	   a	   somatic	   response,	   and	   that	   response	  triggers	  an	  embodied	  appraisal.	  If	  an	  embodied	  appraisal	  just	  happens	  to	  be	  caused	   by	   an	   isolated	   judgment	   on	   some	   particular	   occasion,	   it	   is	   not	   yet	  calibrated	  by	  that	  judgment.	  If	  an	  appraisal	  is	  reliably	  caused	  by	  a	  judgment	  of	   a	   certain	   kind,	   then	   it	   will	   come	   to	   be	   reliably	   caused	   by	   whatever	  external	   conditions	   are	   represented	   by	   that	   judgment.	   For	   that,	   we	   need	  calibration	  files.	  	   Prinz	  2004,	  p.100	  	  
 
 
Prinz uses the notion of the calibration file to circumvent the challenge that emotions 
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that feel similar might be mistaken for one another. He denies that emotions that feel 
similar need necessarily be distinct in terms of their embodiment. Regret, remorse and 
guilt need not be somatically distinct, he argues, because they are the same embodied 
appraisal, recalibrated by virtue of having different causes. “By establishing new 
calibration files, an embodied appraisal can be said to represent something beyond what 
it is evolved to represent. Thus while the set of possible higher cognitive emotions is 
open-ended, it is not the case that every time we have an embodied appraisal triggered 
by a different judgment it counts as a distinct emotion” (Prinz 2004, p.100-101).  
 
An obvious objection to this account of cognition as merely causal (and not intrinsic) is 
foreseen by Prinz. “The distinction between calibrating causes and constitutive causes 
looks like a cheap trick,” he says. “If a judgment reliably triggers an embodied appraisal 
to occur, there seems to be little reason to deny that it is part of the resulting emotion” 
(2004, p.101). Prinz argues that this challenge is based on a false assumption; the 
assumption that ‘reliably caused’ by a judgment means ‘always caused’ by that 
judgment. He argues that jealousy may reliably be caused by more than one judgment – 
‘that one’s lover is unfaithful’, ‘that one’s lover has been staying overly late at work 
recently’, ‘that one’s lover smells of someone else’. But instances of jealousy, caused 
by different judgments, are nevertheless instances of the same emotion. “Instances of 
jealousy are united not by the fact that they share judgments but by the fact that they 
share similar somatic states and those somatic states represent infidelity” (2004, p.101). 
Guilt, remorse and regret, according to Prinz’s theory, are all the embodied appraisals 
that can be distinguished by the separate calibration files that cause them.  
 
On Prinz’s view, differentiation between emotions can be accounted for by cognitive 
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calibration files, held in long term memory. These files cause the recognition of an 
emotional state as being one type rather than another, but they are not part of the 
emotion itself. Emotion, on this view, may have cognitive causes but it has no cognitive 
constituents. He concludes that this means emotion can be reduced to perception alone. 
 
But I believe there is another reason to suggest that emotion cannot be reduced to 
perception. This is because emotion has at least one property that perception does not 
have. Emotions have higher-orders, while perceptions do not. I will argue that a 
perceptual account of emotion cannot explain the second order phenomenon of 
metaemotion. Thus, emotion cannot be reduced to perception.  
 
 
§3.3:	  A	  Property	  of	  Emotion	  not	  held	  by	  Perception	  
 
Metaemotions are second order emotions about first order emotional states. For 
instance, feeling guilty about being happy when so many others aren’t. I argue (§3.3.1) 
that emotion has second-orders but perceptions do not. I anticipate the objection 
(§3.3.2) that second-order emotions might be explained as emotions that take other 
emotions as their objects, which conceivably perceptions can also do. I respond (§3.3.3) 
that second-order emotions have the effect of altering the first-order emotions that they 
are about. A perception which takes another perception as its object does not alter the 
initial perception. Metaemotion is relevantly different, therefore, from a perception 
which takes another perception as its object, and perception alone cannot account for 
the second-order phenomenon of metaemotion. Emotion has at least one property that 
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cannot be accounted for by perception. Therefore emotion cannot be reduced to 
perception. 
 
 
§3.3.1:	  Emotions	  have	  Second-­‐Orders	  while	  Perceptions	  Do	  Not.	  
 
It is possible to have emotions about one’s emotions. For example, it is possible that I 
might feel annoyed about being jealous when I thought that my tendency to feel jealous 
was a pattern I’d finally broken. Similarly, its possible to feel guilty about being happy 
when someone close is going through a tough time. Annoyance about one’s jealousy, 
and guilt about one’s happiness, are emotions about emotions or second-order emotions, 
otherwise known as metaemotions. Second-order emotions have the effect of altering 
the first order emotions that they are about, such that metaemotion changes the 
landscape of an emotional experience. Dina Mendonça writes, “metaemotions 
necessarily have an impact on the value of the first order emotion” (2013 p.394). If I 
feel guilty about being happy, my guilt has the effect of tempering my happiness – my 
guilt makes my happiness less wholehearted than it would have been had I not felt 
guilty about it. 
 
Metaemotion is essentially a learned phenomenon that stems from parental and societal 
attitudes towards emotions. Hakim-Larson et. al explain that children are taught 
“deliberately and inadvertently how to label, express, and regulate emotions by their 
parents and others in their social environment” (2006, p.230). They maintain that how 
children (and the adults they become) feel about their emotions can be heavily 
influenced by whether they grew up in a household where emotions were trivialized, 
	   94	  
dismissed, and discouraged, or in a household where parents are not just aware of the 
child’s emotions but are actively involved in helping their child to process and integrate 
those emotions. In short, metaemotion can be thought of as a conditioned or socialised 
phenomenon, which is learned through familial and societal influence. For instance, a 
child may learn from family, school, or society, that one ought not to show anger, 
especially if one is female. This is because anger may be deemed by some to be a 
‘negative’ or ‘bad’ emotion. ‘Negative’ or ‘bad’ in this context refers to the emotion’s 
axiological value rather than its hedonic charge or valence. In simplistic terms the child 
learns that it is a bad thing to feel angry. As a consequence she may feel ashamed of her 
anger whenever it arises. Feeling shame about one’s anger is something that is learned 
directly from a parent’s or a society’s negative reaction to that emotion, as well as 
indirectly from a parent’s attitude towards the same emotion in themselves. If a parent is 
ashamed of her own anger, then her child will likely grow up in turn feeling ashamed 
whenever she gets angry.  
 
On my view, emotion’s second-orders cannot be accounted for by perception because 
we do not typically have perceptions about our perceptions. Indeed, the very notion of 
second-order perceptions seems conceptually incoherent, and as a result it is difficult 
even to characterise a second-order perception in such as way as to make it 
comprehensible. For example, imagine that you’re listening to a piece of music. This is 
an instance of first order perception. A second order perception might perhaps be 
characterised as ‘hearing yourself listening to a piece of music’. In this instance 
‘hearing yourself listening’ might be said to constitute a second-order perception. But 
the notion of ‘hearing yourself listening’ is not a familiar notion. Even spelled out in 
this way it remains difficult to comprehend. 
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We are much more familiar with the notion of second-orders when it comes to 
cognition. Indeed, cognitions are something that we readily conceive of as having 
second orders; we can easily conceive of having beliefs about our beliefs, or judgments 
about our judgments. Metacognition and metaemotion are well recognised phenomena. 
Meta-perception is not. On my view, this is because perceptions do not have second-
orders. But if perceptions do not have second-orders then perception cannot account for 
metaemotion and hence emotion cannot be reduced to perception alone.  
 
Emotion has second-orders and perception does not. As such, therefore, perception 
cannot explain metaemotion. If perception cannot explain metaemotion then emotion 
cannot be reduced to perception. 
 
 
§3.3.2:	  A	  Challenge	  from	  Cross-­‐Modal	  Perception.	  
 
A challenge may be raised against my position. It might be argued that metaemotion 
might be explained as being analogous to cross-modal perception, in which one form of 
perception can have an altering effect on another. For instance, what one hears while 
one is eating can have an altering effect on one’s flavour perception. Put this way, it is 
less difficult to conceive of metaemotion in perceptual terms as the challenge will show. 
 
Empirical research27 shows that the taste of food can be modulated by changing the 
background noise present when a person is eating. For instance, in one study (discussed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  See	  Crisinel	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  and	  Spence	  (2012).	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in Spence 2012) participants listened to real-time auditory feedback, over headphones, 
of their own crunching while eating Pringles™. The feedback was altered randomly in 
terms of loudness and pitch so that some of the sounds participants heard were veridical, 
some were louder, some softer, and some at a higher or lower pitch. The study found 
that “participants rated the potato chips as tasting both significantly crisper and 
significantly fresher when the overall sound level was increased and/or when just the 
high frequency sounds above 2kHz were boosted. By contrast the participants rated the 
crisps as being both staler and softer when the overall sound intensity was reduced 
and/or when the high frequency sounds associated with their biting in to the potato chip 
were attenuated instead.” (Spence 2012, p.507; original emphasis). According to Spence 
the growing body of evidence “clearly demonstrates that what we hear, be it the sound 
of the food, its packaging, its preparation, or any background noise/music can all 
impact…on both the sensory-discriminative and hedonic aspects of our flavour 
experiences” (ibid, p.513).   
 
A challenger may argue that metaemotion is analogous to the sort of cross-modal effect 
on perception demonstrated in research. On this view feeling guilty about being happy 
might be explained as one type of emotion (happiness) that is altered by another type of 
emotion (guilt). This seems analogous to the example in which a token of olfaction 
(flavour) is altered by a token of audition (e.g. the sound of a crunch). So, according to 
the challenge, just as sound can alter flavour, one’s perception of guilt can alter one’s 
perception of happiness. On this view metaemotion may be explained by perception. 
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§3.3.3:	  A	  Response	  to	  the	  Challenge	  
 
The challenge is mistaken. Cross-modal perception differs from metaemotion in two 
important respects, intentionality and awareness.  
 
In the first instance, the research into flavour perception convincingly demonstrates that 
flavour is a cross-modal form of perception. Which is to say that the flavour of food and 
drink is not determined by taste alone. Rather it is also influenced by sound, by 
kinaesthetic properties such as crispness/softness etc., as well as by vision (as in 
metaphorically ‘eating-with-one’s-eyes’). In short, the research indicates that flavour is 
a multisensory experience; what one hears when one crunches on a crisp is part of one’s 
flavour experience. On this basis one would say, quite accurately, that the improved 
flavour it is because of the sound. But the claim ‘that one’s experience of flavour is 
altered because of what one hears’ is entirely different from the claim ‘that one’s 
experience of flavour is about what one hears’. The latter is an intentional claim, the 
former is not. 
 
Now consider metaemotion. When one feels guilty about one’s happiness, for instance, 
one does indeed feel guilty because one is happy and that guilt does have a modulating 
effect on one’s happiness. But, unlike cross-modal perceptual effects, one’s guilt has an 
intentional object; one feels guilty about one’s happiness. Metaemotions have 
intentionality, and cross-modal perceptions are not plausibly intentional in the same 
way.  
 
Secondly, we are typically unaware of cross-modal perceptual effects. Spence points 
this out when he writes; “[I]t turns out that most people are typically unaware of the 
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impact that what they hear has on how they perceive and respond to food and drink” 
(2012, p.506). So, while it may be true that sound has an altering effect on flavour 
perception, we are not typically aware of that effect.  
 
When it comes to metaemotion, on the other hand, we can be acutely aware of the 
altering effect of a second-order emotion. Metaemotion changes the landscape of an 
emotional experience. When I feel guilty about being happy I do not have the same 
emotional experience as I would have had if my happiness were unadulterated. I am 
aware that my happiness is altered by some (non-happy) emotional state, even if I 
cannot immediately name that altering state. Such awareness makes meta-emotion 
relevantly different from cross-modal perception. Metaemotion and cross-modal 
perception differ in terms of intentionality and awareness. Thus metaemotion and cross-
modal perception are not analogous, and the challenge fails. 
 
Emotions have second-orders and perceptions do not. Therefore, emotion has at least 
one property that is not held by perception. As perception alone is not sufficient to 
explain metaemotion, emotion cannot be reduced to perception. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter	  Conclusion:	  
 
I have argued that the intentionality of emotion supervenes partly on perception; the 
intentional objects of emotion are perceptual objects. On this basis emotion can be said 
to be partly perceptual. However, emotion cannot be reduced to perception because 
emotions have second-orders and perceptions do not. As such, therefore, perception 
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cannot account for this property of emotion. Thus, emotion has perceptual parts, but 
emotion cannot be reduced to perception.  
 
This chapter concludes the first part of the argument for my claim that emotion is an 
ontologically emergent sui generis faculty. Next, in the conclusion to Part I, I will sum 
up my argument so far, and explain why I consider emotion to be a faculty.  
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Part	  I	  Conclusion:	  The	  Faculty	  of	  Emotion	  
 
I have argued that emotion is partly cognitive, that it requires feelings, and that it is 
partly perceptual. An emotion’s type and intensity are determined in part by cognition; 
an emotion’s phenomenological properties are determined by bodily feelings; and the 
intentionality of emotion is determined in part by perception. I have also shown that 
emotion is irreducible to any of these constituent parts in isolation because, in each 
instance, emotion has at least one property not held by that part. Thus emotion meets the 
first necessary condition for ontological emergence: emotion has mereological parts to 
which it cannot be reduced.  
 
On my view, emotion is a complex phenomenon. For me, this complexity raises an 
important question as to how emotion ought to be characterised. Emotion might be 
characterised as a response to objects and events in the world. But in my view this 
characterisation is inadequate because it fails to capture the complexity of emotion. 
Instead, we should countenance an emotional faculty, which groups together a set of 
related abilities. Putting things this way, my claim that emotion has cognitive and 
perceptual parts can be understood as the claim that emotional abilities will draw on 
cognitive and perceptual abilities, and hence that the faculty of emotion will depend on 
both the faculties of cognition and the faculties of perception. This provides us with a 
more nuanced understanding of emotion.  
 
A ‘faculty’ can be understood as a set of related abilities. Our cognitive faculties 
include: the language faculty, which relates to one’s ability to comprehend and produce 
linguistic utterances; the mathematical faculty, which relates to one’s ability to 
understand numerical patterns and functions; the faculty of pure reason, which relates to 
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one’s ability to think through logical implications; the faculty of practical reason, which 
relates to one’s ability to make decisions that guide one’s actions; and so on. We also 
have perceptual faculties. For instance, spatial ability, which relates to one’s ability to 
recognise and discriminate between different shapes; and auditory ability, which relates 
to one’s ability to process and discriminate between different auditory stimuli.  
 
The notion that our cognitive and perceptual faculties consist in a set of related abilities 
does not require that any individual ability fit into just one faculty. Neither does it 
require that faculties be isolated from one another. Emotion draws on both our cognitive 
and perceptual faculties. For instance, emotion draws on our practical reasoning ability 
in its evaluations. Fear is an evaluation of threat, jealousy is an evaluation of infidelity 
etc. These evaluations are not arrived at by fiat. Rather, they involve inference from 
evidence. The evidence involved can include past experience as well as occurrent 
objects and events. Emotional evaluations require one’s faculties of practical reasoning. 
In the same vein, the intentional objects of emotion are perceptual objects and hence 
emotion requires spatial and auditory faculties.  
 
Additionally, characterising emotion as a faculty is in keeping with the notion of 
emotional intelligence. One definition of emotional intelligence is “the ability to 
monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and 
to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (Salovey & Mayer 1990, 
189; original emphasis). Emotional intelligence, thus described, is a set of abilities. 
Emotional intelligence also includes the ability to understand the emotional motivations 
of oneself and others, which can be a complex task. For instance, I have already pointed 
out (§2.3.1) that the emotions of one person can elicit emotion in another. I argued that 
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emotion can be used instrumentally to elicit emotion (I used the example of sadness 
being used to elicit guilt), with the ultimate aim of achieving one’s own ends. It requires 
a degree of emotional acuity to understand what is going on in such instances, 
irrespective of whether or not the emotional instrument is genuine.  
 
Emotional abilities, many of which require emotional intelligence, draw on cognitive 
and perceptual abilities. Considered as a faculty, emotion can be seen as drawing on 
both the faculties of cognition and the faculties of perception. I propose, therefore, to 
characterise emotion as a faculty.  
 
 
 
I now move to Part II of this thesis, where I argue that emotion demonstrates downward 
causation; emotion has a causal effect on its cognitive, feeling, and perceptual parts.  
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Part	  II	  Emotion	  has	  a	  causal	  effect	  on	  its	  cognitive,	  feeling	  and	  perceptual	  parts.	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Chapter	  4:	  Emotion’s	  Effect	  on	  Cognition	  
 
 
We are exhorted to listen to our heads and not our hearts. That this is the case suggests 
that we intuitively hold emotion to have a causal effect on action. As agents we have a 
choice in terms of what we do. Thus if emotion has an effect on our actions, then it 
seems plausible that emotion has an effect on the beliefs and judgments that determine 
those actions. Hence it is plausible that emotion has a causal effect on cognition. I have 
argued (Ch.1) that emotion is partly cognitive. In this chapter I will argue that emotion 
has a causal effect on cognition. I distinguish three cognitive practices on which I argue 
emotion has a causal effect. These are (§4.1) decision making, (§4.2) cognitive bias, and 
(§4.3) self-deception. As it might be argued that emotion’s effect on these cognitive 
practices demonstrates only that emotion has an effect on cognition at the macro-level 
of the emotional faculty, I also argue (§4.4) that token emotions can have a causal effect 
on cognition.  
 
 
 
§4.1:	  Emotion’s	  Effect	  on	  Decision	  Making	  
 
It is a fact of the matter that human beings are capable of irrational decisions. The 
Darwin Awards28 are testament to this. A recent example from the online press29 might 
be taken as a case in point. A man in Missouri had been burning rubbish in a field when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  “The	  Darwin	  Awards	  are	  a	  tongue-­‐in-­‐cheek	  honor,	  originating	  in	  Usenet	  newsgroup	  discussions	  circa	   1985.	   They	   recognize	   individuals	  who	  have	   supposedly	   contributed	   to	   human	   evolution	   by	  selecting	  themselves	  out	  of	  the	  gene	  pool	  via	  death	  or	  sterilization	  by	  their	  own	  actions.”	  Wikipedia	  entry:	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darwin_Awards	  29	  http://i100.independent.co.uk/article/man-­‐tries-­‐to-­‐put-­‐out-­‐fire-­‐by-­‐repeatedly-­‐driving-­‐over-­‐it-­‐with-­‐van-­‐full-­‐of-­‐guns-­‐and-­‐inadvertently-­‐creates-­‐perfect-­‐analogy-­‐for-­‐western-­‐foreign-­‐policy-­‐-­‐W1de56a2we	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the fire got out of hand. The man panicked and tried to put the fire out by repeatedly 
driving his truck over it. At the time his truck was loaded with firearms and had a full 
tank of petrol. Not unsurprisingly, the truck itself caught fire and both the ordinance and 
the petrol tank exploded. Miraculously the man escaped unharmed. The question I deal 
with in this section is whether or not these kinds of irrational decisions are causally 
influenced by emotion. Was the Missouri man’s panic a causal factor in his unfortunate 
decision, or might his decision be attributed solely to faulty reasoning? I argue that the 
former is the case. I will argue (§4.1.1) that we intuitively hold emotion to affect 
decision making and I present empirical evidence to back up this intuitive claim. I also 
argue that the adaptive value of an emotion like regret can be explained in terms of its 
causal role in decision making. I consider (§4.1.2) the challenge from the utilitarian 
position of Regret Theory that decisions are made on the basis of expected utility and 
thus determined by reason. So-called irrational choices can be explained as instances of 
faulty reasoning on this view. I respond (§4.1.3) that even on this utilitarian account, 
emotion is a factor in the calculation of utility. As such, therefore, the challenge cannot 
be said to undermine my position.   
 
 
§4.1.1:	  Emotion	  as	  a	  Causal	  Factor	  in	  Decision	  Making	  
 
The spurned lover can decide to cause a public scene. The belittled worker can decide to 
quit. The angry driver can decide to cut someone off at the intersection. We intuitively 
think that emotion is a causal factor in these sorts of decisions. For instance, we often 
appeal to emotion when explaining these actions, which would be odd if we didn’t think 
emotion played some role in their causal chain. It is not uncommon, for instance, for the 
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emotional state of a defendant to be presented as mitigating evidence in their defence. 
The nature of this defence suggests that barristers believe the defendant whose 
behaviour can be explained by emotion will be treated with greater lenience. That 
barristers continue to use this kind of defence suggests that this belief is not false.  
 
Even in cases where we think we make decisions on a purely rational basis, our 
decisions may nevertheless be influenced by emotion. Take the example of political 
decisions. One might think that policies and political manifestos are the only factors that 
might affect one’s decision on whom to vote for. But if that were the case then the 
common practice in politics of ‘scaremongering’ would make little sense. The recent 
Labour Party leadership election in the UK is a case in point. Supporters of the three 
losing candidates largely lobbied on the same claim, to the effect that the front-runner’s 
election would result in Labour losing the general election in 2020. One would like to 
assume that politicians are rational creatures. If they are, then their stance only makes 
sense if they expected this claim to result in a loss for the front-runner; they expected 
fear of losing the 2020 election to influence voters’ decisions about whether or not to 
vote for Jeremy Corbyn. If this was not their expectation then their tactics would make 
little sense. Fear, it seems, is a political tool. That this is the case demonstrates that we 
intuitively expect emotion to be a causal factor in decision making.  
 
Our intuitions are not the only reason to hold that emotion is a causal factor in decision 
making; empirical evidence also suggests that this is the case. This evidence comes not 
least from instances in which impaired emotional systems result in impaired decision 
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making. The prefrontal cortex 30  is associated primarily with the affective states 
described as social emotions (embarrassment, shame, guilt, pride etc.), inasmuch as it is 
thought to be the region of the brain functionally responsible for personality (deYoung 
et al, 2010) as well as social and interpersonal behaviour (Yang & Raine, 2009). 
Evidence has shown that when damage occurs in this area, the individual’s ability to 
make rational decisions in personal and social situations is compromised, even in cases 
where there is no impairment to memory or intellect. An example of the effects of 
damage to this area of the brain comes from the case of Phineas Gage, which Antonio 
Damasio (1994) relates in Descartes’ Error. In 1848, Gage, a construction foreman, 
suffered an accident in which a metal rod, one and a quarter inches in diameter, passed 
through his head, entering at his left cheek and existing through the top of his head. The 
accident did not kill Gage, and neither did it cause him to lose consciousness. He sat 
upright in the cart that carried him to help, and an hour following the accident he was 
alert and rational and able to describe the events to the doctor attending him. But while 
his physical and intellectual abilities remained unchanged following the accident, his 
personality was so significantly altered that he was unable to resume the life he had 
lived before.  
 
Gage had previously been described as a balanced individual who was emotionally 
temperate. Following the accident, however, he became anti-social. He became 
emotionally unstable, stubborn, quick to anger and swore constantly, which in the 
mores of the time was considered shocking. His motivation was also affected and 
although he made many plans for the future, they were all abandoned as soon as they 
were devised. The damage to Gage’s prefrontal cortices “compromised his ability to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  The prefrontal cortex is broadly subdivided into the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC).	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plan for the future, to conduct himself according to the social rules he previously had 
learned, and to decide on the course of action that ultimately would be most 
advantageous to his survival” (Damasio 1994, p.33).  
 
More recent cases show similar effects. Individuals who had previously been entirely 
rational in the way they ran their lives began to make personally and socially irrational 
and disadvantageous decisions following prefrontal cortical damage. It is thought that 
the damage to this region of the brain is consistently associated with “a disturbance of 
the ability to decide advantageously in situations involving risk and conflict and a 
selective reduction of the ability to resonate emotionally in [social] situations” 
(Damasio 2000, p.41). Research has also concluded that patients with damage to the 
prefrontal cortex become generally insensitive to future consequences (Bechara et al, 
1994). Damasio believes these findings “suggest that selective reduction of emotion is 
at least as prejudicial for rationality as excessive emotion” (Damasio 2000, p.41). He 
concludes from this that “[w]ell-targeted and well-deployed emotion seems to be a 
support system without which the edifice of reason cannot operate properly” (ibid, 
p.42).  
 
Pathology is not the only source of empirical evidence that emotion is causal in decision 
making. Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) holds that aversion to risk is a 
causal factor in decisions made under circumstances of risk. Research by De Martino et 
al. (2006) provides empirical evidence to back up this theory. Participants in the study 
initially received £50. They were then asked whether they would choose to ‘gamble’ or 
to ‘stay’. If they gambled, the respondent’s would have a chance of winning or losing 
the entire amount; if they ‘stayed’, they would keep £20 of the original £50. The study 
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found that the way that the ‘stay’ option was framed had a significant effect on the 
subjects’ decisions whether or not to gamble. The ‘stay’ option was framed either as 1) 
keep £20 – designated the ‘Gain’ frame, or as 2) lose £30 – designated the ‘Loss frame’. 
Options 1 and 2 obviously represent the same outcome, phrased differently, and yet the 
“behavioural results indicated that subjects’ decisions were significantly affected by our 
framing manipulation” (De Martino et al. 2006, p.684). Participants were significantly 
more likely not to gamble when presented with the Gain frame than when presented 
with the Loss frame. In other words, the results showed that participants were 
significantly less likely to risk losing the £50 if they were told that they’d keep £20 by 
‘staying’ (gambled 43% of the time), than if they were told that they would lose £30 by 
‘staying’ (gambled 62% of the time).  
 
De Martino et al. also measured the participants’ neurological activity in an fMRI 
scanner while these decisions were made. This allowed the researchers to measure brain 
activation throughout the test and to identify areas that were more active when 
participants were influenced by the way the options were framed. The significant 
differences in amygdala activation prompted the researchers to conclude that the 
framing effect was the result of “an affect heuristic underwritten by an emotional 
system” (ibid, p.686). 
 
In addition to our intuitions and the empirical evidence, the nature of some emotions is 
such that their evolution implies the role of emotion in decision making. Take the 
example of regret. Regret is a puzzling emotion when you consider that it is an 
immutable fact, in our world, that one cannot change the past. If emotion evolved for 
adaptive purposes (and it is plausible that it did) then it seems strange that an emotion 
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might evolve which is temporally biased more towards the past than the present, or the 
future. If emotion contributes to survival and adaptation, surely the temporal bias of 
emotion ought to be in the here and now. To regret the argument I had with my sister 
last week, or the fourth glass of wine I had at last year’s Christmas party, seems strange 
when it is a fact that I cannot go back and change either of those things. So the adaptive 
value of regret isn’t as immediately obvious as it might be, for instance, in the case of 
less temporally biased emotions like fear or jealousy.  
 
Fear has adaptive value inasmuch as it motivates me to fight, flee, or freeze, when I find 
myself in dangerous circumstances, and those who fight, flee, or freeze, are more likely 
to survive than those who don’t. Jealousy has an adaptive value inasmuch as it 
motivates me to fight for the attention of my mate against potential competitors, and 
those who successfully keep a mate are more likely to pass on their genes than those 
who don’t. But discerning the adaptive value of regret is more complicated because of 
its temporal bias. However the ubiquity of regret suggests that it does have some 
adaptive value. I believe that a plausible adaptive value for regret might be its causal 
influence on future choices. Regret appears to constitute an affective signal that one has 
made a mistake. If that’s the case then it’s plausible that regret evolved because those 
who learn from their mistakes have a better chance of survival than those who don’t. 
One can be said to have learned from one’s mistakes when one makes better decisions; 
when one is faced with the same set of circumstances and chooses differently. On this 
basis, a decision to choose differently is determined, at least in part, by one’s having 
learned from one’s mistakes. And regret is a causal factor in one’s learning from one’s 
mistakes.  
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In summary, we intuitively believe that emotion has a causal effect on decision making. 
Evidence from pathology, as well as from studies on decision making, suggest that this 
intuition is correct. Additionally, the adaptive value of an emotion like regret can be 
understood in terms of its affect on decision making. It seems reasonable, therefore, to 
conclude that emotion has a causal effect on decision making.   
 
 
§4.1.2:	  Challenge	  from	  Utilitarian	  Regret	  Theory	  
 
Regret Theory (Loomes & Sugden 1982) holds that we make decisions on the basis of 
the expected utility of the outcome, modified by the potential emotional consequences 
of our choice. According to Regret Theory we choose the outcome with the highest 
expected modified utility. The challenge might be raised, on the basis of Regret Theory, 
that decision making is, therefore, a rational practice unaffected by emotion.  
 
Actions have real-world consequences, including emotional consequences, and Regret 
Theory suggests that decision making can be explained in terms of the ascription of 
utility to these consequences. When one makes a choice between two options, the 
option that was not chosen ceases to be possible. Any emotion resulting from a 
difference between ‘what is’ and ‘what might have been’ is a consequence of that 
choice. Take the example of choosing between two job-­‐offers - for instance, between 
working in a bank or working in a small but promising start-up. If one chooses the job 
at the bank, the world becomes such that one works at a bank. If one chooses the start-
up, the world becomes such that one works in a small but promising start-up. Thus 
one’s choice has consequences in terms of how one experiences the world. Having 
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chosen the bank, one might wonder about what one’s world might have been like had 
one chosen the start-up, and vice versa. Regret Theory suggests that the pleasure we can 
derive from having chosen one option over the other will depend not only on the real-
world consequences of that choice, but also on the pleasure we believe we might have 
derived had we chosen the other option. If the option one did choose is deemed more 
pleasurable, one might experience happiness or joy. If that option is deemed less 
pleasurable, however, one will experience regret. On this view, the difference between 
‘what is’ and ‘what might have been’ can determine whether one rejoices or regrets31. 
Regret theory holds that we factor these emotional consequences into the utility value of 
our choices – what the authors call ‘expected modified utility’. In decision making, the 
theory suggests, we seek to maximise expected modified utility. 
 
Loomes & Stuben maintain that “Regret Theory rests on two fundamental assumptions: 
First, that many people experience the sensations that we call regret and rejoicing; and 
second, that in making decisions under uncertainty, they try to anticipate and take 
account of those sensations” (1982, p.820). For instance, if one were to apply the 
utilitarian principles of Regret Theory to the fire-fighting Missouri man, one might hold 
that his unfortunate decision was due to an inaccurate calculation of his decision’s 
expected modified utility, possibly based on incomplete information. On this basis, his 
decision was not irrational, nor was it due to his panic, but rather his decision was the 
result of a failure in reasoning. The man had two choices, he could do nothing or he 
could attempt to put the fire out. The consequences of his doing nothing might include 
that the fire would spread, potentially developing into a wildfire. This might have 
consequences which he could come to regret. His only other option was to use whatever 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  There	  is	  also	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  choice	  one	  does	  make	  are	  on	  a	  par	  with	  the	  potential	  consequences	  of	  the	  choice	  one	  didn’t	  make,	  in	  which	  case	  one	  may	  feel	  neutral	  with	  respect	  to	  one’s	  decision.	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means he had to hand to try to put the fire out. As it happens, the only means available 
to him was his truck. Unfortunately, the Missouri man failed to consider in his 
reasoning the possibility that his truck would also catch fire. Had he done so, he could 
have factored that possibility into his decision. No doubt, in that instance, he would 
have concluded that his regret would be even greater than the regret he would feel from 
doing nothing. As he failed to realise that his truck could explode, he failed to calculate 
the expected modified utility of his decision accurately. His failure to realise this can be 
explained by the limits of his cognitive acuity without any appeal to his panic. The 
Missouri man’s decision resulted from a failure to factor in all possible outcomes and 
their consequences into his reasoning. Thus his decision was not causally affected by 
emotion, rather it constitutes a failure in reasoning.  
 
Regret Theory can also predict that the Missouri man will not repeat his mistake. 
Having experienced the regret of his decision, he will now be in a position to factor this 
into the expected modified utility of his choices were he to find himself in similar 
circumstances in the future. On this basis, it can be predicted that he will choose 
differently. Appealing in this way to the utilitarian principles of Regret Theory shows 
that so-called irrational decisions may be no more than a failure in reasoning. If that’s 
the case then irrational decisions can be explained without appeal to emotion. Thus, 
emotion is not a causal factor in decision making.  
 
 
§4.1.4:	  Response	  to	  the	  Challenge	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I find the utilitarian challenge presented by Regret Theory to be unconvincing for two 
reasons. First because if emotional consequences are a factor in the determination of the 
expected modified utility of an outcome, and if expected modified utility is causal in 
decision making, then by virtue of transitivity, emotion is causal in decision making. 
And second because I find this approach implausible, especially as applied to the 
unfortunate decision of the Missouri man.   
 
Regret Theory suggests that our choices are determined inter alia by the hedonic value 
of the emotional consequences of our decisions. And if that’s true then emotion plays a 
causal role in decision making. We seek pleasurable emotional experiences, and we 
seek to avoid unpleasant ones. In Regret Theory the hedonic value of regret and joy are 
reflected in the ascription of utility; a lower expected modified utility is ascribed to 
outcomes that result in regret, and a higher expected modified utility to outcomes that 
result in joy. The ascription of utility is hedonically motivated. Regret theory suggests 
that we choose based on the highest expected modified utility. The highest expected 
modified utility is determined, at least in part, by the hedonic value of the emotional 
consequences of the decision. By virtue of transitivity, therefore, what we choose is 
determined, at least in part, by the hedonic value of the emotional consequences of our 
decisions. The hedonic value of emotion affects decision making. If that’s the case then 
decisions based on expected modified utility are not made on the basis of reason alone, 
they are also causally affected by the hedonic value of emotion. Hedonic value is a 
property of emotion. If a property of emotion is a causal factor in decision making then, 
by extension, emotion is a causal factor in decision making.  
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Also, in their argument, Loomes & Stuben consider the emotion of regret and suggest 
that “if an individual does experience such [regretful] feelings, we cannot see how he 
can be deemed irrational for consistently taking those feelings into account” (1982, 
p.820). This seems to me to imply that a person who does not experience regret 
(perhaps for pathological reasons) may not take the potential for feelings of regret into 
account in their decision making. The person who doesn’t feel regret would plausibly 
calculate the expected utility of various outcomes on some basis other than the 
emotional consequences of their decision. If they were to choose differently from a 
person who does take emotional consequences into account, then this difference in 
choice can be ascribed to the influence of emotion. If that’s the case, then for those who 
do experience regret, emotion must be a causal factor in the choice they make between 
different outcomes. Therefore decisions can be causally affected by emotion. 
 
Issues of emotional consequences aside, I believe it is implausible that the Missouri 
man’s panic did not influence his decision to drive his truck over the fire. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines panic as: “A sudden feeling of alarm or fear of sufficient 
intensity or uncontrollableness as to lead to extravagant or wildly unthinking behaviour” 
(OED online). Driving over a fire with a truck full of guns and a full tank of petrol 
seems to me to constitute extravagant and wildly unthinking behaviour. The Missouri 
man’s decision was the very definition of panicked. I believe it is more plausible that he 
acted out of panic than that he acted out of a calculation of expected modified utility. 
Panic can lead to bad decisions, not because the panicked person has failed to take the 
consequences of their decision into account, but because consequences aren’t even 
factored in. In a state of panic one acts first and thinks about it afterwards. If anything, 
panicked decisions epitomise cases in which emotion is the primary causal factor in the 
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choice of action. Thus, even if emotion were to prove to have little or no causal effect 
on decisions not resulting from panic, the fact that panic can have any effect at all on 
choice is sufficient to make my case that emotion can have a causal effect on decision 
making.    
 
 
 
§4.2:	  Emotion’s	  Effect	  on	  Cognitive	  Bias	  
 
In this section I argue that emotion is a causal factor in the development of cognitive 
bias32.  
 
When one selectively processes information, or interprets ambiguous information in a 
partial way, one is demonstrating cognitive bias. Some of the information we deal with 
on a daily basis can be assigned an axiological value, for instance it can be considered 
to have positive or negative moral worth. Such information can be open to interpretation 
with regard to the axiological value we can assign to it. Take the example of the 
growing movement of anti-austerity protests in various countries throughout Europe. 
For some these protests are seen as a campaign for social justice and a moral good. For 
others they are seen as anarchy and a moral bad. When consuming news reports about 
the protests these two groups might select differently in terms of which information 
they process. For example the ‘pro-protest’ group might pay more attention to the 
messages conveyed through speeches and placards, while the ‘anti-protest’ group might 
pay more attention to an image of eggs thrown at a politician by protestors. The two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  In	  making	  my	  argument	  I	  mainly	  limit	  the	  examples	  I	  use	  to	  instances	  of	  negative	  cognitive	  bias,	  or	   ‘bias	   against’.	   This	   should	   not	   be	   taken	   to	   mean	   that	   I	   believe	   positive	   cognitive	   bias	   to	   be	  unaffected	  by	  emotion.	  Rather,	  I	  limit	  the	  examples	  I	  appeal	  to	  because	  demonstrating	  that	  emotion	  causally	   affects	   negative	   cognitive	   bias	   is	   sufficient	   to	  make	  my	   argument	   that	   emotion	   causally	  affects	  cognitive	  bias.	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groups can also interpret the same information differently. For instance the same 
photograph of a group of protesters with their fists in the air might be interpreted by the 
‘pro-protest’ group as ‘fists held high in solidarity’, and by the ‘anti-protest’ group as 
‘fists raised in militant defiance’. What each group pays attention to, and how they 
interpret what they attend to, will depend on their disposition in favour of, or against, 
the protest. This sort of selective processing and interpretation of information is 
otherwise known as cognitive bias. In this section I argue that emotion is a causal factor 
in cognitive bias. I explain (§4.2.1) the mechanisms underpinning associative learning, 
and in particular the role played by the explicit and implicit memory systems. I argue 
that the same systems plausibly underpin cognitive bias. I argue (§4.2.2) that emotion is 
a causal factor in cognitive bias. I consider the potential challenge (§4.2.3) that 
cognitive bias is the result of a chain of reasoning and that emotion is incidental to that 
chain.  I respond (§4.2.4) that the irrationality of cognitive bias is not consistent with 
reasoning as the only causal factor in its formation. The irrationality of cognitive bias 
can, however, be fully explained if emotion is a causal factor.  
 
 
§4.2.1:	  Associative	  Learning	  
 
To be ‘biased’ is to hold an evaluative (positive or negative) stance or attitude. As an 
evaluation, cognitive bias is necessarily learned. Take the common examples of 
negative bias seen in racism, sexism, and homophobia. A person who is racist, sexist or 
homophobic roughly holds the belief that members of these groups are ‘less than’ (less 
valuable or less worthy) members of the group to which they themselves belong. To 
form this kind of bias requires that one form evaluative beliefs about what is valuable 
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and what is worthy. It also requires that one evaluate the value or worth of members of 
the outgroup on the basis of those evaluative beliefs. On this basis, cognitive bias is 
necessarily evaluative. But we are not born cognitively biased. For instance, prejudice is 
not a priori; it is not a fact of the matter like gravity or thermodynamics. Rather, we 
learn to become prejudiced. Thus cognitive bias is an evaluation that is necessarily 
learned.  
 
It is thought that one’s evaluative attitudes are acquired largely through the workings of 
implicit or nondeclarative memory (Squire & Dede 2015). Joseph LeDoux maintains 
that evaluative learning involves “implicit or unconscious processes in two important 
senses: the learning that occurs does not depend on conscious awareness and, once the 
learning has taken place, the stimulus does not have to be consciously perceived in 
order to elicit the conditioned emotional responses” (LeDoux 1998, p.182). The kind of 
evaluative learning that LeDoux focuses on primarily involves the evaluations of 
emotion, but I will show that the same learning process is plausibly involved in the 
learned evaluations of cognitive bias.  
 
LeDoux draws a distinction between implicit, unconscious ‘emotional memory’ and 
explicit, declarative, conscious ‘memory of an emotion’. On LeDoux’s view the implicit 
and explicit systems can run in parallel. Take the example of a person who has 
recovered from a car accident, who subsequently feels afraid every time she sits into the 
driver’s seat. In this instance both the implicit and the explicit system may be activated. 
Because of her traumatic experience, the driver may have come to associate driving 
with the trauma of the crash. Her implicit emotional memory of that trauma may 
subsequently be triggered by getting behind the wheel. At the same time, she may also 
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explicitly remember (and possibly in great detail) that she crashed and she may be 
reminded of that explicit memory whenever she gets behind the wheel.  
 
But this second, explicit system, isn’t necessary to her feeling afraid. LeDoux writes: 
“The particular fact that the accident was awful is not an emotional memory. It is a 
declarative [explicit] memory about an emotional experience. It is mediated by the 
temporal lobe memory system and it has no emotional consequences itself” (1998, 
p.201). That it is the implicit memory system that is predominant in the crash survivor’s 
subsequent fear response is evidenced by the fact that the absence of explicit memory is 
no bar to the triggering of that fear. For instance, had the crash survivor suffered 
amnesia as a result of the crash, she would have no explicit memory of the experience; 
she would have no ‘memory of emotion’. Nevertheless her fear can be triggered every 
time she attempts to drive. As her explicit memory is not functioning in this case, her 
implicit association between driving and crashing must be sufficient to trigger her fear. 
This unconscious system “opens the floodgates of emotional arousal, turning on all the 
bodily responses associated with fear and defense” (ibid, p.201). Thus, implicit systems 
are sufficient for evaluative learning. 
 
Ledoux maintains that “without the emotional arousal elicited through the implicit 
system, the conscious memory would be emotionally flat. But, the co-representation in 
awareness of the conscious memory and the current emotional arousal give an 
emotional flavouring to the conscious memory” (Ledoux 1998, p.201). On Ledoux’s 
view, when the crash survivor sits behind the wheel the memory from the past and the 
current state of arousal become seamlessly fused together so that they form a single 
unified conscious experience. This unified experience can itself also be converted into 
	   120	  
explicit long term memory. This seamless fusing of the past with the current state of 
arousal can allow new fears to develop. Thus, an implicit emotional memory of fear 
associated with a specific crash can evolve into a conscious fear of driving in general. 
That this is the case is evidenced by the fact that the intentional object of this new fear 
(driving in general) differs from the intentional object of the original fear response (a 
specific event that occurred while driving).  
 
Jacobs and Nadel (1985) have studied similar learned emotional responses. The authors 
were struck by the extent to which emotional patterns can become pervasive. Even 
when an individual is aware of just how irrational their emotional response is, “strong 
emotional responses continue to be exhibited” (Jacobs and Nadel 1985, p.514). They 
argue that the acquisition and retention of evaluative learning cannot adequately be 
explained by classical conditioning33 and therefore must have some other explanation. 
Classical conditioning requires repeated exposure to the conditioning stimulus, but in 
contrast, an evaluative response can be acquired from limited exposure, even in cases in 
which we have no conscious memory of the stimulating event. “Acquisition seems to 
just happen, with no specific contingent pairings of the feared stimuli and aversive 
consequences” (ibid, p.514).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Classical	   or	   Pavlovian	   conditioning	   originated	   from	   the	  work	   of	   Ivan	   Pavlov	   (1849-­‐1936).	   He	  demonstrated	  that	  a	  neutral	  stimulus	  can	  be	  made	  to	  elicit	  a	  pre-­‐reflective	  response	  if	   it	   is	  paired	  with	  a	  strong	  stimulus	  during	  a	  period	  of	  ‘conditioning’.	  In	  one	  famous	  experiment	  a	  bell	  was	  rung	  every	  time	  food	  was	  placed	  in	  front	  of	  a	  dog.	  In	  this	  instance	  the	  bell	  was	  the	  neutral	  stimulus	  and	  the	  food	  was	  the	  strong	  stimulus.	  The	  dog	  would	  naturally	  salivate	  when	  presented	  with	  the	  food,	  but	  over	  time	  the	  dog	  was	  conditioned	  to	  associate	  the	  sound	  of	  the	  bell	  with	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  food.	  After	  a	  period	  of	  conditioning	  the	  dog	  would	  salivate	  on	  hearing	  the	  bell,	  even	  when	  no	  food	  was	  presented.	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Jacobs and Nadel speculate, from the fact that early childhood trauma can have a lasting 
detrimental effect on one’s life34, even if that trauma isn’t remembered, that evaluative 
learning may mirror the kind of learning seen in infancy. Due to infantile amnesia35, 
few of our earliest memories are available to us as adults36. This is “a period during 
which the organism obviously experiences and learns but which is not available to 
conscious report” (ibid, p.515). If Jacobs and Nadel are correct, it may be that we 
acquire evaluative learning in much the same way as an infant acquires language skills.   
 
Regardless of the exact mechanisms involved in evaluative learning, as cognitive bias is 
necessarily a learned evaluation it seems plausible that the implicit systems discussed 
above are the same systems involved in cognitive bias. Consider an example. 
Islamophobia is a prejudice towards all Muslims, which has grown following the 
incidents of September 2001, the subsequent war in the Middle East, and the recent 
bombings by the militant group, Daesh37. The progression from the events of 9/11, and 
more recent bombings in Europe, to cognitive bias against Muslims, fits with Ledoux’s 
hypothesis of emotional memory. There seems little doubt that these violent events are 
traumatic, resulting as they do in myriad emotions including feelings of fear, 
helplessness, and rage. As such, for many these events can be said to instantiate both an 
explicit ‘memory of emotion’ as well as an implicit ‘emotional memory’. As discussed, 
conscious declarative memory is not a necessary requirement for the triggering of an 
emotional memory. Just as sitting into a car can unconsciously trigger a fear of driving 
for someone who’s been in a crash, seeing someone who looks like those who bomb 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  detrimental	  effect	  of	  early	  childhood	  trauma	  on	  health	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  35	  This	  phenomenon	  refers	  to	  the	  inability	  of	  adults	  to	  remember	  events	  before	  2-­‐4	  years	  of	  age.	  36	  This	  may	  be	  because	   the	  memories	  are	   somehow	   inaccessible	  or	  because	   they	  don’t	   exist.	   For	  more	  on	  explanatory	  theories	  of	  infantile	  amnesia	  see	  Howe,	  M.	  and	  Courage,	  M.	  (1993).	  37	  For	  a	  report	  on	  Islamophobia	  in	  the	  UK	  see	  Littler	  &	  Feldman	  (2015).	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European cities can unconsciously trigger the same feelings of fear, helplessness and 
rage. Hence, it seems plausible that implicit systems may be involved in the formation 
of Islamophobia.  
 
But even if it's the case that the systems underpinning cognitive bias are the same as the 
systems underpinning affective evaluative learning, this does not substantiate a claim 
that emotion is a causal factor in cognitive bias. In the next section I will argue for this 
claim and draw on empirical evidence that demonstrates a causal chain from emotion to 
prejudice.   
 
 
§4.2.2:	  Emotion	  is	  a	  Cause	  of	  Cognitive	  Bias	  
 
I contend that emotion is a causal factor in cognitive bias. For example hatred and fear 
are among the causes of negative cognitive bias, and love and kinship are among the 
causes of positive cognitive bias. Integrated Threat Theory (Stephen & Stephen 2000) 
claims that threat causes prejudice. The claim is based on quantitative research, carried 
out by the authors, into four types of threat which they found to contribute to bias on the 
part of an ingroup towards an outgroup. These are; realistic threats, symbolic threats, 
intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes. Realistic threats are threats to the existence 
or wellbeing of the ingroup; the authors cite warfare, threats to the ingroup’s economic 
or political power, and threats to the ingroup, or members of the ingroup, in terms of 
physical or material wellbeing (Stephen & Stephen 2000, p.25). Symbolic threats refer 
to perceived group differences in terms of morals, values, standards, beliefs and 
attitudes. As such, the authors hold that symbolic threats are threats to the world-view 
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of the ingroup (ibid, p.25). Intergroup anxiety refers to concerns about negative 
outcomes from intergroup interaction, which may result for individual members of the 
ingroup; examples include embarrassment, rejection, and ridicule (ibid, p.27). And 
finally, stereotypes are fixed and simplified ideas about a group that serve as a basis for 
the ingroup’s expectations about the behaviour of the outgroup (ibid, p.27).  
 
Research was carried out in three separate states in the USA, with circa 100 participants 
in each stage of research. The authors found all four perceived threats were accurate 
predictors of prejudice in all three stages of research (ibid, p.29). Thus the research 
demonstrated that whether or not one holds an outgroup to pose a threat (in terms of 
realistic threat, symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety or negative stereotype) is an accurate 
predictor of whether or not one will hold a prejudice towards that group.  
 
The Stephen & Stephen research has since been backed up by research carried out by 
Steele, Parker & Lickel (2015) into threat as a cause of Islamophobia in the USA. This 
research was carried out among 97 undergraduate students who identified themselves as 
US citizens who were also non-Muslim. Participants were presented with a 30 second 
video of a Muslim Cleric either advocating or condemning acts of terrorism. They were 
led to believe that the videos were actual news clips. The researchers “predicted and 
found that the high provocation condition [in which terrorism was advocated] resulted 
in increased bias against and anger toward Muslims” (Steele, Parker & Lickel 2015, 
p.196). The researchers argue that this research “provides the clearest experimental 
evidence to date that viewing a vivid threat of terrorism from a Muslim leader does at 
least temporarily affect people’s beliefs and attitudes toward Muslims in general” (ibid, 
p.198).   
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The research confirms what may be an intuitive suspicion, that feeling threatened is a 
causal factor in the development of prejudice or cognitive bias. When members of an 
ingroup feel that the outgroup poses a threat to their physical, financial or political 
security, they are more likely to become cognitively biased against that group. When 
they feel that the outgroup poses a threat to their world-view because they hold different 
values, beliefs or attitudes, they are more likely to become cognitively biased against 
that group. When they feel that they risk rejection or ridicule from the outgroup, they 
are more likely to become cognitively biased. And when they hold negative stereotypes 
about the outgroup, they are more likely to become cognitively biased against them.  
 
When one feels threatened one can experience myriad emotions including fear, 
helplessness, despair, outrage, and hatred (Gross et. al. 2013). Unlike merely witnessing 
a threat, feeling threatened is an emotional state. As bias can result from feeling 
threatened, it seems plausible that emotion is a causal factor in the development of 
cognitive bias.  
 
	  
§4.2.3:	  Challenge	  from	  ‘Correlation	  not	  Causation’	  
 
A challenge might be raised that my argument may mistake correlation for causation. 
The evidence does not preclude the possibility that emotion in these instances is 
incidental. It may be that a threat can cause biased cognitive beliefs without any 
necessary involvement of emotion. Take the example of the threat presented in the 
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video from Steele et. al. In that video the person posing the threat is Islamic. Given the 
limits of the information available, a reasonable person cannot assume that all Muslims 
pose a threat. Neither can that person assume that no Muslims pose a threat. Either 
assumption is unreasonable given the evidence. Thus the person might reasonably 
conclude that at least some Muslims pose a threat. Given that the person has no a priori 
means of discriminating between those who do, and do not, pose a threat, that person 
might conclude that the rational course of action would be to form the belief that all 
Muslims pose a potential threat. On the basis of this chain of reasoning the person 
might form a cognitive bias against all Muslims; and ex hypothesi against any group 
deemed to pose a threat. In this scenario emotion is not a necessary link in the causal 
chain. Even in cases where the cognitively biased person experiences strong emotions, 
those emotions may be coincidental. Thus while threat might correspond with emotion, 
this does not mean that emotion is causal in the development of cognitive bias.  
 
 
§4.2.4:	  Response	  to	  the	  Challenge	  
 
While the challenge might appear prima face plausible, it is not; not least because the 
chain of reasoning presented is flawed. It is a mistake in reasoning to conclude that “all 
F’s are G”, from the premise that “some F’s are G”. Cognitive bias can be cashed out in 
terms of the belief that “all F’s are G” – where ‘F’ represents the out group (in this 
instance Muslims) and ‘G’ represents a property (in this instance, the property of being 
a terrorist). The chain of reasoning presented in the challenge starts with the premiss 
that one can reasonably assume that some members of the outgroup are terrorists – i.e. 
that (P1) “some F’s are G”. This chain reasons that “if some F’s are G”, then (C1) 
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“every F is a potential G”. From (C1) the conclusion is drawn that (C2) therefore “all 
F’s are G”. This chain of reasoning falls foul of the fallacy of hasty generalisation.  
 
Cognitive bias can also be said to be lacking in reason in terms of its selectivity. This 
for two reasons: cognitive bias is selective in terms of which groups it singles out, and it 
is selective in terms of the properties of that group on which it focuses. To see this more 
clearly let’s use an imaginary example of an American defender of Islamophobia who 
contends that Islamophobia is rational. Let’s assume that the defender’s reasoning is 
something like the following: It is rational to be biased against someone who might kill 
you; Muslims might kill you, therefore it is rational to be biased against Muslims. One 
of the problems with this line of reasoning is that Muslims are singled out as the only 
instantiation of the qualifier ‘someone who might kill you’. Now consider that, as of 
October 2015, there were 994 mass shootings in the US in a period of just 1,004 days38, 
none of which were attributed to Muslim extremism. And in the period between 2004 
and 2013, over 300,000 deaths in the US were attributable to firearms while circa 300 
deaths were attributable to terrorism39. It is a fact of the matter that in America you are a 
thousand times more likely to be killed by a gun-owner than by a terrorist. The 
Islamophobia defender reasons that it is rational to be biased against someone who 
might kill you. Given the evidence, and based on this reasoning, cognitive bias against 
the 39% of Americans who are gun-owners40 would be rational. Given its rationality, 
cognitive bias against gun-owners ought to be widespread in America. But it is not, and 
Americans vociferously continue to rally against gun control despite the growing 
number of atrocities that occur almost daily. It is not rational to single out one group as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  See	  http://www.theguardian.com/us-­‐news/ng-­‐interactive/2015/oct/02/mass-­‐shootings-­‐america-­‐gun-­‐violence	  39	  Sorce:	  US	  Centre	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention.	  40	  Source:	  Gallup	  poll	  2010.	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posing a threat, while at the same time wilfully ignoring a group that poses a threat 
which is a thousand times greater. Due to its being selective in this way, Islamophobia 
is irrational. 
 
Cognitive bias is also irrationally selective inasmuch as it focuses attention solely on 
one property of its target - in this instance, the property of ‘posing a threat’ or ‘being a 
terrorist’. While it may be true that some Muslims pose a threat, it is also true that some 
Muslims are pacifists, that some Muslims are medics, and that some Muslims are in the 
US military. Pacifists don’t kill, medics save lives, and the function of the US military 
is to defend its citizens in a time of war. It is irrational to hold that all Muslims pose a 
threat to US lives when some Muslims are actively saving and defending those lives. 
Due to its being selective in this way, Islamophobia is irrational.   
 
Cognitive biases like Islamophobia cannot be due solely to reasoning because they run 
counter to reason in at least two important ways; their purported reasoning is fallacious 
and they are irrationally selective. This lack of rationality cannot be explained if 
cognitive bias is causally affected by reason alone. It is necessarily the case, therefore, 
that something other than reasoning is a causal factor in cognitive bias. Emotion 
infamously can defy logic and lacks rationality at times. Consider the panicked decision 
of the Missouri man to drive a truck full of guns and petrol over an out of control fire. 
Or the panic-selling of stocks or real estate in a time of economic uncertainty, such as 
occurred in the last major economic crisis in 2008. At that time people sold their assets 
at considerably less than market value in the phenomenon colloquially referred to as a 
‘fire-sale’. History tells us that markets and real estate recover once an economic crisis 
has passed, and history tells us that panic-selling will only worsen the crisis when it 
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occurs. Divesting oneself of one’s assets in panic, therefore, is irrational. But fear and 
panic are powerful motivators that can defy logic and lead one to make irrational 
decisions.  
 
Cognitive bias is irrational. Emotion can lead to irrationality. On this basis, the 
irrationality of cognitive bias can be fully explained by emotion’s part in the causal 
chain in its formation. Thus, emotion has a causal effect on cognitive bias.  
 
There remains one other cognitive practice on which emotion can be said to have a 
causal effect, self-deception. 
 
 
§4.3:	  Emotion’s	  Effect	  on	  Self-­‐Deception	  
 
Self-deception is philosophically problematic because it seems to require that one hold 
contradictory beliefs. The problem stems from the treatment of self-deception as being 
isomorphic with interpersonal deception. Interpersonal deception involves an intentional 
act in which one believe that P, and convinces another to believe that not-P (or vice 
versa - one believes that not-P and convinces another that P). In self-deception, the 
deceiver and the deceived are one and the same. If self-deception is isomorphic with 
interpersonal deception, then self-deception involves an intentional act in which one 
believes that P, and convinces oneself to believe that not-P. This treatment of self-
deception requires that one hold contradictory beliefs (P and not-P) which is 
conceptually problematic.  
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A deflationary view of self-deception (Mele 1997, 2000) holds that instances of self-
deception are instances of motivated biased beliefs and are not in fact isomorphic with 
interpersonal deception. I do not propose to make any commitment with regard to the 
debate about the nature of self-deception. Instead I propose to concentrate solely on the 
phenomenon of ‘denial’ - a phenomenon which is commonly characterised as self-
deception and which, I will argue (§4.3.1), fits most closely with the deflationary view. 
I do not defend against a potential charge that denial is not a form of self-deception. 
Even if denial is not self-deception, properly understood, it is nevertheless cognitive in 
nature, and my only aim here is to demonstrate that emotion can causally affect 
cognition. I argue (§4.3.2) that denial is motivated, at least in part, by fear of the 
emotional consequences of accepting an unpalatable truth. To the extent that denial is 
motivated by emotion, emotion is a causal factor in denial. I consider the challenge 
(§4.3.3) that emotion is epiphenomenal in denial. On this view, denial can be fully 
explained by cognition. I respond (§4.3.3) that the intransigence of denial is not 
consistent with the notion that denial is caused solely by cognition. The intransigence of 
denial can be fully explained if emotion plays a causal role. Thus emotion is a causal 
factor in the form of self-deception commonly referred to as denial. 
 
 
§4.3.1:	  Denial	  and	  The	  Problem	  of	  Self-­‐Deception	  
 
Some truths are unpalatable. Examples might include, the diagnosis of a terminal 
illness, the idea that one’s spouse is having an affair, the depth of one’s financial 
difficulties, or the idea that one’s child is a drug addict. Denial is often associated with 
these sorts of unpalatable truths. When one chooses to believe that one’s spouse is not 
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having an affair, despite evidence to the contrary, one can be said to be in a state of 
denial. When one insists that one’s financial situation isn’t that bad, even when the 
bailiffs are at the door, one can be said to be in a state of denial. When one continues to 
believe that one will survive despite the diagnosis of a terminal illness with an 
overwhelmingly negative prognosis, one can be said to be in a state of denial.  
 
In my view someone in denial 1) holds a biased belief and 2) withholds belief from that 
biased belief’s negation. To understand what I mean by this, it is first worth elaborating 
that it is possible to have various attitudes towards belief, two of which are of particular 
importance to my project. Namely, it is possible to withhold belief, and it is possible to 
have an attitude of desire towards belief.  
 
It is possible to withhold belief; it is possible to withhold belief in a claim, as well as to 
withhold belief in a claim’s negation. Indeed, withholding belief is the ideal attitude to 
adopt when testing scientific hypotheses. Ideally one ought to remain agnostic with 
respect to a hypothesis before testing it. Not to do so runs the risk of affecting the way 
in which one interprets evidence for and against the hypothesis, which in turn runs the 
risk of biasing the conclusions one draws on the basis of that evidence. In other words, 
the ability to withhold belief allows one to avoid confirmation bias in scientific 
theorising. Thomas Gilovich (1991) provides an example of what can happen when one 
assumes something is true before testing it: 	  [T]he	   history	   of	   scientific	   attempts	   to	   relate	   brain	   size	   or	   body	   shape	   to	  intelligence,	  personality,	  and	  (often	  by	  implication)	  ‘social	  worth’	  is	  riddled	  with	   examples	   of	   investigators	   vigorously	   challenging	   and	   reinterpreting	  unanticipated	   results	  while	   glossing	   over	   similar	   flaws	   and	   ambiguities	   in	  more	   comfortable	   findings.	   The	   French	   craniologist	   Paul	   Broca	   could	   not	  accept	   that	   the	   German	   brains	   he	   examined	   were	   on	   average	   100	   grams	  heavier	  than	  his	  sample	  of	  French	  brains.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  he	  adjusted	  the	  weights	   of	   the	   two	   brain	   samples	   to	   take	   into	   account	   extraneous	   factors	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such	  as	  overall	  body	  size	   that	  are	  related	  to	  brain	  weight.	  However,	  Broca	  never	  made	   a	   similar	   adjustment	   for	  his	  much-­‐discussed	  difference	   in	   the	  brain	  sizes	  of	  men	  and	  women.	   Gilovich	  1991,	  p.46	  	  
 
Broca drew the conclusion that men are more intelligent than women on the basis that 
men’s brains are heavier, but he did not take into account the difference in overall body 
size between men and women. His conclusion that intelligence is determined by gender 
is a false belief. And it is plausible that his methodological mistake was influenced by a 
pre-existing belief, widespread at the time, that women were less intelligent than men. 
Thus it is plausible that his pre-existing belief influenced his erroneous conclusion. This 
cautionary tale shows that the ability to withhold belief is not just possible, it is essential 
to good science. Withholding belief is also the attitude that every jury is admonished to 
adopt before the closing arguments in a trial. During a trial the weight of evidence can 
pile up on one side or the other, only to shift suddenly with the introduction of new 
testimony. If one did not withhold belief throughout one could not interpret the 
evidence fairly and an unjust verdict could be reached. The fact that unfair verdicts are 
reached does not mean that withholding belief is impossible. It merely means that we 
are not always very good at it.  
 
It is also possible to have an attitude of desire towards belief; it is possible to want 
something to be true. And it seems that one’s wanting something to be true can 
influence whether or not one actually believes it. Take the example of biased beliefs. 
Despite evidence to the contrary (994 mass shootings in 1,004 days, over 300,000 
shooting deaths in a nine year period) members of the NRA continue to believe that 
restricting the sale and use of firearms is unwarranted. That this is what they want to 
believe is evidenced by the way that they treat the evidence of gun violence. The 
evidence is either downplayed or interpreted to suggest that the situation would be made 
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worse by gun control. For instance Ben Carson, a candidate for the Republican 
nomination for President, argued in an interview with CNN41, that the Holocaust could 
have been “greatly diminished” were it not for gun control in Germany at the time. The 
belief that gun control is unwarranted could be characterised as a motivated belief. In 
the aftermath of a recent mass shooting, Carson stated42 “I never saw a body with bullet 
holes that was more devastating than taking the right to arm ourselves away”. Carson’s 
belief that gun control is unwarranted seems to be motivated by a desire to uphold the 
constitution. Believing something which one is motivated to believe is otherwise known 
as a biased belief.  
 
It is also possible to be biased in one’s beliefs about oneself. Empirical evidence 
suggests that what one wants to believe about oneself can have an influence on what 
one actually believes; one is capable of believing what one wants to believe about 
oneself. For instance, Patricia Cross reports that: “More than 90% of faculty members 
rate themselves as above average teachers, and two-thirds rate themselves among the 
top quarter” (Cross 1977, p.1). And Gilovich (1991) tells us that a survey of a million 
high-school students showed that almost two thirds of them claimed to have above 
average leadership ability, while only 2% claimed to be below average. In terms of 
social ability, 60% of the students believed they were in the top 10% of people who get 
on well with others. Additionally, research carried out by Weinstein & Lachendro 
(1982) found that students in their research believed that other people were roughly 
three times more likely than they themselves were to suffer heart attacks, contract lung 
cancer, be fired from a job, or be divorced within five years. It is not implausible, on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  http://edition.cnn.com/videos/politics/2015/10/08/ben-­‐carson-­‐gun-­‐control-­‐nazi-­‐germany-­‐intvw-­‐wolf.cnn/video/playlists/ben-­‐carson/	  42	  http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-­‐draft/2015/10/06/ben-­‐carson-­‐says-­‐he-­‐would-­‐have-­‐been-­‐more-­‐aggressive-­‐against-­‐oregon-­‐gunman/	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basis of this evidence, that one’s desire to believe something may influence one’s 
tendency to believe it. This should not be taken to imply that we always believe what 
we want to believe. As Gilovich explains; “Our desire to believe comforting things 
about ourselves and about the world does not mean that we believe willy-nilly what we 
want to believe…Rather our motivations have their effects more subtly through the 
ways in which we cognitively process evidence relevant to a given belief” (1991, p.80). 
By attending to evidence that confirms what one wants to believe, and downplaying, or 
explaining away, evidence to the contrary, one can maintain a degree of ignorance with 
regard to whether or not one’s belief is actually true.  
 
In my view, denial involves holding a biased belief and withholding belief from its 
negation. Take the example of someone with a terminal illness. When faced with the 
diagnosis of a terminal illness, the person diagnosed does not want the diagnosis to be 
true. She wants to believe that she will not die from this disease. When the doctor tells 
her that the mortality rate for this kind of illness is 95%, she thinks to herself that she 
could be among the 5% of people who survive. Why not? After all, someone has to be 
in the 5%. She knows that medical research advances all the time and that cures can be 
found every day. She scours the internet looking for stories by, and about, people 
who’ve suffered from the same illness. She pays particular attention to accounts about 
survivors, reading them in detail. When she comes across stories about those who died, 
she skims over them looking for any evidence that they were different from her – 
perhaps they ate a different kind of diet from hers, or maybe they drank when she 
doesn’t, or didn’t take enough exercise when she has stayed fit for years. Once she finds 
evidence of difference between herself and the person who died from her disease, she 
can dismiss their situation as irrelevant to her own. The more she reads, the more she 
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believes she will survive her illness. This is a classic example of denial, because the 
truth is that she is almost certain not to survive. And her denial can be explained without 
appeal to deception. She wants to believe that she will survive, and so she focuses on 
evidence in favour of that belief and downplays evidence that would contradict it. Thus, 
she has a biased belief that she will survive and she withholds belief from anything that 
will negate that biased belief - she simply refuses to believe it.  
 
The challenge might be raised here that her downplaying evidence that contradicts her 
belief that she will survive indicates that she necessarily believes, if only at a 
subconscious level, that her  biased belief is false. If she believes deep down that she 
will die then she can be characterised as holding the belief that she will die, and 
convincing herself that she will not die. In that case, she is engaged in a straightforward 
act of deception, which is no different from the deception we engage in when we try to 
deceive others.  
 
I disagree. Her downplaying contrary evidence does not imply that she necessarily 
believes she is going to die. Her downplaying evidence implies that her belief that she 
will survive is a biased belief; i.e. it indicates that she wants to believe it. Bias is not 
isomorphic with deception. She is biased in favour of the belief that she’ll survive, and 
she filters the evidence in accordance with her desired belief. Even if her bias indicates 
the existence of the possibility that her belief is false, she can nevertheless withhold 
belief from that possibility, in much the same way as a scientist can withhold belief in 
the hypothesis she’s testing, or a jury can withhold belief in the guilt or innocence of a 
defendant. Denial, on my view, is not isomorphic with interpersonal deception.  
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§4.3.2:	  Emotion	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  Denial	  
 
Denial, as mentioned, is commonly associated with unpalatable truths. And unpalatable 
truths are unpalatable for a reason. It can be psychologically or materially 
disadvantageous for an individual to believe an unpalatable truth, not least because 
accepting the truth involves making oneself vulnerable to the potentially negative 
impact of the truth. For example, a parent who finally accepts that their child is a drug 
addict can no longer sleep in blissful ignorance. Having accepted the unpalatable truth, 
it’s not uncommon for that parent to wonder where and how they failed their child. It’s 
not uncommon that they experience feelings of shame, guilt and fear. These emotions 
can potentially be overwhelming and few of us relish being so overwhelmed. The 
benefit of denial is that it avoids the negative impact of the truth.  
 
Take another example, that of a spouse who finally accepts that their partner is having 
an affair. In this instance the unpalatable truth can result in divorce. Divorce, as anyone 
like me who’s been through it can attest to, can be excruciatingly painful. Feelings of 
heartbreak, rejection, fear, anger, and despair are just some of its overwhelming 
emotional consequences. Divorce also has material consequences. When one goes from 
dual income to single income, one can potentially no longer afford the home one shared 
with one’s partner. When one adds the stress of having to sell up and move to the 
overwhelming emotions already at play, the results can be devastating. And this is all 
before taking any children of the marriage into account. When there are children 
involved, one also has to worry about the negative impact on their psychological and 
emotional wellbeing. On this account it is little wonder that denial is preferable.  
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 The denial of unpalatable truths is sometimes necessary to the psychological or 
material wellbeing of the individual when acceptance of the truth can have a negative 
impact. The negative impact of unpalatable truths on our emotional state is not 
inconsiderable and can in fact be overwhelming. And just as it is possible to be risk 
averse, it is also possible to have an aversion to painful emotional states. People have 
been known to stay in dysfunctional relationships because of their aversion towards 
loneliness. Aversion towards shame can keep a person from stealing when there’s a 
chance they might be caught out. Aversion towards guilt can keep a person from leaving 
home when their ailing parents want them to stay. It is plausible, therefore, that denial is 
caused in part by an aversion to the painful impact of the truth; aversion towards 
heartbreak, aversion towards fear, and aversion towards despair. Such aversion need not 
be conscious; one need not be conscious of one’s aversion to loneliness, or guilt or 
heartbreak etc. in order for that aversion to have a causal affect. Just as risk aversion can 
unconsciously affect one’s decision not to gamble, aversion to painful emotions can 
have an unconscious effect on denial. 
 
It is worth noting that one should not confuse aversion with the notion of ‘a desire to 
avoid’. Firstly, desire is not aversive. Secondly, one can have a desire to avoid 
something, such as the desire to avoid ice-cream when on a diet, without necessarily 
being averse to that thing. Aversion might roughly be described as a feeling of intense 
dislike or repugnance towards something. When one has an aversion to painful 
emotions, the desire to avoid such emotions may come about as a result, but the desire 
to avoid is not sufficient to describe one’s aversion. Aversion is an affective state. And 
if denial is caused in part by aversion then emotion is a causal factor in denial.  
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§4.3.3:	  An	  Epiphenomenal	  Challenge	  
 
The challenge might be raised that denial can be explained by cognition alone. On this 
view, appeal to emotion as a causal factor constitutes an overdetermination of denial. 
For instance, Jerome Schaffer (1983) argues, emotion is superfluous to behaviour and to 
cognition. On his view emotion is much like the whistle of a steam train that contributes 
nothing to its locomotion43. He gives the example of careening around the corner in a 
car, only to find the road blocked by a log. As well as believing bodily harm to be likely 
and desiring not to be harmed, he feels fear – his heart races, his throat constricts. But, 
he says, his belief and desire alone are sufficient for him to slam on the brakes and bring 
the car to a halt; his fear, he argues, is superfluous and has no causal role in his braking. 
“My slamming on the brakes and stopping is a result not of the turning pale, accelerated 
heart beat, or sensation of my stomach tightening but simply of my seeing the log, 
judging that harm is likely and desiring not to be harmed” (Schaffer 1983, p.163).  
 
Schaffer also argues that, in addition to having no effect on action, emotion has no 
effect on cognition. He gives an example of two soldiers in a war, one feels fear and the 
other doesn’t but both continue to fight. “Certainly,” he says, “it is possible that 
someone in battle might have exactly the same beliefs and desires as those around him 
and still, unlike the others, feel no fear” (1983, p.163). He concludes that if one can 
have exactly the beliefs and desires of the fearful soldier and yet feel no fear, then fear 
makes no necessary contribution to one’s beliefs and desires.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  This	  is	  the	  analogy	  that	  Thomas	  Huxley	  (1874)	  drew	  when	  he	  argued	  that	  mental	  events	  are	  epiphenomenal.	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Emotion, it might be argued, may be equally superfluous in denial. Take, for instance, 
the denial that one’s spouse is having an affair. If one’s spouse is having an affair then 
acceptance of that fact might lead to divorce. One might believe divorce to be a bad 
thing for oneself, for one’s children and for one’s financial security. One might, 
therefore, desire that one’s marriage not end in divorce. One’s belief that divorce is a 
bad thing and one’s desire that one’s marriage not end in divorce are sufficient to 
explain one’s denial of the affair. In this instance, one’s denial is a rational response and 
any emotional consequences of the truth are superfluous to that denial.  
 
This potential challenge to my account might also argue that denial of death can be 
explained purely by appeal to rationality. For instance, Thomas Nagel (1970) writes that 
“life is all one has and the loss of it is the greatest loss one can sustain” (1970, p.73). He 
argues that life is an intrinsic good44. And, “like most goods, this one can be multiplied 
by time; more is better than less” (ibid, p.74). It is rational to want more life rather than 
less. Thus denial of death is rational. Denial in the face of death can be explained purely 
by appeal to reason. If one can explain denial without appeal to emotion, then emotion 
is superfluous to denial. Emotion is not a causal factor in denial. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Nagel’s	  argument	  is	  made	  in	  a	  challenge	  to	  Epicurus(341-­‐270	  B.C.E.)	  	  and	  Lucretius	  (circa	  99-­‐55	  B.C.E.).	  Epicurus	  argues	  that	  death	  isn’t	  a	  bad	  thing.	  In	  his	  view,	  pain	  is	  the	  only	  intrinsic	  bad	  or	  evil.	  When	  one	  is	  dead	  one	  has	  no	  awareness	  and	  feels	  no	  pain.	  He	  argues	  that	  if	  pain	  is	  the	  only	  intrinsic	  bad,	  and	  if	  one	  feels	  no	  pain	  when	  one	  is	  dead,	  then	  death	  is	  not	  a	  bad	  thing.	  Lucretius	  provides	  a	  similar	   argument	   in	  On	  The	  Nature	   of	   Things.	   He	   claims	   that	   death	   is	   nothing	   to	   fear	   because	   a	  person	  ceases	  to	  exist	  when	  they	  die	  and	  a	  person	  who	  doesn’t	  exist	  cannot	  be	  unhappy.	  Lucretius’	  goes	  on	   to	  argue	   that	   in	   the	   respect	  of	  non-­‐existence,	  being	  dead	   is	  no	  different	   from	  not	  having	  been	  born.	  One	  doesn’t	  consider	  the	  fact	  that	  one	  wasn’t	  born	  earlier	  as	  anything	  to	  be	  feared.	  As	  the	  prenatal	  and	  posthumous	  states	  are	  symmetrical,	  it	  is	  illogical	  that	  one	  would	  fear	  dying.	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§4.3.4:	  Response	  to	  the	  challenge	  
 
I find the challenge implausible for three reasons. First, if the truth is undesirable then it 
is usually undesirable for more than merely material or practical reasons. Second, 
reason alone cannot explain the fact that evidence is not treated equally in cases of 
denial. And third, the intransigence of denial cannot be explained by reason alone.  
 
Nagel points out that “doubt may be raised whether anything can be bad for a man 
without being positively unpleasant to him: specifically, it may be doubted that there are 
any evils which consist merely in the deprivation or absence of goods, and which do not 
depend on someone’s minding that deprivation” (Nagel 1970, p.75-76; original 
emphasis). Thus, when the challenge suggests that a spouse’s denial can be fully 
explained by a belief that divorce is a bad thing, one has to question the basis on which 
divorce in this instance is deemed to be bad. It is implausible that divorce is bad purely 
on material or practical grounds. If the only reasons a person might be in denial about 
their spouse’s affair were material or practical then the very rich would never 
experience this sort of denial; the loss of a second income wouldn’t result in material 
hardship and they could hire professionals to deal with any practical concerns, such as 
child care etc. But this kind of denial is not limited to people of limited means. Thus, 
the undesirability of divorce must extend beyond its material or practical consequences. 
If that undesirability extends to emotional consequences then emotion is not superfluous 
in denial.   
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Also, were reason the only causal factor in denial then one would expect that even the 
most unpalatable of truths would be accepted if the balance of evidence was in their 
favour. But that doesn’t seem to happen. Instead it seems that there is a difference in the 
threshold, above which a person will accept a premise, between evidence against an 
unpalatable truth and evidence in its favour. The person who is in denial of her terminal 
illness will have a lower threshold for evidence that she will survive and a higher 
threshold for evidence that she will die; she’ll believe evidence for the former more 
easily than evidence for the latter. As such, not all evidence is treated equally. This 
inequality in the way evidence is treated cannot be explained if reason is the only causal 
factor in denial, because reason dictates that relevantly equal evidence should be treated 
equally. The fact that it is not treated equally suggests that denial lacks rationality in 
much the same way as the cognitive bias discussed in §4.2 can be said to lack 
rationality; in cognitive bias against an outgroup one is more likely to process 
information that confirms one’s bias and less likely to process information 
disconfirming it.   
 
Finally denial, as with other forms of self-deception, is intransigent by definition. When 
one is in denial, one continues to believe something despite the existence of substantial 
evidence to the contrary. Such intransigence cannot be explained by appeal to reason 
alone, because reason dictates that if one is provided with sufficient evidence that one’s 
beliefs are false then one could not continue to hold that false belief. In cases of denial 
the evidence can be overwhelmingly in favour of one’s belief’s being false and yet one 
can continue to hold one’s false belief. The fact that, in denial, one can continue to 
believe something despite substantial evidence to the contrary suggests that cognition is 
not the only causal factor in denial.  
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They say that ignorance is bliss, and given the negative consequences of accepting an 
unpalatable truth, ‘they’ are probably right. When we choose to remain ignorant of the 
truth we protect ourselves from the negative consequences of the truth. Significant 
among those consequences is the negative impact that an unpalatable truth can have on 
emotion. When we are in denial we can avoid the adverse emotional impact of 
heartbreak, fear and despair that comes with accepting the truth. When we are in denial 
we can remain blissful. We have a lower threshold for evidence that allows us to remain 
in bliss, and a higher threshold for evidence that will break our hearts. It seems 
implausible on this basis that the difference in emotional outcomes is superfluous to 
one’s being in denial. And certainly the intransigence of denial suggests that it is not. 
Emotion is not superfluous to denial.  
 
Denial shares certain parallels both with decision making and with cognitive bias. Just 
as decision making can be affected by an aversion to risk, denial can be affected by an 
aversion to painful emotions. Just as cognitive bias is selective in terms of the 
information it interprets, denial is selective in terms of the weight it gives to evidence. 
And denial, like panicked decisions, and cognitive bias, lacks rationality. Hence, just as 
certain aspects of decision making and cognitive bias cannot be accounted for by reason 
alone, neither can similar aspects of denial. These aspects of denial can, however, be 
fully accounted for if emotion is a causal factor in denial. Emotion has a causal effect on 
denial.  
  
It may be thought that my arguments so far demonstrate only that emotion has a causal 
effect on cognition at the macro-level of the emotional faculty. If emotion truly has a 
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downward causal effect that effect ought to be demonstrable at the level of the 
individual emotion. In the next section I argue that individual emotions can have a 
causal effect on cognition.  
 
	  
§4.4:	  Causal	  Effect	  of	  an	  Individual	  Token	  of	  Emotion	  on	  Cognition	  
 
Emotions can be reasons for action. We perform acts of kindness for those we love; we 
retaliate out of anger against those who offend us; we lash out at those whom we fear. 
These can be said to be actions that are caused by emotion inasmuch as the emotion 
involved constituted the primary reason for that action. If a token of emotion can cause 
an action, by virtue of being the primary reason for that action, then emotion can be said 
to have a downward causal effect on cognition.  
 
Consider the everyday example of someone (subject A) who non-accidentally honks her 
horn at another driver (subject B) who refuses to give way in traffic. If she were to be 
asked: “Why did you honk your horn?” A’s potential response might be: “Because I 
was angry that B wouldn’t give way”. In this instance A’s anger can be accepted as the 
primary reason for her honking her horn. If A’s anger is the primary reason for her 
action, it can be characterised as a rationalising reason for her action; i.e. a reason which 
makes her action intelligible. Donald Davidson argues that rationalising reasons are “a 
species of causal explanation” (1963, p.691). He holds that whenever someone does 
something for a reason they can be characterised as “(a) having some sort of pro attitude 
toward actions of a certain kind, and (b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, 
remembering) that his action is of that kind” (ibid, p.685). On this Davidsonian view, it 
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is plausible that A’s honking her horn was caused by her anger in the following way: 
A’s honking was a retaliatory action, an action that signalled her displeasure with B’s 
refusal to give way. It is plausible that A’s anger caused her to have a pro attitude 
towards an act of retaliation. Coupled with her belief that honking her horn was an 
action of this kind (an act retaliation), A’s honking her horn can plausibly be 
characterised as A’s acting for a reason. Davidson writes that: “Central to the relation 
between a reason and an action it explains is the idea that the agent performed the action 
because he had the reason” (1963, p.691). A honked her horn because she was angry 
with B. As such, therefore, A’s anger is a primary reason for her non-accidentally 
honking her horn. And as reasons are a species of causal explanation, A’s anger can be 
characterised as having caused her action. If A’s anger is the primary reason for her 
action then A’s anger can be said to have causally affected her reasoning; i.e. A’s anger 
causally affected her cognition. 
 
A challenge may be raised against my characterisation of A’s anger as the cause of her 
honking her horn. A challenger might argue that the cause of A’s action was B’s refusal 
to give way and not, as I have claimed, A’s anger at B’s refusal to give way. On this 
view B first refused to give way, and that event caused A to honk her horn. According 
to this challenge it was the preceding event, and not A’s emotion, that caused A’s 
action45. If B’s refusal to give way was sufficient to cause A to honk her horn, then A’s 
anger was epiphenomenal, and hence had no causal role in her action.  
 
But the challenge is unconvincing. While it is certainly the case that B’s refusal to give 
way was a causal factor in A’s honking her horn, it was merely one factor in a causal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  This	  is	  akin	  to	  the	  objection	  considered	  by	  Davidson	  in	  his	  argument	  that	  reasons	  can	  be	  causes	  (Davidson	  1963,	  p.695).	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chain. I say this because reliance on the preceding event, as solely explanatory of A’s 
action, results in an underdetermination of that action. To see this more clearly, consider 
another person (Subject C) who is also cut off by B’s refusal to give way in traffic. 
Unlike A, C’s response to B’s act is to shake her head wryly and wonder at the stresses 
of modern life which might lead to B’s behaving so ungraciously. Unlike A, C does not 
honk her horn. While it might be accepted that C’s is a less commonplace reaction to 
being cut off in traffic than A’s, her reaction is nevertheless fully comprehensible. By 
introducing C it becomes evident that the event of B’s refusal to give way is not 
sufficient to explain A’s honking her horn.  
 
If the same event can lead to A’s honking, and C’s not-honking, then we naturally want 
to know the reason for that difference. It is plausible that the reason for the difference in 
action was because A was angry and C was not. If the difference in action can be 
explained by appeal to A’s anger, then the fact of A’s anger is necessary to a full 
explanation of A’s action. Therefore, A’s anger is plausibly a causal factor in A’s action 
of honking her horn.  
 
Acting for a reason involves reasoning, and as reasoning is a species of cognition. As 
A’s anger causally affects her reasoning, then A’s anger can be said to causally affect 
her cognition. On this basis, an individual emotion can have a causal effect on 
cognition.  
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Chapter	  Conclusion:	  
 
I have argued that emotion has an effect on decision making, on cognitive bias, and on 
the form of self-deception commonly referred to as denial.  
 
I argued that the notion that decisions are affected by emotion is an intuitive one and I 
presented empirical evidence to back up that intuition. I considered whether a utilitarian 
approach could fully explain decision making and thus render my argument unsound. I 
responded that even this utilitarian approach factors emotion into the calculation of 
utility and thus fails to undermine my argument. Emotion has a causal effect on 
decision making. 
 
I argued that emotion is a causal factor in cognitive bias and presented empirical 
evidence that bias against an outgroup is determined by the various kinds of threat that 
outgroup is deemed to pose. I considered the challenge that bias could be explained as a 
mistake in reasoning, and that my argument mistakes a correlation between emotion and 
bias for emotion as a cause of bias. I responded that bias lacks rationality and that this 
lack of rationality cannot be explained if bias is affected by reason alone. The same 
rationality can be explained if emotion is a causal factor. Emotion has a causal effect on 
cognitive bias.  
 
I argued that emotion is a causal factor in the form of self-deception commonly referred 
to as denial. I argued that the denial of unpalatable truths is beneficial as a buffer against 
the negative emotional consequences of the truth. I argued that denial is motivated by 
aversion to painful emotion and therefore emotion is a causal factor in denial. I 
considered the challenge that denial can be fully explained by reason and therefore 
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emotion is superfluous to denial. I responded that reason alone cannot explain the 
unequal way in which evidence is treated in cases of denial, and neither can it explain 
denial’s intransigence. As both of these factors can be explained by emotion then 
emotion is a causal factor in denial. Emotion has a causal effect on denial.  
 
Finally, in anticipation of a potential challenge that my arguments demonstrate only that 
the emotional faculty has an effect on cognition, I argued that an individual emotion 
such as anger can have a causal effect on cognition. I argued that anger can be a 
rationalising reason for an act of retaliation. As rationalising reasons can be causes, 
anger can be a cause for action.  
 
In Chapter 1, I argued that emotion is partly cognitive. In this chapter I argued that 
emotion has a causal effect on cognition. Downward causation is the term used to 
describe instances in which a system has causal effect on its parts. As emotion is partly 
cognitive, and as emotion has causal effect on cognition, then emotion demonstrates 
downward causation.  
 
In the next chapter I will argue that emotion also has causal effect on another of its 
mereological parts, namely feelings.  
 
 
  
	   147	  
	  
Chapter	  5:	  The	  Effect	  of	  Emotion	  on	  Feelings	  
 
 
In this chapter I will argue that emotion can have a downward causal effect on feelings, 
both at a macro-level of the emotional faculty and at the level of individual emotions. 
At the macro-level, I will argue (§5.1) that emotion can have a causal effect on the 
character of one’s life in terms of its happiness or unhappiness. At the level of the 
individual emotion I will argue (§5.2) that a token of an emotional type can causally 
affect one’s feelings about, or towards, oneself.  
 
	  
§5.1:	  Emotion’s	  Effect	  on	  Happiness	  
 
In this section I argue that emotion has a causal effect on the happiness46 or unhappiness 
of one’s life. In this, when I talk about someone as having, or aspiring to have, a happy 
life, the happiness I refer to is not the happiness associated with particular events, as in 
someone who feels happy that the sun is shining. Rather, I mean ‘happiness’ to refer to 
the character of one’s life or what Sizer (2010) calls ‘global happiness’. This is 
happiness associated “with significant spans of time, entire lives, and hoped-for futures” 
(Sizer 2010, p.134). I argue (§5.1.1) that unresolved emotional issues are a barrier to a 
happy life, and a causal factor in an unhappy one. I consider the potential challenge 
(§5.1.2) from moral philosophy that self-respect is the main arbiter of happiness. On 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  I	   am	   concerned	   exclusively	  with	   happiness	   in	   the	   psychological	   sense	   of	   that	   term.	   I	  make	  no	  claims	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   Aristotelian	   sense	   of	   happiness	   as	   of	   leading	   a	   virtuous,	   successful	   or	  enviable	   life.	   For	   more	   on	   the	   distinctions	   between	   the	   different	   meanings	   of	   ‘happiness’	   see	  Haybron	  (2000).	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this view it is one’s level of self-respect, and not emotion, which causally affects the 
character of one’s life as being happy or unhappy. I respond (§5.1.3) that self-respect is 
causally affected by unresolved emotional issues. Thus, even if the challenge is correct, 
emotion is nevertheless part of the causal chain affecting the character of one’s life in 
terms of its happiness or unhappiness.        
 
 
§5.1.1:	  Emotion’s	  Effect	  on	  the	  Character	  of	  One’s	  Life	  
 
I have never met a person who doesn’t ‘beat themselves up’ for one thing or another. 
For instance, I’ve never met a person who doesn’t give themselves a hard time for not 
living up to some expectation of perfection, or success, that they’ve been conditioned to 
believe is important; or who doesn’t mentally criticise themselves (sometimes quite 
harshly) for not being good enough, or clever enough, or for behaving in ways that 
might make them look bad in the eyes of others. In other words, I have never met a 
person who is without the types of unresolved emotional issues that lead to this kind of 
internal unrest. This is not to say that such a person doesn’t exist, but if they do exist 
then they seem not to be in the majority.  
 
What I mean by an ‘emotional issue’ is a past emotional hurt; for instance rejection or 
humiliation. When I call an emotional issue ‘unresolved’, I mean that the emotional 
pain caused by the past hurt continues to persist; which is to say that the same emotional 
pain will be re-experienced whenever circumstances arise that are reminiscent of those 
in which the hurt originated. I call an emotional issue ‘resolved’ when the same 
circumstances no longer result in emotional pain.   
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It is useful to understand how unresolved emotional issues might arise. Attachment 
Theory47 suggests that we develop internal working models on the basis of early 
emotional experience with primary caregivers. These internalised models represent 
oneself and one’s caregiver, as well as the dynamics of the interaction between the two. 
For instance, it is thought that “if an individual has experienced a rejecting relationship 
with a primary caregiver, the working model of the rejecting parent is likely to be 
complimented by a working model of self as unlovable” (Bretherton 1990, p.239-240). 
Thus, according to Attachment Theory it is possible for a child to see herself as 
unlovable in the eyes of a primary caregiver and hence to come to believe herself to be 
unlovable. John Bowlby (1969) suggests that rejecting parents were likely themselves 
rejected, so the same internalised model may be handed down through the generations.  
 
Although the model doesn’t deal specifically with events outside of the home, it seems 
reasonable that early experiences in the schoolyard and in the playground will also have 
an impact on a child’s internalised models. Rejection and humiliation of children by 
children is hardly an uncommon occurrence, and emotionally overwhelming 
experiences like these can have lasting effects. As the child grows up, their internalised 
model can become the standard for other attachment relationships in their life. For 
instance, a rejected child can grow up to expect rejection in all of their relationships. 
One possible effect of this is that they may become anxious or ‘clingy’ in their adult 
attachments. If this happens, the person may then be prone to worries about being liked 
or popular enough. They may also develop behavioural patterns consistent with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Attachment	  theory	  was	   first	  developed	  by	   John	  Bowlby	  (1907-­‐1990).	  The	  theory	  explains	  how	  early	   relationships	   (primarily	   with	   caregivers)	   affect	   one’s	   interpersonal	   relationships	   over	   the	  long	  term	  and	  in	  particular	  one’s	  ability	  to	  develop	  trust.	  It	   is	  speculated	  that	  there	  are	  four	  basic	  attachment	   styles	   –	   secure,	   anxious-­‐ambivalent,	   anxious-­‐avoidant,	   and	   disorganised.	   See	   Bowlby	  (1969).	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archetypal ‘people-pleaser’. Alternatively, the rejected child may become aversive and 
resist forming close bonds for fear of further rejection. This person may develop 
behavioural patterns consistent with the archetypal ‘commitment-phobe’. The tendency 
to cling to relationships, and the tendency to avoid relationships, may seem 
contradictory responses to rejection, but in fact they represent two sides of the same 
internal model, i.e. the expectation of rejection.  
 
Schank and Abelson (1977) describe these internalised models as ‘scripts’ and suggest 
that ‘script-relevant’ events result in new instantiations of the same script. So, on their 
view, the ‘rejection script’ might be re-instantiated numerous times in a person’s 
lifetime albeit with a different person playing the role of the rejecter each time. In this 
way the same emotional themes can play out over and over again in that individual’s 
life. Richard Lazarus maintains that “many or even most emotional encounters are 
repetitions of relational troubles and triumphs of the past, which are central to the 
person rather than peripheral and which involve basic adaptational themes, such as 
being loved or rejected, being powerful or powerless, or overcoming or being 
traumatised by adversity, loyalty or treachery, loss or gain, failure or success, and the 
like, even if the connection is not at all obvious” (Lazarus 1991, p.110). 
 
It seems that the scripts associated with unresolved emotional issues reappear repeatedly 
until such time as the emotional issue is resolved. For example, Stephen Diamond 
(2008) writes that “one of the most common phenomena psychotherapists deal with is a 
chronic pattern of dysfunctional relationships. The person’s partners share consistent 
similarities, such as physical and/or emotional abuse, instability, narcissism, etc. And 
each relationship eventually ends badly because of these repetitive dynamics”. Sigmund 
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Freud (1920) referred to this phenomenon of repeating patterns, caused by unresolved 
emotional issues, as ‘repetition compulsion’. Repetition compulsion might roughly be 
characterised as the tendency to repeat, in one’s current experience, repressed emotional 
material from one’s past. Freud likened repetition compulsion to the migratory patterns 
of birds and fish in which the same territory is traversed in an oscillating pattern.  
 
Now consider the ordinary person you might pass on the street. I am talking here about 
someone with a job, a home, friends, a family, someone who enjoys a good night out, or 
taking a holiday, or going to the movies. Chances are that this person will have some 
unresolved emotional issues resulting from a negative internalised model or ‘script’ 
adopted from an early age. For instance they might have an internal script that says that 
they’re not strong enough, or not clever enough, or not good enough, or not popular 
enough, or not successful enough, or not interesting enough, or not generous enough, or 
not thin enough, or not enough in control, or that they are unlovable. Indeed, it seems as 
if the number of ways in which a person can believe that they’re not enough may 
potentially be as large as the number of people you’ll pass on the street.  
 
These beliefs about oneself as being unlovable, or not enough in some way, can 
causally affect the character of one’s life in terms of its happiness. If one’s internal 
script is that one is unlovable then that script will be triggered whenever circumstances 
arise that are reminiscent of the circumstances in which that script was first learned. For 
instance, if one was rejected in the schoolyard, or the playground, then the rejection 
script can be triggered by social occasions or in friendships. If one was rejected by a 
primary caregiver then the rejection script can be triggered by intimate relationships. 
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The triggering of an internal model like the rejection script can result in fears about 
abandonment and the re-experiencing of feelings of rejection.  
 
Nico Frijda (1988) formulated what he calls ‘The Laws of Emotion’48, amongst which 
is ‘The Law of Conservation of Emotional Momentum’: 	  Emotional	   events	   retain	   their	   power	   to	   elicit	   emotions	   indefinitely,	   unless	  counteracted	  by	  repetitive	  exposures	  that	  permit	  extinction	  or	  habituation,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  these	  are	  possible.	  	   Frijda,	  1988,	  p.	  354.	  	  
	   	  
 
Unresolved emotional issues can cause emotions to arise, as if fresh, years after the 
emotional events that elicited them. And, unlike physical pain, emotional pain is re-felt 
when it is remembered. Physical pain is typically remembered episodically but not 
phenomenologically; we typically remember only that we experienced physical pain, 
the pain itself is not re-felt when remembered. But emotional pain is remembered 
phenomenologically as well as episodically. Thus the triggering of an internal script can 
be a painful experience every time that triggering occurs. And unfortunately, it is not 
unusual for the rejection script to become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Fearing rejection, 
the person holds on to the relationship too tightly and is rejected for being too ‘clingy’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  The	  Laws	  of	  Emotion	  from	  Frijda	  (1988)	  are:	  The	  Law	  of	  Situational	  Meaning	  (“Emotions	  arise	  in	  response	   to	   the	  meaning	   structures	   of	   given	   situations”	   p.349);	   The	   Law	   of	   Concern	   (“Emotions	  arise	   in	   response	   to	   events	   that	   are	   important	   to	   the	   individual’s	   goals,	   motives	   or	   concerns”	  p.351);	  The	  Law	  of	  Apparent	  Reality	  (“Emotions	  are	  elicited	  by	  events	  appraised	  as	  real,	  and	  their	  intensity	   corresponds	   to	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   this	   is	   the	   case”	   p.352);	   The	   Laws	   of	   Change,	  Habituation	   and	   Comparative	   Feeling	   (“Emotions	   are	   elicited	   not	   so	   much	   by	   the	   presence	   of	  favorable	  or	  unfavorable	  conditions	  but	  by	  actual	  or	  expected	  changes	  in	  favorable	  or	  unfavorable	  conditions”	  p.353);	  The	  Law	  of	  Hedonic	  Asymmetry	  (“Pleasure	   is	  always	  contingent	  upon	  change	  and	  disappears	  with	  continuous	  satisfaction.	  Pain	  may	  persist	  under	  persisting	  adverse	  conditions”	  p.353);	  The	  Law	  of	  Closure	  (“Emotions	  tend	  to	  be	  closed	  to	  judgments	  of	  relativity	  of	  impact	  and	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  goals	  other	  than	  their	  own”	  p.354);	  The	  Law	  of	  Care	  for	  Consequences	  (“Every	  emotional	   impulse	   elicits	   a	   secondary	   impulse	   that	   tends	   to	   modify	   it	   in	   view	   of	   its	   possible	  consequences”	  p.355);	  The	  Laws	  of	  the	  Lightest	  Load	  and	  the	  Greatest	  Gain	  (“Whenever	  a	  situation	  can	  be	  viewed	   in	  alternative	  ways,	   a	   tendency	  exists	   to	  view	   it	   in	   a	  way	   that	  minimizes	  negative	  emotional	  load”	  [and/or]	  “maximizes	  emotional	  gain”	  p.356).	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Or, fearing rejection, the person avoids committing themselves to the relationship and is 
rejected for being too ‘cold’. In this way it is possible to go from friendship to 
friendship, or from relationship to relationship, and yet still replay the same emotional 
script, with the same emotional outcome. In this way, the unresolved emotional issue 
becomes a barrier to living a happy life and a causal factor in one’s unhappiness.  
 
There is another way in which I believe unresolved emotional issues impact on the 
character of one’s life, and that is in the way that one feels towards other people. Freud 
(1920) believed that repetition compulsion underlies the psychological phenomenon 
known as ‘Projection’. This phenomenon refers to the practice of attributing troubling 
emotional or psychological aspects of oneself to others. Carl Jung (1875-1961) referred 
to the projected parts of the self as ‘shadow aspects’ because they are outside the ‘light’ 
of the conscious mind, i.e. they are emotional issues about which we may remain 
consciously oblivious, even while repeatedly projecting them onto others.  
 
The term ‘shadow’ is not intended to denote negative value; the difficult aspects of self 
that are ‘cast’ into the shadow aren’t always ones which might be termed ‘bad’. For 
instance, a child who grows up in a household in which emotions are treated with 
derision or suspicion, might come to believe that they will be rejected or humiliated if 
they show emotion. Indeed, if emotions are treated with derision by the household then 
they are correct in their belief. As a simple matter of self-preservation, therefore, it 
becomes necessary for the child to suppress their emotions. In Jungian terms, it 
becomes necessary that they ‘cast’ their emotions ‘into the shadow’. When a part of 
oneself is cast into the shadow like this, reminders of that part can engender panic and 
result in emotional pain; after all, the part is still there it has merely been repressed. It is 
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not difficult to imagine that a person who has repressed her emotions, as a matter of 
self-preservation, might be afraid that those repressed emotions could suddenly emerge 
and overwhelm her, leading eventually to her rejection or humiliation.  
 
The behaviours of others can be strong reminders of the repressed parts of ourselves. 
When another behaves in a way that reminds us of our repressed parts, when they 
behave in a way that we have prohibited ourselves from behaving, this can trigger 
feelings of discomfort and even panic. So for instance, the person who has repressed her 
emotions may feel very uncomfortable when someone else talks about, or shows, their 
feelings. The more uncomfortable she feels, the more likely it is that she will deride the 
other as being ‘emotional’. This derision is a reflection of the distress caused by the 
suppression of her own emotions. But being unaware of this in herself, the repressor can 
assume that she just doesn’t like ‘emotional people’. She may indeed become hyper-
sensitive to ‘emotional people’ and she may develop feelings of instant dislike for 
anyone who potentially has this characteristic. In doing this, the repressor has 
effectively ‘projected’ a part of themselves onto another. Repression and projection 
indicate that a person has issues of self-acceptance. The lower one’s level of self-
acceptance, the more likely one is to suffer internal unrest, and the less likely one is to 
have a happy life  
 
Consider another example. For some the body can be a source of shame, most 
especially in our modern society where enormous emphasis is placed on being thin 
(sometimes to the point of morbidity). In our society being overweight is equated with 
being lazy, ugly, and generally worthy of derision. It is little wonder, therefore, that 
someone might develop the belief that they will be rejected or humiliated if they do not 
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watch their weight. Indeed, as overweight people are so often treated with derision by 
the media, and by Western society in general, then they are correct in their belief. As a 
simple matter of self-preservation, therefore, it may become necessary for a person to 
suppress the part of them that would wish to nourish themselves. As with the earlier 
example, reminders of that part can engender panic and result in emotional pain. Again, 
it is not difficult to imagine that a person who has repressed this part of herself, as a 
matter of self-preservation, might be afraid that the repressed part could suddenly 
emerge. If that were to happen, if she were to throw caution to the wind and just eat, 
then she would risk putting on weight, and ultimately being rejected or humiliated.   
 
Again, as before, the behaviours of others can be strong reminders of the repressed parts 
of ourselves. For the person who has repressed the part of them that wishes to nourish 
themselves, seeing someone who is overweight can be a strong reminder of their own 
repression. This reminder can lead to panic and distress. As a result the repressor can 
experience strong feelings of dislike for anyone who is overweight. A cruel and unusual 
example of how extreme this kind of projection can be cropped up from a group calling 
themselves ‘Overweight Haters Ltd’. The group handed out cards (see Figure 5.1) on 
the London Underground to individuals they considered to be overweight49: 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  See:	  http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-­‐england-­‐london-­‐34969424	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  Overweight	  Haters	  Ltd	  It’s	  really	  not	  glandular,	  it’s	  your	  gluttony…	  	  Our	  organisation	  hates	  and	  resents	   fat	  people.	  We	  object	   to	   the	  enormous	  amount	   of	   food	   resource	   you	   consume	   while	   half	   the	   world	   starves.	   We	  disapprove	  of	  your	  wasting	  NHS	  money	  to	  treat	  your	  selfish	  greed.	  And	  we	  do	   not	   understand	   why	   you	   fail	   to	   grasp	   that	   by	   eating	   less	   you	   will	   be	  better	  off,	  slimmer,	  happy	  and	  find	  a	  partner	  who	  is	  not	  a	  perverted	  chubby-­‐lover,	  or	  even	  find	  a	  partner	  at	  all.	  	  We	  also	  object	  that	  the	  beatiful	  (sic)	  pig	  is	  used	  as	  an	  insult.	  You	  are	  not	  a	  pig.	  You	  are	  a	  fat,	  ugly	  human.	  	  
Figure	  5.1:	  Text	  of	  the	  card	  handed	  out	  by	  Overweight	  Haters	  Ltd	  
 
The actions of this group are clearly extreme and their extreme nature leads me to 
believe that they are driven by their own unresolved fears and feelings of shame about 
the body. The attempt to publicly humiliate others seems clear evidence that this is an 
emotional issue. Obviously this doesn’t excuse their behaviour. Not everyone who has 
unresolved feelings of fear and shame about the body acts this way, so it is possible to 
have the same emotions and not take the same actions. My point here is that the kinds of 
emotional issues that might lead to these kinds of actions can have an impact on one’s 
acceptance of others, as well as one’s self-acceptance, both of which can causally affect 
the character of one’s life in terms of its happiness or unhappiness. 
 
Emotion can causally affect the character of one’s life in two ways. First, we learn at a 
very young age to see ourselves through the eyes of others. On the basis of our 
interactions with others we learn internal models or scripts which we then repeat in our 
relationships as adults. If these scripts are negative, if we believe that we are somehow 
unlovable or not good enough, then we can be said to have unresolved emotional issues. 
These scripts can have a detrimental effect on relationships as well as on one’s peace of 
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mind, and the same dynamics can be repeated many times over during the course of a 
lifetime. Second, for reasons of self-preservation, we may learn to repress parts of 
ourselves that we have come to believe will result in our rejection or humiliation. The 
continued repression of those parts can result in panic and emotional pain when we are 
reminded of them. If we are reminded of those parts by another person we can develop 
an instant dislike for them. The more parts of ourselves that we repress, the more people 
we end up disliking. Repression and projection have a negative impact on self-
acceptance and peace of mind, and thus can be a barrier to a happy life. 
 
Conversely, it is also possible to resolve emotional issues and to reclaim the parts of 
oneself that one has repressed. Indeed, reclaiming one’s shadow aspects and learning to 
accept oneself is a goal in forms of psychotherapy like Psychosynthesis. Once a person 
accepts themselves, such that he or she no longer finds any part of themselves to be 
unacceptable, the characteristics of others no longer have any bearing and internal 
unrest can be alleviated. As such, therefore, as much as unresolved emotional issues can 
be a barrier to happiness, resolving those issues can be a means of achieving it. On my 
view, therefore, emotion can have a causal effect on the character of one’s life in terms 
of its happiness or unhappiness.  
 
 
§5.1.2:	  A	  Challenge	  from	  Moral	  Philosophy	  
 
Paul Bloomfield writes that “being immoral keeps a person from being happy” (2014, 
p.4). He argues that living morally “is the only way of living that leads to happiness and 
the Good Life” (ibid, p.4). This is because “whenever immorality is disrespectful to its 
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victims, it is to the same degree self-disrespecting to its perpetrators” and “people 
cannot be happy and live the Good Life without self-respect” (ibid, p.4). To be moral, 
on Bloomfield’s view, is roughly to appreciate that one ought to do things out of regard 
for others, and not only out of regard for oneself. He maintains that morality is 
necessary for self-respect, and self-respect is necessary for happiness, thus morality is 
necessary for happiness50. It might be argued that, on this view, it is self-respect and not 
emotion that is causal in the character of one’s life as being happy or unhappy. 
 
Take, for instance, the various examples used in the previous section. The view 
espoused by someone like Bloomfield might explain the unhappiness in the lives I’ve 
alluded to as follows:  
 
The possible unhappiness of a person who fits the archetypal description of being a 
‘people-pleaser’ could be argued to be due to a lack of self-respect. Bloomfield points 
out that “one is not morally permitted to carry out a self-disrespecting act in order to 
please others” (2014, p.23). A people-pleaser necessarily lacks self-respect by virtue of 
their servility and lack of regard for themselves in always trying to please others. This 
lack of self-respect can explain why a people-pleaser cannot live a happy life because 
one cannot live a happy life without self-respect. Thus the life of the people-pleaser will 
necessarily be unhappy.  
 
In the same vein, the person who holds on too tightly to a relationship restricts the 
freedom and the peace of mind of the person whom she is with. She does this for her 
own benefit, i.e. so as not to be left alone. But restricting another’s freedom and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  He	  also	  makes	  the	  stronger	  claim	  that	  “living	  morally	  and	  virtuously	  is	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  people	  to	  live	  as	  happily	  as	  possible”	  (Bloomfield	  2014,	  p.6).	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disturbing their peace of mind is disrespectful of that person. In doing what she does, 
therefore, she fails to have proper regard for the other person. This will have a negative 
impact on her self-respect because whenever one is disrespectful to others, one is 
disrespectful to oneself to the same degree. As a result of her holding on too tightly, she 
loses self-respect. And she continues to do so every time she enters a relationship in 
which the pattern is repeated. This lack of self-respect can explain why she cannot live a 
happy life because one cannot be happy without self-respect. Therefore her life is 
necessarily unhappy.   
 
Finally, the same can be argued in the case of the Overweight Haters Ltd. The actions of 
this group are clearly immoral, inflicting as they do unnecessary harm on complete 
strangers. By inflicting harm on others the group’s actions are disrespectful to those 
others, and to the same degree they are disrespectful to themselves. Thus the actions 
undertaken will have a negative impact on the self-respect of the individual members of 
the group. As a result of their actions, the individual members will lose self-respect. 
One cannot be happy without self-respect. Therefore, members of the group will 
necessarily live unhappy lives.  
 
On this moral view, the unhappy examples I presented in the previous section can be 
explained as being due to the negative impact on self-respect of behaving 
disrespectfully. If that’s the case then it is one’s self-respect, rather than one’s emotion, 
that is causal in the character of one’s life in terms of its happiness or unhappiness.   
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§5.1.3:	  Response	  to	  the	  Challenge.	  
 
I do not wish to discount the importance that self-respect plays in the character of a life. 
In fact, I agree with Bloomfield that self-respect is necessary for happiness. However, 
one does not lose self-respect in a vacuum. I mean by this that there are underlying 
reasons why a person becomes a people-pleaser, or clingy, or cold, or someone who 
projects onto others, and those underlying reasons include unresolved emotional issues 
such as those I’ve described. 
 
Additionally, issues of self-respect cannot explain why the incidence of prescribing 
antidepressants increased by approximately 20% per annum in the period between 2000 
and 2010 across 27 European countries (Lewer et al., 2015). Nor can it explain the fact 
that the proportion of people in the UK consulting a counsellor or psychotherapist 
increased from 20% in 2010 to 28% in 201451. These figures are clear indicators that 
many people are living unhappy lives, and that their unhappiness is affect-related. If this 
were not the case then it would make little sense that they turn to affect-regulating drugs 
or seek the emotional support of a counsellor or psychotherapist.  
 
Even if self-respect is a significant factor in living a happy life, unresolved emotional 
issues can be a causal factor in one’s level of self-respect. Thus, unresolved emotional 
issues can causally affect one’s happiness. Emotion has a causal effect on the character 
of one’s life in terms of its happiness or unhappiness.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Report	  from	  the	  British	  Association	  of	  Counselling	  &	  Psychotherapy	  (BACP)	  http://www.bacp.co.uk/media/?newsId=3506.	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But demonstrating that emotion can have an effect on the character of one’s life is 
evidence only that one’s emotional faculties causally effect feelings. For my thesis to be 
fully plausible I must demonstrate some causal effect on feelings at the level of the 
individual emotion. I do this in the next section. 
 
 
§5.2:	  Effect	  of	  an	  Individual	  Token	  of	  Emotion	  on	  Feelings	  	  
 
In this section I argue that an individual token of emotion can causally affect one’s 
feelings towards oneself. 
 
We learn from a young age that some emotion types are more socially acceptable than 
others. It is not uncommon, for example, for a person to feel embarrassed by, or even 
apologise for, any public display of sadness. It is rather less common for a person to do 
the same when they smile, or laugh, or generally feel happy in the company of others. 
To be embarrassed by one’s sadness, but not by one’s happiness, is evidence that the 
former is relatively less socially acceptable than the latter. Other emotions which may 
be thought of as being socially proscribed to some extent include anger, bitterness, 
despair, envy, fear, hatred, jealousy, panic, regret, and resentment. While emotions that 
are socially acceptable might include affection, compassion, courage, exuberance, 
gratitude, hope, love, passion, and resilience.  
 
Feeling a token of an emotional type that is socially proscribed can causally affect one’s 
feelings towards oneself. Take the example of fear. Fear seems to be a fact of life. We 
can feel fear in response to deteriorating global conflicts, to economic crises, to the 
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conditions of our lives, and to everyday events and occurrences. Now consider an 
imaginary person called Bob who feels fear as he tries to pass his neighbour’s barking 
dog. Bob has been told since he was a small boy that he should “man up” in scary 
situations, and that being afraid means that he’s a coward. Thus Bob has been 
conditioned to believe that fear is an emotion which is not only socially unacceptable, 
but which also reflects badly on his own character (i.e. his feeling fear implies his 
cowardice). Because of this conditioning, Bob dislikes the fact that he feels afraid, and 
what is more, he becomes the object of his own feelings of dislike. Bob dislikes himself 
for feeling fear. Thus, Bob’s feeling of fear has a  causal effect on his feelings towards 
himself.  
 
The emotions that one feels seem to say something about one’s character, about the kind 
of person one is. For instance, I dislike the notion that I’m capable of bitterness. I hold it 
to be a singularly unattractive emotion. But nevertheless I am human, and so there are 
times when I experience feeling bitter. When I feel bitter I am faced a the fact of the 
matter about the type of person that I am; I am the type of person who is capable of 
feeling bitter. As I dislike bitterness, so in that moment I dislike myself for feeling 
bitter. I become the object of my own dislike as a causal effect of my feeling bitter. 
Thus my feeling bitter causally affects how I feel about myself.  Because we believe 
that the emotions we feel say something about the type of person we are, feeling 
emotions that we believe speak badly of our character can have a negative impact on 
how we feel about ourselves; just as feeling emotions that we believe speak well of our 
character can have a positive impact on how we feel about ourselves. If that’s the case 
then an individual token of emotion can causally affect feelings.  
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An objection might be raised here. In the examples I’ve described it seems that how one 
feels about oneself is more plausibly affected by one’s beliefs. One’s belief that emotion 
speaks to character, coupled with one’s belief that a particular token of an emotion type 
can reflect badly (or well) on one’s character, can causally affect how one feels about 
oneself. Put this way it seems that it is one’s beliefs, and not one’s emotion, that plays 
the causal role in one’s self-feelings.  
 
To see this challenge more clearly consider a non-emotional example: If I believe (a) 
‘that drinking orangeade speaks to my character’, and I believe (b) ‘that drinking 
orangeade reflects badly on my character’, then I will feel badly about myself when I 
drink orangeade. But it is my beliefs, and not the fact of my drinking orangeade, that 
causally affects how I feel about myself. That this is the case can be seen by changing 
the beliefs involved. If I were to change my belief (b) such that instead I now believe (c) 
‘that drinking orangeade makes people like me’, then I will probably feel good about 
myself when I drink orangeade. Changing my belief from (b) to (c) changes how I feel 
about myself, and so it is my beliefs and not my behaviour that plays the casual role.  
 
Now imagine a world (w*) in which fear is believed to be a laudable rather than a 
lamentable emotion. In (w*) someone who feels fear is believed to be brave rather than 
cowardly. Plausibly, in (w*) a person would feel good about themselves when they feel 
fear. But the difference between (w*) and our world is a difference in beliefs not 
emotions; fear feels the same in (w*) as it does in our world, and it is felt in response to 
the same things, such as barking dogs. If the difference in belief results in one’s feeling 
good about oneself on (w*), then it seems that it is one’s beliefs, and not one’s 
	   164	  
emotions, that have a causal effect on how one feels about oneself. It that’s true then my 
claim that emotion causally affects feelings is undermined. 
 
In my view, emotional conditioning is a complex phenomenon. Specifically, the social 
conditioning that results in aversion to socially proscribed emotions, or to the 
expression of those emotions, includes deep and abiding beliefs, judgments, 
physiological responses and higher-order perceptions. However the topic, while worthy 
of argument, is tangential. The problem with the challenge is not that it underestimates 
emotional conditioning, but rather that, in this instance, it confuses the cognitive 
element of a self-directed emotion with its cause.  
 
I have already argued (Ch.1) that emotion supervenes inter alia on cognition, and it is 
this supervenience that muddies the water, so to speak, when it comes to one’s disliking 
oneself as a result of having a particular emotion. When one dislikes oneself, one feels 
the emotion of dislike. Dislike, just like any other emotion, supervenes in part on 
cognitive factors. But supervenience is not a causal relation. If A supervenes on B, then 
the relationship is such that there cannot be a change in B without some change in A. 
This seems correctly to describe the relationship between, for instance, social 
conditioning about what fear says about one’s character, and the type of one’s self-
directed emotion. Consider the twin worlds example used in the objection. There is a 
difference between (w*) and our world in terms of the conditioning about what fear 
says about a person. In (w*) fear is laudable, in our world it is lamentable. In (w*) a 
person can feel good about themselves when they feel afraid, and in our world a person 
can feel bad about themselves when they experience the same emotion (they can dislike 
themselves). On this view, the difference in self-directed emotion can be seen to 
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supervene on the difference in conditioning – by changing the conditioning the self-
directed emotion changes. Indeed it seems unlikely that such a change in conditioning 
wouldn’t change the self-directed emotion in the way described. If one were 
conditioned to hold that feeling a certain emotion reflected well on one’s character then 
it seems unlikely that one would dislike oneself as a result of feeling that emotion.  
 
But the cognitive element of one’s self-directed emotion, while important, ought not to 
be confused with the cause of that self-directed emotion. In the examples I used (Bob’s 
fear and my bitterness) our self-directed feelings of dislike supervene on our respective 
conditioning about such emotions; the reason the self-directed emotion in question is 
dislike rather than pride, or affection (or some other positive affect), is because the 
emotion is determined by our conditioning about fear and bitterness. But the 
conditioning upon which the self-directed emotion supervenes is not the same as the 
instigating cause for those self-directed feelings to arise. 
 
If Bob had not felt fear, he would not have felt dislike towards himself for feeling fear. 
If I had not felt bitterness, I would not have felt dislike towards myself for feeling bitter. 
It is Bob’s feeling of fear, and my feeling of bitterness, that are causally antecedent to 
how we feel towards ourselves. If that’s true then an individual token of emotion can 
causally affect how one feels towards oneself; a token of emotion can causally affect 
feelings. Thus emotion can have a downward causal effect on feelings.  
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Chapter	  Conclusion:	  
 
In this chapter I have argued that emotion can be a causal factor in the character of a life 
in terms of its happiness or unhappiness, and that an individual token of an emotion 
type can causally affect one’s feelings towards oneself. Thus emotion can have a causal 
effect on feelings.  
 
I have already argued that emotion has a causal effect on cognition. This chapter 
constitutes my argument that emotion can have a causal effect on feelings. In the next 
chapter I will argue that emotion has a causal effect on the remaining constituent part of 
emotion, perception.  	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Chapter	  6:	  Emotion’s	  Effect	  on	  Perception 
 
They say that love makes you see the world through ‘rose tinted glasses’, and that 
revenge is ‘a dish best served cold’. They also say that disappointment is a ‘bitter pill’, 
compared with the ‘sweet taste’ of success. And in the same sensory vein, we talk about 
rage as a ‘red mist’; about being ‘green’ with envy, and about sadness as ‘feeling blue’. 
Metaphors like these abound. And their abundance serves to illustrate how 
commonplace a notion it is that our emotions affect how we perceive the world around 
us. In this chapter I argue that this commonplace notion is correct, emotion can have a 
causal effect on perception. I argue (§6.1) that emotion has a causal effect, at the level 
of the emotional faculty, on the selectivity of perceptual processing. I also argue (§6.2) 
that a token of an emotion type can causally effect higher-order perception.  
 
 
§6.1:	  Emotion’s	  Effect	  on	  Perceptual	  Selectivity	  	  
 
The human capacity to process perceptual information is finite and thus limited in 
comparison with the volume of information available. For instance, from the amount of 
visual information available to the retina at any given time, only a proportion will be 
processed into conscious awareness, while the rest will effectively remain 
unperceived52. When there is more information available than is processed, it would be 
beneficial that material relevant to our survival or wellbeing should make it through the 
information bottleneck to conscious perception ahead of more neutral material. For 
instance, the person whose visual attention is automatically drawn to movement in the 
grass is more likely to avoid the poisonous snake and thus survive; the person whose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  See	  Desimone	  &	  Duncan	  (1995).	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hearing picks up on the stealthy footsteps behind her is more likely to have time to 
outrun an attacker and thus remain uninjured. It would make sense, from an adaptive 
perspective therefore, if a stimulus that elicits an emotion like fear had preference for 
perceptual processing over more neutral stimuli. Given our finite capacity for perceptual 
processing, and given the adaptive benefit of a preference for emotion-eliciting stimuli, 
it seems plausible that emotion has a prioritising effect on perceptual processing. In this 
section, I argue (§6.1.1) that emotion causally affects perceptual selectivity and I 
present empirical evidence to back up my claim. If emotion affects perceptual 
selectivity then emotion can be said to have a causal effect on perception. I consider the 
potential challenge (§6.1.2) that perceptual selectivity is a cognitive process rather than 
a perceptual one. If that’s true then I am mistaken when I appeal to perceptual 
selectivity as an example of emotion’s effect on perception. I respond (§6.1.3) that 
cognition can be a cause of perceptual selectivity but that does not mean that the process 
itself is not perceptual. I argue that perceptual selectivity is a perceptual process on the 
basis of parsimony, and because this fits better with the empirical evidence. Perceptual 
selectivity is a perceptual process. Emotion has a causal effect on perceptual selectivity. 
Therefore emotion has a causal effect on perception.   
 
§6.1.1:	  Emotion’s	  Effect	  on	  Perceptual	  Selectivity	  
 
The volume of information processed by perception at any given time can be vast. 
Consider driving down a busy street with the radio playing and a passenger in the car. 
As you do this, perceptual processing will include proprioceptive information about 
posture and the movement of your feet and hands; tactile information from the pressure 
of the pedals and the grip of the steering wheel; auditory information from the sound of 
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the engine, the music from the radio, and conversation from your passenger; and visual 
information from both inside the vehicle (mirrors, gearstick, gauges, panel lights, 
yourself, your passenger) and outside the vehicle (sign posts, lane markings, traffic 
lights, parked cars, buses, traffic, shop windows, pedestrians). In this most ordinary of 
everyday activities the volume of information that is being processed simultaneously 
through perception is not inconsiderable. Even so, the volume of information that 
actually makes it through to conscious awareness is only a proportion of the information 
that’s available. For instance, fine-grained sensory information, such as the colour of a 
pedestrian’s hat, or the facial features of the bus driver, or words on the poster in the bus 
shelter, can often fail to register. Similarly, most of the available sensory information 
about the road ahead of you will be unattended when you shift your focus to the rear-
view mirror. Not all available sensory information makes it though to conscious 
perception, and the term given to the process by which we filter out some of the 
available perceptual information is called ‘perceptual selectivity’.  
 
Biased Competition Theory (Desimone & Duncan 1995) suggests that sensory 
information is not all treated as equal in perceptual selectivity. It suggests that 
perceptual processing prioritises certain stimuli over others and that, as such, perception 
can be said to be biased. The theory holds that perception does this for two reasons. 
First, because processing of perceptual information becomes less detailed the more 
information is being processed. For instance, we can attend to more than one object in 
the visual field at any given time, but when visual attention is divided the information 
processed becomes less fine grained. “Information about more than one object may, to 
some extent, be processed in parallel, but the information available about any given 
object will decline as more and more objects are added” (Desimone & Duncan 1995, 
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p.197).  So, for instance, I can attend to my phone while I’m driving, but I cannot read 
the text of a message on it and attend to the road ahead at the same time; indeed laws 
and stipulations against using mobile phones in the car reflect this perceptual limitation. 
Second, at any given time some perceptual stimuli will have more importance or 
relevance, with regard to one’s occurrent endeavours, than other stimuli. For instance, 
my visual field is cluttered at present, as it typically is, but the words on this page are 
more important to my current writing project than the view from the window beyond. 
As a result, much of the available visual information from the view beyond the window 
will not make it through the filtering process to my conscious perception. It is simply 
unnecessary that it do so, and it would be a waste of my finite perceptual processing 
capacity for unnecessary information to be processed.  
 
Perceptual selectivity occurs in audition as well as in vision. For instance, I can attend 
to a conversation being held by a group behind me when I’m in a busy restaurant, even 
while the people sitting closer to me are also speaking. In an experiment by Moray 
(1959), two different messages were delivered simultaneously, one to each ear of the 
participating subjects. The subjects were instructed to attend only to one of these 
messages. It was ensured that they did this by their repeating the message aloud as it 
was delivered (a process known as ‘shadowing’). Moray found that, even in cases where 
the unattended message consisted of a short list of simple words, repeated several times, 
no trace of that message was retained. In similar tests (Cherry 1953) subjects were 
unable even to report what language the unattended message had been spoken in. An 
interesting exception to this, Moray found, was when the person’s name was spoken as 
part of the unattended message; “a person’s own name can penetrate the block” (Moray 
1959, p.60). Unnecessary or unimportant auditory stimuli can be filtered out before they 
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are processed, and more important stimuli, such as the individual’s own name, are more 
likely to make it through the filter to conscious auditory perception.  
 
As information declines when attention is divided, and as we operate within a 
constantly cluttered perceptual environment, with a finite capacity to processes it, the 
available perceptual information is necessarily prioritised. Biased Competition Theory 
holds that as the perceptual system prioritises some objects over others, then the 
perceptual system must be selectively biased in favour of certain types of information.  
 
Research shows that emotion-eliciting stimuli are typically given priority over non-
emotional stimuli. For instance, Öhman et al. (2001) found that fear-relevant images 
(snakes and spiders) are found more quickly in an array of images than fear-irrelevant 
ones. In their view, this is because our perceptual systems are biased towards stimuli 
that are relevant to survival. A perceptual system that is biased in this way would have 
adaptive value. “Mammals evolved in environments where resources and dangers were 
unpredictably distributed in space and time. The reproductive potential of individuals, 
therefore, was predicated on the ability to efficiently locate critically important events in 
the surroundings” (Öhman et al. 2001, p.466). The authors also suggest that visual 
selectivity would have to be automatic in order to be adaptive. The slower the 
selectivity for survival-relevant stimuli, the less likely the survival. In their view, 
perceptual selectivity of survival-relevant stimuli would have to be automatic or pre-
reflective if it is to have adaptive benefit.  
 
It makes sense that survival-relevant stimuli would automatically make it through the 
sensory information bottleneck to conscious perception. This raises the question as to 
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what might signal to the perceptual process that one type of stimulus is more relevant to 
survival than another. Consider the mundane driving scenario I used in the introduction 
to this section. Now consider what happens when you add something into the mix that’s 
likely to provoke anxiety. For instance, torrential rain. In this scenario several anxiety-
eliciting events can occur at once. For instance, your windscreen might keep misting up 
and your view would be obscured by this, as well as by the rain, and by the wipers that 
can’t move fast enough to clear it; brake lights from the cars in front of you would flash 
on and off as the traffic slows; pedestrians might dash across the street without looking; 
and oncoming cars might swerve over the central line to avoid those pedestrians. In 
such a situation these anxiety-eliciting objects and events will take precedence for 
perceptual processing over more neutral proprioceptive, tactile, visual and auditory 
stimuli. This seems reasonable. If our capacity to process perceptual information is 
finite, then selectively processing sensory information relevant to avoiding a crash, or 
running over a pedestrian, will be more beneficial than processing the lyrics of the song 
on the radio.  
 
When objects elicit anxiety there is an increase in the biochemical correlates of anxiety; 
cortisone and adrenaline are released into the bloodstream53. It seems possible that this 
biochemical surge is a factor in the prioritisation of emotion-eliciting events over 
neutral events in selective perception. Empirical evidence suggests that this is the case. 
Adam Anderson (2005) found that one of the limitations of perceptual processing, 
known as the ‘attentional-blink’, is reduced in the presence of emotion-eliciting stimuli. 
In research studies, subjects sit before a screen on which words are flashed rapidly one 
after another (at times T1, T2, T3…). Some of those words are neutral, for example 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  See	  previous	  chapter	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  biological	  process	  involved	  in	  the	  stress	  mechanism	  of	  ‘fight	  or	  flight’.	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‘chrysanthemum’; some of the words are emotion-eliciting, for example ‘rape’. When a 
subject is presented with two neutral words in tandem, there is a transient impairment to 
perceptual attention. So, for instance, for neutral words there is an impairment in 
perception of the word presented at T2, during which time the word presented at T1 is 
still being processed. This transient impairment is known as the ‘attentional-blink’. 
Attentional-blinks can last for up to 500ms. When the time intervals between words is 
shorter, there is a greater volume of information competing for processing into 
perceptual awareness. When this happens the attentional-blink is longer. It is thought 
that this impairment to attention “demonstrates that perceptual encoding depends on a 
capacity-limited short-term consolidation process” (Anderson 2005, p.259). In other 
words, our capacity to process and consolidate information in perceptual awareness is 
limited.  
 
In a series of tests, Anderson found that the attentional-blink is significantly reduced 
when an emotion-eliciting word is introduced into the series of words being flashed on 
the screen; there’s a shorter attentional-blink when an emotion-eliciting word like ‘rape’ 
appears. This means that whatever process limits visual attention, that process is 
penetrated more easily by emotional stimuli. This is in keeping with Moray’s findings 
that hearing one’s name spoken can penetrate a block on auditory perception. 
Significantly, the reduction in attentional-blink is more pronounced when the time 
interval between words is shortest; i.e. the faster the words are flashed the more quickly 
an emotional word will make it through to visual awareness. This is the opposite effect 
from that observed when neutral words are flashed more quickly. The author believes 
that the reduction in the length of the attentional-blink for emotional stimuli “would 
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suggest that affective events require fewer attentional resources during encoding to gain 
entry into awareness” (Anderson 2005, p.260).  
 
Anderson also found that the more emotionally arousing the stimulus, the shorter the 
attentional-blink. Thus, the level of emotional arousal associated with the word flashed 
on the screen had an affect on the attenuation of the attentional-blink. So, for instance, a 
word like ‘rape’ would be processed more quickly than a word like ‘home’. This fits 
with the notion that the biochemical correlates of emotion play a causal role in the 
prioritisation of objects and events in the perceptual field. There is a direct correlation 
between emotional arousal and the speed of perceptual processing. On Anderson’s 
view, this means that emotional arousal is best characterised as an enhancement to 
perception. On this view, it is not just that perception of emotional stimuli happens 
faster, rather we should consider this as evidence that emotion itself speeds up 
perceptual processing.  
 
Further evidence that emotion speeds up perceptual processing comes from pathological 
cases in which damage has occurred to emotion centres in the brain. Anderson & Phelps 
(2001) found that damage to the amygdala, an area of the brain intimately associated 
with emotion, reduces the attenuating affect of emotional stimuli on perceptual 
attention. When the amygdala is undamaged emotional stimuli are processed more 
quickly than neutral stimuli; when the amygdala is damaged emotional stimuli and 
neutral stimuli are processed as the same speed. The authors found that “a patient with 
bilateral amygdala damage has no enhanced perception for…aversive stimulus events” 
(2001, p.305). As amygdala damage affects emotional arousal, this fits with the 
hypothesis that emotion speeds up perceptual processing.  
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An analogy might be useful to explain how this might happen. Imagine a sorting-tray 
from which packets of information are picked up by grappling hooks and delivered to 
slots in the wall. Let’s call the time it takes, between pick-up by the grappling hook and 
delivery to the slot in the wall, the ‘blink-time’. Imagine that packets of information are 
constantly arriving on the sorting-tray. The speed of arrival of the packets is faster than 
the speed of processing by the grappling-hooks, and so the packets begin to accumulate. 
As the packets accumulate, it’s more difficult for the grappling hooks to grab hold of 
them with any precision, which can slow down the process and thus the ‘blink-time’ 
increases.  
 
Now imagine that the packets of information come in two types – ‘urgent’ and ‘non-
urgent’. Urgent packets are distinguished from non-urgent packets by virtue of the fact 
that the former emit a chemical signature while the latter do not. The grappling hooks 
are pre-programmed such that whenever an urgent packet arrives on the sorting tray, the 
chemical signature it emits automatically causes the nearest grappling hook to drop 
whatever it’s carrying, and go back to pick up the urgent packet instead. It then delivers 
the urgent packet to the slot in the wall.      
 
In this analogy, there are several variables that affect the speed of delivery; the type of 
packages on the sorting tray (urgent or non-urgent), the volume of packets on the 
sorting tray, and the proportion of grappling hooks employed in urgent and non-urgent 
processing. Neither the number, nor the size of the slots in the wall are variable and 
each slot can receive only one package at a time, irrespective of their urgency. In this 
automated system, urgent packets always have priority and as more and more urgent 
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packets arrive, more and more grappling hooks drop their non-urgent load and start 
processing urgent packets instead. Thus disproportionately more urgent packets make it 
through the slot in comparison with non-urgent packets.  
 
In my analogy, the non-urgent packets represent non-emotional stimuli; urgent packets 
represent emotion-eliciting stimuli. The latter are distinguishable because emotions 
have biochemical correlates (such as cortisol and adrenaline etc.), which are represented 
in my analogy as chemical signals. The more intense the emotion elicited, the more 
biochemicals released, the stronger the chemical signal. The grappling hook represents 
perceptual processing. And finally, the slot in the wall represents conscious awareness; 
only the packets that make it through the slot make it into conscious awareness.  
 
Because the chemical signal attached to urgent packets will cause the grappling hooks 
to drop whatever they’re carrying in order to pick them up, the time it takes from arrival 
to delivery is reduced for urgent packets in comparison with non-urgent packets. But 
sometimes a malfunction can occur. Take for instance the scenario in which an urgent 
packet does not emit a chemical signal. In this case the system doesn’t register it as 
urgent and therefore doesn’t automatically drop what it’s carrying and pick up the 
urgent package. The urgent package becomes just another in the bottleneck of packages. 
This is analogous to the situation in which there is damage to the amygdala, the part of 
the brain responsible for regulating the release of biochemicals in the stress response. 
Without the presence of a chemical signal, the processing system is not interrupted. In 
this instance the processing time for the urgent packet isn’t reduced in comparison with 
the processing time for non-urgent packets.   
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Perceptual processing is finite and therefore perceptual stimuli must be prioritised in 
some way. With a constantly crowded visual and auditory field, it makes sense that 
emotion-eliciting stimuli would have priority over non-emotional stimuli when both are 
in competition for perceptual attention. Prioritising emotional stimuli improves one’s 
chances for survival, and empirical evidence suggests that emotionally relevant stimuli 
are indeed prioritised in perceptual processing. The more emotionally arousing the 
stimulus, the more quickly it’s processed into conscious perception. Think about the 
example I gave earlier of driving in torrential rain. Events like the windscreen starting to 
fog-up, or brake lights coming on in the cars ahead are likely to cause anxiety. But this 
will likely be considerably less than the anxiety provoked if a pedestrian were suddenly 
to dash in front of your car without looking. When that happens the pedestrian will 
automatically, and instantly, have your full attention. This automaticity in prioritising 
events that elicit the strongest emotional response suggests that it is emotion itself (or at 
least the biochemical correlates of emotion) that has the prioritising effect on 
perception. If that’s the case then emotion has a causal effect on the selectivity of the 
perceptual process. As emotion affects perceptual selectivity, emotion has a causal 
effect on perception.   
 
 
§6.1.2:	  A	  Challenge	  from	  Selectivity	  as	  a	  Cognitive	  Process	  
 
A potential challenge may be raised against the characterisation of perceptual selectivity 
as a perceptual process. It may be that the selectivity of perception is mediated by 
cognition. It may be that selectivity is not automatic, as I’ve suggested, but rather 
selectivity is controlled by cognition; it may be that we decide which types of 
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perceptual stimuli to process first. If perceptual selectivity is a cognitive process then 
the prioritisation of emotion-eliciting events is not done by perception. If that’s the case 
then my conclusion that emotion has a causal effect on perception is mistaken.  
 
Nicholas Pastore (1949) holds such a view. He maintains that perceptual selectivity is 
the result of cognitive mechanisms and denies that perception itself is selective. He 
argues that it is the interpretive system accompanying perception which does the 
filtering. Perceptual selectivity, he argues, does not involve perception alone, it also 
involves the attention or interests of the individual. On Pastore’s view, the very fact that 
perceptual selectivity filters out information that may be deemed ‘irrelevant’ to our 
occurrent endeavours suggests that the filtering process is cognitive. After all, 
determining what is, and what isn’t, relevant is something that can only be done by 
cognition. On Pastore’s view it seems incoherent to claim that the perceptual system 
does this determining. On this basis, Pastore argues, perceptual selectivity is cognitive 
rather than perceptual.  
 
 It might be argued that Pastore’s view is in keeping with the notion of information 
encapsulation in perception. The inputs of perception (visual and auditory stimuli etc.) 
are thought to be informationally encapsulated from belief and expectation. Jerry Fodor 
(1983) first proposed this notion of ‘cognitive encapsulation’. He points to sensory 
illusions as evidence for his view. Take for example the Müller-Lyer lines (Figure 
6.2.1). Two lines of exactly equal length can appear to be different in length when the 
arrows on either end are reversed in direction. Even when one is aware that the image is 
a visual illusion, the illusion seems to persist. Fodor argues that the persistence of the 
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illusion would not be possible if sensory perception were not informationally 
encapsulated from beliefs and expectations. 
  
 
Figure 6.2.1: Müller-Lyer Lines 
   
 
On Pastore’s view, prioritisation in perception seems to require some form of 
categorisation; i.e. inputs would have to be categorised as relevant or irrelevant etc. in 
order to be prioritised. If, as Fodor holds, perceptual inputs are informationally 
encapsulated from beliefs and expectations, then it seems unlikely that categorisation 
could occur in advance of cognition. This is because categorisation seems to require that 
the perceptual input be operated on by belief; for example, the belief that events with 
certain properties belong to the same category. Thus, if perceptual inputs are 
informationally encapsulated, it seems more likely that perceptual selectivity is 
cognitive, as Pastore argues. Perceptual illusions seem to provide reason to believe that 
perceptual inputs are informationally encapsulated. Therefore, there is reason to believe 
that perceptual selectivity is cognitive rather than perceptual. If that’s the case then 
emotion’s effect on perceptual selectivity is due to an effect on cognition and not on 
perception. Hence, emotion’s effect on perceptual selectivity does not constitute an 
argument that emotion causally affects perception.	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§6.1.3:	  Response	  to	  the	  Challenge	  
 
As an initial response, it is worth noting that the informational encapsulation of 
perceptual inputs is not inconsistent with the notion that perceptual selectivity is a 
perceptual process. It is possible that what is perceived can be informationally 
encapsulated, even if the selection of what is perceived is prioritised by perception. This 
is in keeping with our ordinary experience of perception of emotion-eliciting stimuli. 
Consider that the coiled object in the grass might turn out to be a rope and not a snake. 
When this fear-eliciting object is first selectively perceived, however, that distinction is 
not made. It is only subsequently, post the adrenaline rush, that the distinction between 
rope and snake is typically made. Thus perceptual processing of the coiled object can be 
prioritised even while still informationally encapsulated. Selectivity by perception and 
informational encapsulation are not mutually exclusive. I have suggested that the 
biochemical correlates of emotion affect the prioritisation of perceptual information. If 
that’s true then cognition is not required for prioritisation. On this basis, the emotion-
eliciting stimulus can still be selectively processed without interference from belief or 
expectation.  
 
In my view, Pastore is mistaken when he maintains that perceptual selectivity is 
cognitive rather than perceptual. I believe cognition can have the effect of directing 
perceptual selectivity, but this does not mean that perceptual selectivity is entirely a 
cognitive process. A selective system in which higher-priority information is identified 
automatically is more efficient than a selective system in which priority must be 
ascribed. If perceptual selectivity is cognitive, then incoming information is not 
prioritised automatically. Rather, the prioritisation of the information comes about 
through cognitive processing. This would require a heavier processing load than if 
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selectivity were part of the perceptual process itself. The heavier processing load 
necessarily makes this a less efficient system. If selectivity confers survival benefit, 
then an organism has a higher chance of survival with a more efficient system rather 
than a less efficient one. The parsimony of an automatic system suggests that selectivity 
is more likely to be perceptual rather than cognitive.  
 
My response from parsimony is also backed up by the fact that an automatic system fits 
better with the empirical evidence. Adam Anderson’s (2005) research showed that the 
bottleneck of perception is penetrated faster by emotional stimuli when the presentation 
of stimuli is speeded up. Thus the shortening of the attentional-blink is more 
pronounced when the time interval between stimuli is reduced. He claims that this 
“suggests enhanced encoding of emotional events is best characterised as a relative 
enhancement of preattentive bottom-up processing rather than a postattentive top-down 
modulation of resources toward these events” (Anderson 2005, p.270). Perception is a 
bottom-up process, while cognition is typically top-down. If the empirical evidence is 
more consistent with a bottom-up process then it is more likely that perceptual 
selectivity is perceptual rather than cognitive.   
 
Additionally, and not insignificantly, amygdala damage does not affect a person’s 
comprehension of the significance of an emotional stimulus. So, for instance, a patient 
with bilateral amygdala damage will fully comprehend the emotional significance of the 
emotional words flashed up on the screen. They would understand that a word like 
‘chrysanthemum’ is a fairly neutral word, and that a word like ‘rape’ has strong 
emotional significance. If perceptual selectivity were a cognitive process, one would 
expect that the subject’s understanding of the emotional significance of a word like 
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‘rape’ would have some influence on perceptual selectivity. One would expect the speed 
of processing the word ‘rape’ would be faster than the speed of processing the word 
‘chrysanthemum’. In other words, if perceptions are filtered by cognition, one would 
expect cognitive understanding to have an effect on what is selected for filtering. But 
this is not the case. Understanding what the word ‘rape’ means does not reduce the 
attentional-blink.  
 
Amygdala damage impairs the production of the biochemical correlates of emotion. 
Think about the example of a pedestrian dashing in front of your car. When this 
happens your stress response kicks in. In the stress response under normal (non-
pathological) conditions, the amygdala signals to the hypothalamus to release hormones 
that eventually lead to the release of cortisol into the bloodstream. The cortisol then 
affects heart rate and respiration etc. When the amygdala is damaged, this signalling is 
impaired and so cortisol isn’t released as it should be. When the amygdala is damaged 
the attentional-blink is not shortened as it would normally be, and the fact that it is not 
shortened might be explained by the lack of cortisol in the bloodstream.  
 
None of this need be interpreted to mean that cognition cannot also have an effect on 
perceptual selectivity. Such a claim would be unjustified, as well as unnecessary. The 
notion that cognition can affect selectivity is consistent with the notion that perceptual 
selectivity is a perceptual process. By virtue of parsimony, and on the basis of empirical 
evidence, it is more likely that perceptual selectivity is a perceptual process. Emotion 
has a causal effect on perceptual selectivity.  
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The effect of emotion on perceptual selectivity shows that emotion has a causal effect 
on perception at the macro-level of the emotional faculty. But in order for my thesis to 
be complete it is necessary to show that an individual token of an emotion type can also 
causally affect perception. I do this in the next section.  
 
 
§6.2:	  An	  Individual	  Token	  of	  an	  Emotion	  Type	  can	  Causally	  Affect	  Perception	  
 
In this section I argue that an individual token of an emotion type can have a causal 
effect on higher-order perception. 
 
Theories of higher order perception hold that learning and experience contribute to the 
representational content of perception. Tim Crane explains that this view “entails that a 
scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it 
but the second won’t. The claim is not, of course, that the child’s experience is ‘empty’; 
but that, unlike the scientist, it does not see the tube as a cathode ray tube” (Crane 1992, 
p.136). On this view it can be said that the scientist’s ‘higher-order’ perception of the 
tube is as a cathode ray tube. On my view an individual token of an emotion type can 
have a causal effect on higher-order perception – an emotion can cause one to (higher-
order) perceive X as Y, in much the same way as the scientist perceives the tube as a 
cathode ray tube.  
 
I argued, in Chapter 3, that the intentional objects of emotion are perceptual objects. On 
the basis of that argument, I claimed that the intentionality of emotion is partly 
determined by perception. From there I concluded that emotion is partly perceptual. In 
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the course of my argument I used the example of feeling hurt about being snubbed by a 
friend who fails to acknowledge me. I argued that my feeling hurt is determined in part 
by my friend’s failure to acknowledge me. I said that we fall foul of an act-object 
ambiguity when we conflate the object of my hurt (my friend’s failure to acknowledge 
me) with my act of evaluation of that object (i.e. as a snub). I highlighted the mistake in 
this potential ambiguity by pointing out that my evaluation of ‘my friend’s failure to 
acknowledge me’ as ‘a snub’ can be mistaken (she may simply not have seen me). Thus 
separating the object of an emotion from one’s evaluation of that object is important if 
we are accurately to understand the constituent parts of emotion. In the dialectic to 
follow, I take this specific example a step further in order to demonstrate how my 
feeling hurt in this instance can causally affect my higher-order perception of my friend. 
On my view, my feeling hurt by my friend’s failure to acknowledge me can cause me to 
(higher-order) perceive her as hurtful; i.e. as a person who has the property of being 
capable of deliberately inflicting emotional pain or distress on another.  
 
An early objection may be raised here. A challenger may argue that it may be that my 
feeling hurt has a causal effect on my beliefs rather than on my higher-order 
perceptions. For instance, it may be that my feeling hurt causes me to form the belief 
that my friend has acted in a hurtful way, and I may conclude from this belief that she is 
in fact hurtful. But if that’s the case then my categorisation of this belief as a higher-
order perception is a mistake.  
 
I am not convinced by the objection because my perception of my friend as hurtful may, 
in fact, run counter to my beliefs. My background knowledge may be such that I believe 
that she is tactful and kind. Indeed, my seeing her in that moment as hurtful may result 
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in some internal dissonance, where my previous beliefs conflict with my current 
perceptual experience of seeing her as hurtful. My seeing her as hurtful in this instance 
seems to have perceptual rather than cognitive grounds; i.e. my perception of her failure 
to acknowledge me.  
 
But my response to the objection raises a separate potential challenge. It may be argued 
that my perception of my friend’s failure to acknowledge me is sufficient for my 
(higher-order) perception of her as hurtful. After all, a person who ignores a friend in 
public seems to be a person who is capable of deliberately inflicting emotional pain. If a 
person’s actions are hurtful then is seems plausible that that person can be (higher-
order) perceived as hurtful, whether or not anyone is actually hurt by their actions. And 
even if it turns out that the action was not deliberately hurtful (if in fact I was mistaken 
to feel hurt), there would still be no reason to believe that my emotion played a causal 
role in my higher-order perception, because perception too can be mistaken. If my 
(higher-order) perception of my friend as hurtful can be explained by her action, even 
when that higher-order perception is mistaken, then my feeling hurt need play no causal 
role in that higher-order perception. If this challenge is correct then my claim that 
emotion can causally effect higher-order perception is seriously undermined.  
 
As reasonable as the objection sounds, it doesn’t seem entirely plausible to me that my 
feeling hurt is epiphenomenal in my (higher-order) perception of my friend as hurtful. 
Consider that my feeling hurt is a token of rejection (metaphorically, one feels stung by 
rejection, and the sting of rejection is painful, it hurts). When we feel rejected, one way 
of reducing the pain of that hurt is by rejecting the rejecter. In order to reject the rejecter 
we must see the rejecter in a negative light, so to speak.  
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Consider that when we feel rejected we look for reasons for that rejection. After all, as 
rational agents we do things for reasons, and so we have an expectation that others, 
similarly, do things for reasons. If someone rejects me there seems be two possible 
reasons available – either I’m rejected because of something to do with me (some flaw 
of mine, previously unknown to me, which explains), or I’m rejected because of 
something to do with the rejecter (some flaw in her, previously unknown to me, which 
explains her rejection). In other words, either I’m to blame or she is. Psychologically, 
it’s less painful if the latter is true and the former is false. If the flaw is mine, if I’m to 
blame for her rejection, the pain of that rejection won’t be reduced. If, on the other 
hand, I can reject the rejecter then the hurt I feel can be ameliorated (the “I never liked 
her in the first place” defence). In order to reject the rejecter I must see her as flawed; as 
someone, for instance, who is capable of deliberately inflicting emotional pain or 
distress on another. When I (higher-order) perceive the rejecter as hurtful, I can in turn 
reject her, and the pain of my own rejection is reduced. 
 
When we feel pain of any kind, physical or emotional, we intuitively seek to reduce it. 
The sting of rejection can be particularly painful. One means of reducing that pain is to 
reject the rejecter. One way of rejecting the rejecter is to see them as flawed. On my 
view my feeling hurt can cause me to (higher-order) perceive my friend as hurtful in 
order to reduce my feelings of hurt. As such, therefore, my feeling hurt plays a causal 
role in my (higher-order) perception of my friend as hurtful. If that’s true, and it 
plausibly is, then an individual token of an emotion type can causally affect perception.   
 
 
	   187	  
 
Chapter	  Conclusion:	  
 
I have argued that emotion causally affects perception  
 
At the level of the emotional faculty, emotion plays a causal role in perceptual 
selectivity. Emotion-relevant information has biochemical correlates which may act to 
prioritise the information for perceptual processing. If that’s the case then the 
biochemical correlates of emotion directly affect perceptual selectivity. As emotion 
causally affects perceptual selectivity, and as perceptual selectivity is a perceptual 
process, then emotion causally affects perception.  
 
At the level of the individual emotion, emotion can have a causal effect on higher-order 
perception. When one feels hurt by rejection, one seeks to reduce the pain of that 
emotion. One can reduce the pain of rejection by rejecting the rejecter. One means of 
rejecting the rejecter is to see them in a negative light, to see them as flawed. So by 
changing one’s higher-order perception of the rejecter, one can reduce the pain of one’s 
rejection. Thus a token of rejection can causally result in one’s higher-order perception 
of the rejecter. A token of an emotion type can causally affect perception.  
 
 
In this chapter I have argued that emotion causally affects perception. In the previous 
chapters I argued that emotion also has a causal effect (Ch.4) on cognition, and (Ch.5) 
on how one feels. Thus, I have argued that emotion causally affects its cognitive, feeling 
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and perceptual mereological parts. This means that emotion demonstrates downward 
causation.  
 
I now go on to the wrap-up to Part II, where I will show that the arguments and the 
evidence I have presented in this thesis lead to the conclusion that emotion is an 
ontologically emergent sui generis faculty.     
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Thesis	  Conclusion:	  
 
In the introduction to this thesis I explained that there are two individually necessary, 
and jointly sufficient, conditions which emotion must meet if it is to be considered 
ontologically emergent. These are: 
1. Emotion must have mereological parts to which it cannot be reduced. 
2. Emotion must demonstrate downward causation. 
 
I argued, in Part I, that emotion has cognitive, feeling, and perceptual mereological parts 
to which it cannot be reduced. The evaluations of emotion are complex, and necessarily 
require cognition. These evaluations are determined, in part, by subjective factors. The 
type of emotion an individual experiences, as well as the intensity of their emotional 
response, will be determined by cognition. Thus emotion is partly cognitive. But 
emotion is valenced and cognition is not, so cognition cannot account for at least one 
property of emotion. Hence emotion is partly cognitive, but it cannot be reduced to its 
cognitive parts.  
 
The phenomenal properties of emotion that cannot be explained by cognition are 
determined by bodily feelings. When emotion is elicited, a cascade of biochemical 
events unfolds within the body, changing it at a cellular level. These changes partly 
determine what it’s like to have an emotion. Emotion, therefore, is partly constituted by 
feelings. But emotion is open to reason and feelings are not, so emotion has at least one 
property not held by feelings. Hence emotion is partly constituted by feelings, but it 
cannot be reduced to its feeling parts.  
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Finally, the intentionality of emotion is partly determined by perception. We experience 
emotion in response to objects and events in the world, and the intentional objects of 
emotion are perceptual objects. Thus emotion is partly perceptual. But emotions have 
second-orders and perceptions do not, so perception cannot account for at least one 
property of emotion. Hence emotion is partly perceptual, but it cannot be reduced to its 
perceptual parts.  
 
On the basis of these arguments, it can be said that emotion meets the first necessary 
condition for ontological emergence: 
 
1. Emotion has cognitive, feeling, and perceptual parts to which it cannot be 
reduced.  
 
 
In the conclusion to Part I, I said that my claim that emotion has cognitive and 
perceptual parts can be understood as a claim that emotional abilities draw on both 
cognitive and perceptual abilities. Cognitive and perceptual abilities are otherwise 
characterised ‘faculties’. As emotion draws on cognitive and perceptual faculties, I 
proposed that emotion be characterised as a faculty. On my view, in addition to our 
cognitive and perceptual facilities, human beings also possess the faculty of emotion, 
which blends together thoughts, feelings and perceptions.  
 
In Part II I argued that emotion has a causal effect on its mereological parts. At the leve 
of the emotional faculty, emotion has an effect on decision making, on cognitive bias, 
and on self-deception. At the level of the individual emotion, a token of an emotion type 
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can be a reason for action. Thus, emotion has a causal effect on cognition. Emotion also 
causally affects feelings. At the level of the emotional faculty, emotion has a causal 
effect on the character of one’s life in terms of its happiness or unhappiness. And an 
individual token of an emotion type can causally affect how one feels about, or towards, 
oneself. Thus emotion has a causal effect on feelings. And finally, emotion has a causal 
effect on perception. At the level of the faculty emotion causally affects perceptual 
selectivity. And an individual token of an emotion type can have a causal effect on 
higher-order perception. Thus emotion has a causal effect on perception. Putting these 
effects together, emotion can be said to have a causal effect on its cognitive, feeling and 
perceptual constituent parts. When a complex system has a causal effect on its 
mereological parts, this effect is otherwise known as downward causation. Thus 
emotion meets the second necessary condition for ontological emergence: 
 
2. Emotion demonstrates downward causation. 
 
 
The faculty of emotion meets the individually necessary, and jointly sufficient, 
conditions for ontological emergence. It has mereological parts to which it cannot be 
reduced, and it demonstrates downward causation. As an ontologically emergent 
faculty, emotion is different in kind from the cognitive and perceptual faculties on 
which it supervenes. Thus the ontologically emergent faculty of emotion can be said to 
be sui generis. In short: Emotion is an ontologically emergent sui generis faculty.  
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